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Introduction
Game theory is a mathematical theory that studies models of conflict and cooperation between
intelligent and rational decision-makers. Specifically it deals with all real-life situations in which
rational people interact each-other, that is when an individual's single strategy depends on what
other individuals choose to do. In this sense it should not be suprising that economics is the field in
which game theorists develop their main ideas: the narrowness of economic world resources and the
conflicts between countries to get them both create all the necessary ingredients for a game situation.
In literature game theory's birth coincides with the book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
published in 1944 by the mathematician John Von Neumann and the economist Oskar Morgenstern
(see [123]).
In game theory there is a classical distinction between non-cooperative games and cooperative
games. In a non-cooperative game, player's agreements either do not occur or are not binding, even
if pre-play communication between players is possible. In contrast, in cooperative game theory,
player's commitments are binding and enforceable. In non-cooperative game theory the focus is
mainly on individual behavior while in cooperative game the emphasis is on the group of coalitions
of players and on how to divide the gains among coalitions.
This thesis deals both with non-cooperative and cooperative games in order to apply the math-
ematical theory to competitive dynamics arising from economics, particularly quantity competition
in oligopolies and pollution reduction models in IEA (International Environmental Agreements).
In Chapter 3 a new model of game is defined: the Bayesian multicriteria game. In our opinion
this class of game is a very useful tool to model economic situations as Cournot duopoly game in
x Introduction
which firms produce two different goods and a firm may have different production costs according
to a given probability distribution. The new idea is to think that a firm can produce two (or more)
kind of products. For example firms produce two types of mineral water: without bubbles and with
bubbles or we can consider the diamond market which is tipically divided in two lines of produc-
tion: one covering the luxury market and the other for an industrial use. This leads to optimize the
different profits at the same time. On the other side it is naturally imagine that each firm profit
can be affected by uncertainty: for example, the cost could be different depending on the used
technology. We extend the definition of Bayesian game when the players have many objectives to
optimize as defined by Shapley in [102] and investigate the existence of strong and weak Bayesian
Pareto equilibria ([30] and [31]). In the special case of potential games ([74]) it is extended the
result obtained in [94] to Bayesian multicriteria game. In general it is used a scalarization approach
to obtain an existence theorem for weak and strong Bayesian Pareto equilibria (wBPE and sBPE
for short, respectively). The existence of approximate equilibria for Bayesian games (see ([73]) is
also discussed in the multicriteria case.
There is a field of game theory literature which deals with environmental issues, in particular a
big number of contributions have been published on pollution reduction models in recent years, see
for example [1], [2], [20], [29], [42], [46], [59], [70], [85], [116] and [127]. The typical issues analyzed
in this literature are the incentive schemes of countries which sign a treaty and the stabilization
of International Environmental Agreements. There are two main lines of thought. The first line
of research, exemplified by [9], [10], [11], [22], [23], [35] and [45], sees the problem of designing (or
signing) an IEA from the perspective of coalitions stability, a concept that has its root in the cartel
problem in industrial organization literature. The stability of an IEA is ensured by two tests: the
entry test that intends to see whether it is in interest of an already formed group of signatories to
enlarge the IEA with new members; the exit test that intends to check whether it is in the interest
of a player to remain in the coalition. The general message carried out in this literature is that
only a small number of countries will end up signing an IEA, i.e. only a small stable coalition
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can emerge. This approach is also known as the small coalition approach. The second line of
thought adopts cooperative game theory as the analytical framework. The allocation problem is
solved following a two-step methodology. First, one computes the Pareto-optimal emission levels
and second, one uses a solution concept based on cooperative game theory (Core, Shapley value,
etc) to allocate each player his share of the total optimized cooperative payoff. The remaining issue
is to find the right allocation function that guarantees the stability of the formed solution in the
core sense. Contrary to the first approach, here the stability of the coalition is passive in the sense
that the number of partecipating countries is exogenous. In other words, this approach supposes
the existence of a large number of countries that are predisposed to sign the agreement, from which
the naming grand coalition approach originates. (See for example [26], [27], [28], [41], [44], [51],
[52], [65] and [96]).
Chapter 4 is devoted to illustrate a pollution-reduction model. In this chapter an application of
Bayesian game is shown in the field of environmental economics. Specifically we apply the model of
Bayesian oligopoly games to an environmental game where countries choose their optimal emissions
strategy maximizing their own profits, having to take into account that their aggregate emissions
amount to an environmental cost suffered by all of them. Here the type structure, which is about
marginal gains and production function, is finite and partially ordered. Under some hypothesis
the Bayesian game has a potential function and, in this way, it is simple to compute optimal pure
strategies in classical examples: in this chapter we deal with three different models, whose respective
payoffs were endowed with linear, linear-quadratic and linear-logarithmic cost functions.
The starting points are [5] and [18], which on their turn are related to [52] and [53]. In the above
models, the involved countries aim at maximizing their utility functions by manoeuvring their
emissions strategies, which affect both their revenues and the damage provoked by the polluting
actions. The countries are differentiated based on these two crucial characteristics: marginal gains
and marginal damage, the former expressing competitiveness and intensity of production, the latter
involving the negative impact of the economic activities on the environment. Such double formu-
lation of uncertainty is somewhat similar to the uncertainty in inverse demand functions and cost
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functions analyzed by [39] and [40] in their papers on the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibria
in duopolies. Differently from their approach, here the focus is on monotonicity with respect to the
partial order of the type spaces rather than on existence and uniqueness of equilibria. In the second
part, the environmental aspect is faced with a cooperative point of view. Chapter 6 proposes a
new perspective on cooperative games, by assuming that the involved players are supposed to face
a common damage. The agents can choose to make an agreement and form a coalition or to defect
and face such damage individually.
When such disadvantage is modeled by a dynamic state variable evolving over time, cooperating and
non-cooperating agents solve different optimization problems, but they all must take into account
such state variable, as if it represented an externality in all their respective value functions. Even
if we just consider the cooperative and static aspects of such a game, the externality has a key role
in the worth of coalitions.
The approach relies on a class of cooperative games including an external effect, such that the
characteristic value function is split in two parts: one of them is standard, the other one is affected
by externality.
It is worth describing this new idea of externality, which basically differs from the previous charac-
terizations in literature. Transferable utility games with positive externalities were defined by [99],
which related such externality to an increase in pay-off for the players in a specific coalition when
the remaining coalitions committed to merging. That is, in presence of a partition of the set of
agents and of multiple coalitions, a group of players may enjoy a positive spillover originating from
a merger of external coalitions rather than from a strategic choice.
On the other hand, the role of externality is played, and its amount is measured, by a different
state variable, not directly depending on the possibly undertaken agreements. Loosely speaking,
externalities arise in the same way as they do in standard dynamic oligopoly models (see [64]).
When we relate this idea to the welfare of a country dealing with an emission reduction strategy, we
stress that the clean share of welfare is always positive, whereas the share including the pollution
effect is negative, then the total welfare must be globally evaluated.
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The tools which allowed us to study economic applications are discussed in the rest of the thesis.
In particular the first part is devoted to non-cooperative games. Chapter 1 shows classical tools of
non-cooperative game theory. More precisely we underline the distinction between finite games and
non-finite games discussing Nash equilibria and approximate Nash equilibria. A section is dedicated
to potential games: in such games, introduced in [83], the incentive of all players to change their
strategy can be expressed using a single global function called the potential function. Section 1.5
deals with Bayesian games. Harsanyi in [58] introduces games with incomplete information. He
proves the existence of Bayesian equilibria for the case when the pure strategy spaces are finite.
Many aspects of Bayesian games have been studied in literature. Some of them regard the existence
of equilibria in these games. Milgrom and Weber in [82] noted that the usual fixed point argument
of Nash in [86] with the standard assumptions is not applicable in proving the existence of Bayesian
equilibrium and hence introduced sufficient conditions for the existence. Balder in [6] and [7]
generalized their result and Radner and Rosenthal in [98] presented sufficient conditions for the
existence of pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium. Kim and Yannelis in [67] provide equilibrium
existence results for Bayesian games with infinitely many agents. Reny in [100] generalizes Athey's
and McAdams results in [4] and [76] respectively, on the existence of monotone pure strategy
equilibria in Bayesian games. Mallozzi, Pusillo and Tijs in [73] consider situations where one
of the players may have an infinite set of pure strategies, one criterion and a finite number of
types and get an existence theorem of approximate equilibria. As for mixed strategies they are
usually regarded as unappealing because they are not only hard to interpret, but also, considered
as too complex for real players to use. Motivated by this view, game-theorists have provided
several purification theorems that describe when mixed strategies can be replaced by equivalent pure
strategies. Several purification results have been obtained for games with a large number of players,
see for example Cartwright and Wooders in [24] and Carmona in [21]. As concerns the economics
literature, Bayesian games play a key role: indeed several types of uncertainty are considered,
and their implications on the provision of public goods are discussed. Gradstein in [54] assumes
that consumers are uncertain about the contribution of other individuals. Under this uncertainty,
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the time dynamics of the private provision of public good is derived. Gradstein et al. in [55] re-
examine Warr's neutrality of the provision of a public good with respect to income distribution
(see [126]) in the context of uncertainty. In the model, uncertainty is about the consumers' income:
each consumer knows her own endowment, but her information regarding the endowments of other
consumers is incomplete. Keenan et al. in [66] examine the impact of increased uncertainty on the
provision of the public good under a non-Nash response and symmetric equilibrium. Here again,
uncertainty is about the response of other contributors to a contribution to the public good. In
[61] the authors consider a public good economy with differential information regarding consumers
income and preferences. The private information of each consumer is given by her information
partition: that is, a consumer cannot distinguish between different states of nature that belong to
the same element in her information partition. In [62] the authors apply the concept of information
advantage in [38] to a model of a public good economy introduced in [61]: they consider a public
good economy where the consumers' state-dependent utilities have a multiplicative structure. Also
as regards Cournot oligopoly in [38] authors study the value of information: in an oligopoly where
the market demand and the linear cost are uncertain, a firm with superior information obtains higher
expected profits than a firm whose information is inferior. Einy et al. in [38] also present an example
of a Cournot duopoly with quadratic costs where superior information is disadvantageous. Also in
[32] and in [68] the authors show that in equilibrium a less informed firm earns higher expected
profits than a more informed firm. Finally, the last section of Chapter 1 is devoted to supermodular
games introduced by Topkis in [109] and very useful to describe, for example, oligopoly situations.
Chapters 2 deals with multicriteria games. In recent years, many authors have studied the game
problem with vector payoffs, for example, see [3] and [14]. Although many concepts have been
suggested to solve multicriteria games, the notion of Pareto equilibrium, introduced by Shapley in
[102], is the most studied concept in game theory. In [125], Voorneveld et al. introduced the new
concept of ideal Nash equilibrium for finite multicriteria games which has the best properties and
Radjef and Fahem in [97] provide an existence theorem for this new solution concept. Patrone,
Pusillo, Tijs in [94] link the concept of multicriteria game with that one of potential game. For
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some applications see for example [31].
Chapter 5, in the second part of thesis, provides the tools of cooperative game theory. In
particular in this chapter TU-games are investigated.
xvi Introduction
Part I
Non Cooperative Approach

Chapter 1
Basic concepts on games and equilibria
The theory of non-cooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situations where
each agent's optimal choice may depend on her forecast of the choices of her opponents. In non-
cooperative games the emphasis is mainly on the individual behavior.
1.1 Finite Games
Let us denote with N = {1, . . . , n} the players' finite set of cardinality n.
Definition 1.1. A non-cooperative game with a finite number n of players is a tuple G =
(N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) where ∀i ∈ N,
• Xi is a non-empty set and represents the pure strategy space of player i;
• ui : X :=
∏
i∈N Xi → R is the utility function of player i.
If we also assume that ∀i ∈ N , Xi is a finite set, we say that G is a finite game, and we denote
with Γfinite the class of finite games.
Notation 1.1. Take i ∈ N , we denote with (xi, x−i) the element belonging to X such that:
• xi ∈ Xi;
• x−i ∈
∏
j∈N\{i}Xj =: X−i.
2 Basic concepts on games and equilibria
Definition 1.2. Let G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a non-cooperative game. Player i′s strategy
x˜i ∈ Xi dominates strategy xi ∈ Xi if
ui (x˜i, x−i) ≥ ui (xi, x−i) ∀xi ∈ Xi, ∀x−i ∈ X−i, (1.1)
with a strict inequality for at least one xi ∈ Xi. A player i′s strategy is dominated if there exists at
least another strategy which dominates it.
Player i′s strategy x˜i ∈ Xi strictly dominates strategy xi ∈ Xi if
ui (x˜i, x−i) > ui (xi, x−i) ∀xi ∈ Xi, ∀x−i ∈ X−i, (1.2)
The most important solution concept for non-cooperative games are Nash equilibria.
Definition 1.3. Let G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a non-cooperative game.
A n-tuple (x˜1, . . . , x˜n) ∈ X is a Nash Equilibrium (NE for short) [Strong Nash Equilibrium
(sNE for short)] for G if ∀i ∈ N we have:
ui (x˜i, x˜−i) ≥ [>]ui (xi, x˜−i) ∀xi ∈ Xi. (1.3)
We denote with NE(G) [sNE(G)] the set of Nash equilibria [strong Nash equilibria] for G.
We can observe that the condition (1.3) is equivalent to say that ∀i ∈ N we have:
ui (x˜i, x˜−i) ≥ sup
xi∈Xi
ui (xi, x˜−i) . (1.4)
Nash equilibria are characterized as fixed points of particular correspondences called best re-
sponse correspondences.
In general given two sets X,Y a correspondence from X to Y is a map associating to each
element of X a subset of Y.
Definition 1.4. Let X,Y be topological spaces and F : X ⇒ Y a correspondence. We say that:
• F is upper hemicontinuous (u.h.c. for short) in x ∈ X if for any open neighbourhood V of
F (x), there exists a neighbourhood U of x such that F (x′) ⊆ V ∀x′ ∈ U ;
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• F is lower hemicontinuous (l.s.c. for short) in x ∈ X if ∀y ∈ F (x) and for any open
neighbourhood V of y in Y, there exists a neighbourhood U of x in X such that F (x′)∩ V 6= ∅
∀x′ ∈ U ;
• F is upper hemicontinuous in X if it is upper hemicontinuous ∀x ∈ X;
• F is lower hemicontinuous in X if it is lower hemicontinuous ∀x ∈ X;
• F is continuous in x ∈ X if it is upper hemicontinuous and lower hemicontinuous in x ∈ X;
• F is continuous in X if it is upper hemicontinuous and lower hemicontinuous in X.
Recall that, given a correspondence F : X ⇒ Y, we say that k ∈ X is a fixed point for F if
k ∈ F (k).
For further explanations see [69].
Definition 1.5. Let G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a non-cooperative game. We define for all
i ∈ N the correspondence Ri : X−i ⇒ Xi where
Ri (x˜−i) = arg max
xi∈Xi
ui (xi, x˜−i) = {x˜i ∈ Xi : ui (x˜i, x˜−i) ≥ ui (xi, x˜−i) ∀xi ∈ Xi} ,
that is the player i′s best reply when the other players play x˜−i.
Let us call
R : X ⇒ X
the correspondence such that
R (x) = (R1 (x−1) , . . . , Rn (x−n)) , ∀x ∈ X.
Then R is said best reply for Nash equilibria of G.
The following theorem links fixed points and Nash equilibria.
Theorem 1.1. Let G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a non - cooperative game, and x˜ ∈ X a
strategy profile. Then
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• x˜ ∈ NE(G) iff x˜ ∈ R (x˜) .
Proof. It follows from Definitions 1.3 and 1.5.
Now let us consider the following example.
Example 1.1. Let us consider the game G = (N,X1, X2, u1, u2) ∈ Γfinite with two players and
payoffs' matrix given by Table1.1 in which X1 = X2 = {T,B} are the finite strategy spaces of player
I and II respectively. The utility functions u1, u2 : X1×X2 −→ R of player I and II respectively are
defined in the following way:
u1 (T, T ) = 2 u1 (T,B) = 0 u1 (B, T ) = 4 u1 (B,B) = 1;
u2 (T, T ) = 2 u2 (T,B) = 4 u2 (B, T ) = 0 u2 (B,B) = 1.
Table 1.1: Prisoner's dilemma
I \ II T B
T 2 2 0 4
B 4 0 1 1
We have that NE(G) = {(B,B)}.
In the Example 1.1 we have seen that there exists a unique NE. However the existence and
uniqueness property are not ensured for this kind of solution as the following examples show. In
particular such properties are not ensured for the class Γfinite.
Example 1.2. Let us consider, as in the previous example, the game
G = (N,X1, X2, u1, u2) ∈ Γfinite with two players and payoffs' matrix given by Table1.2
Table 1.2: Matching Pennies
I \ II P D
P 1 -1 -1 1
D -1 1 1 -1
Here there are not Nash equilibria.
1.1 Finite Games 5
Example 1.3. Let us consider, as in the previous example, the game
G = (N,X1, X2, u1, u2) ∈ Γfinite with two players and payoffs' matrix given by Table1.3
Table 1.3: Battle of the sexes
I \ II T B
T 3 1 0 0
B 0 0 1 3
We have that NE(G) = {(T, T ) , (B,B)} .
To get a result that ensures the existence of at least a NE we have to consider the mixed
extensions of finite games.
Definition 1.6. Take G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) ∈ Γfinite. We define mixed extension of
G the game G˜ = (N,∆(X1), . . . ,∆(Xn), u˜1, . . . , u˜n) , where for all i ∈ N we have:
• ∆ (Xi) =
{
pi ∈ R|Xi| : pij ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , | Xi |,
∑|Xi|
j=1 pij = 1
}
that is the probability space
on Xi;
• u˜i : ∆ (X) :=
∏
i∈N ∆ (Xi) −→ R defined in the following way:
u˜i(p) =
|X1|∑
k1=1
· · ·
|Xi|∑
j=1
· · ·
|Xn|∑
kn=1
p1k1 · · · pij · · · pnknui
(
x1k1 , . . . , xij , . . . , xnkn
)
,
where p ∈ ∆ (X) .
We denote with Γmixed the class of mixed extension of finite game.
Nash equilibria and best replies for mixed extensions of a finite game are defined in a similar
way.
Let us consider the following results.
Definition 1.7. Let X,Y be subsets of Rn and F : X ⇒ Y a correspondence. We say that F has
a closed graph if the set {(x, y) ∈ X × Y : y ∈ F (x)} is a closet subset of X × Y.
6 Basic concepts on games and equilibria
Theorem 1.2. Let K be a compact, convex and non-empty subset of Rn and F : K ⇒ K a
corrispondence with closed graph and where F (K) is a non-empty and convex set. Then there is a
x ∈ K such that x ∈ F (x).
Proof. See [69].
Theorem 1.3. Let S, T be metric spaces and f : S × T −→ R a continuous function. Then the
correspondence M : S ⇒ T such that
M(s) = arg max
t∈T
f (s, t)
has closed graph.
Proof. See [69].
Let us consider the following definition:
Definition 1.8. Let X ⊆ Rn be a convex set. A function f : X −→ R is said quasi concave if
∀t ∈ R the set {x ∈ X : f(x) ≥ t} is convex.
Theorem 1.4. Take G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) ∈ Γfinite then the mixed extension of G, G˜
has a NE .
Proof. For every i ∈ N the set Ri (p˜−i) is non-empty since u˜i is continuous and ∆ (Xi) is compact,
and it is convex since u˜i is quasi-concave on ∆ (Xi) ; R is upper hemicontinuous (that is equivalent
to have closed graph since R is compact-valued), since each u˜i is continuous. Thus by Theorem 1.2
R has a fixed point.
Let us calculate Nash equilibria in mixed strategies of Example 1.2.
Example 1.4. Let us consider the mixed extension G˜ = (N,∆ (X1) ,∆ (X2) , u˜1, u˜2) in Example
1.2.
We can identify the mixed-strategy space of player I and II, ∆ (X1) ,∆ (X2) respectively as the
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interval [0, 1]. Let us call p = (p, 1− p) the mixed-strategy of player I and q = (q, 1− q) the mixed-
strategy of player II. The utility functions in mixed-strategy u˜1, u˜2 : ∆ (X1) × ∆ (X2) −→ R for
player I and II respectively are defined in the following way:
u˜1
(
p, q
)
= pq − p (1− q)− q (1− p) + (1− p) (1− q) ,
u˜2
(
p, q
)
= −pq + p (1− q) + q (1− p)− (1− p) (1− q) .
Moreover
RI
(
q
)
= argmaxp∈[0,1] pq − p (1− q)− q (1− p) + (1− p) (1− q)
= argmaxp∈[0,1] p (4q − 2) + 1− 2q.
Then
RI
(
q
)
=

{1} if q > 12
{0} if q < 12
[0, 1] if q = 12
Similarly
RII
(
p
)
=

{0} if p > 12
{1} if p < 12
[0, 1] if p = 12
Then NE
(
G˜
)
=
{(
1
2 ,
1
2
)}
.
We can note that Theorem 1.4 is only an existence-theorem and does not ensure the uniqueness
as the following example shows.
Example 1.5. Let us consider the mixed extension G˜ = (N,∆ (X1) ,∆ (X2) , u˜1, u˜2) in Example
1.3.
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We can identify the mixed-strategy space of player I and II, ∆ (X1) ,∆ (X2) respectively as the
interval [0, 1]. Let us call p = (p, 1− p) the mixed-strategy of player I and q = (q, 1− q) the mixed-
strategy of player II. The utility functions in mixed-strategy u˜1, u˜2 : ∆ (X1) × ∆ (X2) −→ R for
player I and II respectively are defined in the following way:
u˜1
(
p, q
)
= 3pq + (1− p) (1− q) ,
u˜2
(
p, q
)
= pq + 3 (1− p) (1− q) .
Moreover
RI
(
q
)
= argmaxp∈[0,1] 3pq + (1− p) (1− q)
= argmaxp∈[0,1] p (4q − 1) + 1− q.
Then
RI
(
q
)
=

{1} if q > 14
{0} if q < 14
[0, 1] if q = 14
Similarly
RII
(
p
)
=

{1} if p > 34
{0} ifp < 34
[0, 1] if p = 34
In Figure1.1 the continuous line describes the graph of RI
(
q
)
, while the dotted line describes the
graph of RII
(
p
)
. The circles represent the Nash equilibria. Then NE
(
G˜
)
=
{
(0, 0) ,
(
3
4 ,
1
4
)
, (1, 1)
}
We can note that the equilibria (0, 0) , (1, 1) correspond to pure-equilibria (T, T ) , (B,B) respectively.
The last remark of Example 1.5 is true for all game G ∈ Γfinite but the viceversa does not hold
as we can see from Example 1.5.
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Figure 1.1: Nash Equilibria
1.2 Non-Finite Games
A non-cooperative game with non-finite strategy-spaces is called non-finite game. In particular
the mixed-extention of a finite game is a non-finite game. In this sense we have a corollary of
Theorem 1.4 for non-finite game in general.
Corollary 1.1. A non-cooperative game G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) has a NE if for each
player i :
• the strategy set Xi is a non-empty, compact and convex subset of an Euclidean space;
• the payoff function ui is continuous and quasi-concave in xi.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 1.4.
1.2.1 Cournot-NE
A solution very similar to NE was first used by Cournot as early as 1838 in the framework of
duopoly model. This model is considered rightly as one of the major classic examples of applied
game theory in economics. In this model, the firms are supposed to choose simultaneously their
10 Basic concepts on games and equilibria
volume of output. See [108].
Two firms produce and sell a homogeneous good. Let us call q1 and q2 the quantities produced
by firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. To simplify matters, assume that there are not fixed costs and
that marginal costs are constant and equal to c, so that the total cost is:
Ci = cqi.
Firms face an inverse demand function given by:
P = max {a−Q, 0} ,
where Q = q1 + q2, P is the price of the good and a is a positive constant and, in generally, it is
assumed to be the reservation price of the homogeneous good. In order to avoid a corner solution
assume that a > c.
Firms are supposed to choose simultaneously the quantities q1 and q2. In this model those variable
are thus the players' strategies. The strategy sets of the player are identical and given by:
X1 = X2 = [0, a− c] .
The players' payoff functions are here the profit functions of the firms:
u1 (q1, q2) = P (q1, q2) q1 − cq1
u2 (q1, q2) = P (q1, q2) q2 − cq2.
Or,more generally, after a clear change of notations:
ui(qi, qj) =

[a− (qi + qj)− c] qi if 0 ≤ qi ≤ a− c− qj
0 if 2− c− qj ≤ qi ≤ a− c.
(1.5)
If
(
q∗i , q
∗
j
)
is a NE of this game, then ∀i ∈ N :
ui
(
q∗i , q
∗
j
) ≥ ui (qi, q∗j ) ,
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for all qi ∈ Xi. Then for each player i, q∗i must be a solution of:
max
qi
ui = [a− (qi + qj)− c] qi.
It is easy to check that, by Corollary 1.1, in this game there always exists at least a NE.
With the assumption that q∗i < a− c, the first-order conditions of this optimization problem are
necessary and sufficient:
∂ui
∂qi
= 0, i = 1, 2,
which gives:
q∗i =
(
a− q∗j − c
)
2
, i = 1, 2.
Solving this pair of equations leads finally to the outcome of the game:
q∗1 = q
∗
2 =
a− c
3
.
The Cournot duopoly model can be extended to the case in which there are many firms (n > 2):
in this case we speak of Cournot oligopoly. In general the early literature on Cournot oligopoly
has been concerned with three main issues: whether the model is quasi-competitive, i. e., industry
output rises and price falls with additional firms (see for example [13], [49] and [78]); whether the
model converges to perfect competition with an infinite number of firms (see [25], [49], [60], [78],
[103] and [119]). The third issue concerning the question whether the equilibrium solution itself is
dynamically stable (see [56], [89] and [105]).
This model has many variants in which cost structures, inverse demand and value of information
change. For example in [12] authors consider a duopoly model with quadratic cost functions. They
show existence and uniqueness of affine equilibrium strategies and that, in equilibrium, expected
profits of firm i increase with the precision of its information and decrease with the precision of
the rival's information. Novshek and Sonnenschein in [88] consider a duopoly model with constant
costs and examine the incentives for the firms to acquire and release private information. Clarke
in [33] considers an n-firm oligopoly model and shows that there is never a mutual incentive for all
firms in the industry to share information unless they may cooperate on strategy once information
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has been shared.
Vives in [120] observed that more information can be undesirable in the setting of Cournot oligopoly.
More recently papers about the value of information in this framework are [39] and [68].
1.3 Approximate Nash Equilibria
In this section we deal with a different concept solution.
We consider the following definition introduced by Tijs in [106].
Definition 1.9. Let G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a non-cooperative game and  > 0. Then
(x˜1, . . . , x˜n) ∈ X is an approximate Nash equilibrium (-NE for short) for G if for each i ∈ N
we have:
ui (x˜i, x˜−i) ≥ ui (xi, x˜−i)−  ∀xi ∈ Xi. (1.6)
We denote with −NE(G) the set of approximate Nash equilibria of G.
Obviously for  = 0 the set of approximate Nash equilibria is equal to the set of Nash equilibria.
The condition (1.6) means that for each i ∈ N we have:
ui (x˜i, x˜−i) ≥ sup
xi∈Xi
ui (xi, x˜−i)− . (1.7)
Moreover if 1 < 2 then 1 −NE(G) ⊆ 2 −NE(G) for each game G.
Example 1.6. Let us consider G = (N,X1, X2, u1, u2) with X1 = X2 = R and u1 (x1, x2) =
−u2 (x1, x2) = x22 − x21. By condition 1.7 we have that, by fixing  > 0, the pair (x˜1, x˜2) ∈ R2 is a
-NE if
x˜22 − x˜21 ≥ sup
x1∈R
u1 (x1, x˜2)−  = sup
x1∈R
(
x˜22 − x21
)− 
= x˜22 − ,
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and
x˜21 − x˜22 ≥ sup
x2∈R
u2 (x˜1, x2)−  = sup
x2∈R
(
x˜21 − x22
)− 
= x˜21 − .
That is if (x˜1, x˜2) ∈ [−
√
,
√
]× [−√,√] .
−NE (G) is the square with center (0, 0) and side 2√. In particular NE(G) = {(0, 0)} .
Example 1.7. Let G = (N,X1, X2, u1, u2) be a non-cooperative game with X1 = X2 = R and
u1 (x1, x2) = −u2 (x1, x2) = x1x2. We have that:
sup
x1∈R
u1 (x1, x˜2)−  = sup
x1∈R
x˜2x1 − 
< +∞⇔ x˜2 = 0,
and
sup
x2∈R
u2 (x˜1, x2)−  = sup
x2∈R
−x˜1x2 − 
< +∞⇔ x˜1 = 0.
So the unique −NE is the pair (x˜1, x˜2) = {(0, 0)} . In this case −NE(G) = NE(G).
Next example shows that for some values of  the existence of approximate Nash equilibria is
not ensured.
Example 1.8. Let us consider G = (N,X1, X2, u1, u2) a non-cooperative game with X1 = X2 =
{−1, 1} and u1 (x1, x2) = −u2 (x1, x2) = x1x2, (see 1.2). By condition (1.7) we have that, by fixing
 > 0, the pair (x˜1, x˜2) ∈ {−1, 1} × {−1, 1} is a -NE if:
x˜1x˜2 ≥ max
x1∈{−1,1}
u1 (x1, x˜2)− 
= max
x1∈{−1,1}
x˜2x1 −  = 1− ,
and
−x˜1x˜2 ≥ max
x2∈{−1,1}
u2 (x˜1, x2)− 
= max
x2∈{−1,1}
−x˜1x2 −  = 1− .
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then the pair (x˜1, x˜2) ∈ {−1, 1} × {−1, 1} is a -NE iff  ≥ 2. So if  < 2, there are not
approximate Nash equilibria and, in particular NE(G) = ∅.
From these examples we have seen that, as for Nash equilibria, neither the existence (see Example
1.8) nor the uniqueness (see Example 1.6) of approximate Nash equilibria is guaranteed. Also in
this case there are existence theorems. We quickly show a result due to Tijs (see [106]), but many
other papers have been written about this topic (see for example [16], [104]).
Theorem 1.5. Take G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) ∈ Γfinite such that for each player i, ui is an
upper bounded function on X =
∏
i∈N Xi, then for each  > 0, the mixed extension of G, G˜ has
−NE.
Proof. See [106].
1.4 Potential Games
Potential games were introduced by Monderer and Shapley in [83] and studied for example in
[124]. A game is said a potential game if the incentive of all players to change their strategy can
be expressed using a single global function called the potential function. This potential function
provides the necessary information for the computation of the pure Nash equilibria. Thus a potential
function is an economical way to summarize the information concerning pure Nash equilibria into
a single function. Moreover, every finite game with a potential function has an equilibrium in pure
strategies: since the strategy space is finite, the potential function achieves its maximum at a certain
strategy profile.
Definition 1.10. Let G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a non-cooperative game. We say that G
is a potential game if there is a function (called potential function) Π : X :=
∏
i∈N Xi −→ R such
that for each i ∈ N, xi, yi ∈ Xi, x−i ∈ X−i we have:
ui (xi, x−i)− ui (yi, x−i) = Π (xi, x−i)−Π (yi, x−i) .
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Table 1.4: A potential function
T B
T 2 4
B 4 5
Example 1.9. Let us consider the Prisoner's dilemma game (see Example 1.1). It is a potential
game, where a potential function Π is given in Table1.4.
From Definition 1.10 it follows that a potential function is not unique: if Π is a potential function
for a game G also Π + c, with c ∈ R, is a potential function for G. Then all potential functions of
the Prisoner's dilemma game are Πk, with k ∈ R, given by Table1.5.
Table 1.5: All potential functions
T B
T 2+k 4+k
B 4+k 5+k
Interesting classes of potential games are the coordination games and the dummy games.
Definition 1.11. Let G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a non-cooperative game. We say that G
is a coordination game if ui = uj ∀i, j = 1, . . . , n. That is the utility functions are equal for each
player.
Definition 1.12. Let G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a non-cooperative game. We say that G
is a dummy game if ui (xi, x−i) = ui (yi, x−i) ∀i = 1, . . . , n, xi, yi ∈ Xi, x−i ∈ X−i. That is
player i′s strategy choice does not affect her payoff.
A potential function for a coordination game G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) is Π = u1 while a
potential function for a dummy game is the null function.
Not all finite games admit a potential function as we can conclude from:
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Theorem 1.6. Take G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) ∈ Γfinite a potential game, Π a potential
function for G, and G1 = (N,X1, . . . , Xn,Π, . . . ,Π) a coordination game. Then
i) NE(G) = NE(G1);
ii) G has a NE.
Proof. See [107].
By Theorem 1.6 the game in the Example 1.2 is not a potential game.
For non-finite games we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1.7. Let G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a potential game and Π an upper bounded
potential function for G. Then ∀ > 0, G has −NE.
Proof. See [83].
The next results, dealing with differentiable games (i.e. such that their utility functions are
differentiable) are well-known.
Lemma 1.1. Let G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a game in which for each player i, Xi are
intervals of real numbers. Suppose the utility functions ui are continuously differentiable ∀i ∈ N,
and let Π : X −→ R. Then Π is a potential function for G iff Π is continuously differentiable, and
∂ui
∂xi
=
∂Π
∂xi
, ∀i ∈ N.
Theorem 1.8. Let G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a game in which for each player i, Xi
are intervals of real numbers. Suppose the utility functions ui are twice continuously differentiable
∀i ∈ N. Then G is a potential game iff
∂2ui
∂xi∂xj
=
∂2uj
∂xi∂xj
, ∀i, j ∈ N. (1.8)
Moreover, if the utility functions satisfy (1.8) and z is an arbitrary (but fixed) strategy profile in X,
then a potential function for G is given by
Π (x) =
∑
i∈N
∫ 1
0
∂ui
∂xi
(y (t)) (yi)
′ (t) dt, (1.9)
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where y : [0, 1] −→ X is a piecewise continuously differentiable path in X that connects z to x.
Example 1.10. Let Gc = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a Cournot oligopoly game in which there
is a linear inverse demand function P = max {a−Q, 0} , where Q = ∑ni=1 qi, and cost functions
c1, . . . , cn with continuous derivatives. We take Xi = [0,+∞) and
ui (q1, . . . , qn) = P (q1, . . . , qn) qi − ci (qi) , ∀i ∈ N.
It is simple to prove that Gc is a potential game with potential function
Π (q1, . . . , qn) = a
n∑
i=1
qi −
n∑
i=1
q2i −
∑
1≤i<j≤n
qiqj −
n∑
i=1
ci (xi) .
1.5 Bayesian Games
We frequently wish to model situations in which some of the parties are not certain of the
characteristics of some of the other parties. The model of a Bayesian game is designed for this
purpose: indeed the case of perfect knowledge of payoffs is a simplifying assumption that may be
a good approximation in some cases. A Bayesian game, or game with incomplete information, is
a game in which, at the first point in time when the players can begin to plan their moves in the
game, some players already have private information about the game that other players do not know.
The initial private information that a player has at the first point in time is called the type of the
player. The type of a player embodies any private information (more precisely, any information that
is not common knowledge to all players) that is relevant to the player's decision making. This may
include, in addition to the player's utility function, her beliefs about other players' utility functions,
her beliefs about what other players believe her beliefs are, and so on.
To define a Bayesian game, see for example [50], we must specify a set of players N and, for each
player i ∈ N, we must specify a set of possible actions Ai, a set of possible types Ti, a probability
function pi and a utility function ui. We let A =
∏
i∈N Ai, T =
∏
i∈N Ti. That is, A is the set of
all possible profiles of actions that the players may use in the game, and T is the set of all possible
profiles of types that the players may have in the game. For each player i, we let T−i denote the set
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of all possible combinations of types for the players other than i. The probability function pi must
be a function from Ti into ∆ (T−i) , the set of probability distributions over T−i. That is, for any
possible type ti ∈ Ti, the probability function must specify a probability distribution pi (·|ti) over
the set T−i, representing what player i would believe about the other players' types if her own type
were ti. Thus, for any t−i ∈ T−i, pi (t−i|ti) denotes the subjective probability that i would assign to
the event that t−i is the actual profile of types for the others players, if her own type were ti.
For any player i ∈ N, the utility function ui in the Bayesian game must be a function from A× T
to R.
These structures together define a Bayesian game G, so we may write
G = (N,A1, . . . , An, T1, . . . , Tn, p1, . . . , pn, u1, . . . , un) .
G is finite iff the sets N,Ai and Ti are finite ∀i ∈ N. When we study such a Bayesian game G, we
assume that each player i knows the entire structure of the game and her own actual type in Ti and
this fact is common knowledge among all the players in N. A strategy for a player i in the Bayesian
game G is defined to be a function from her set of types Ti into her set of action Ai.
We say that beliefs (pi)i∈N in a Bayesian game are consistent iff there is some common prior
distribution over the set of type profile t such that each players' beliefs given her type are just the
conditional probability distribution that can be computed from the prior distribution by Bayes's
formula. That is, beliefs are consistent iff there exists some probability distribution p ∈ ∆ (T ) such
that:
pi (t−i|ti) = p (t−i, ti)
p (ti)
∀i ∈ N. (1.10)
Because we consider in the following consistent beliefs under condition 1.10 we denote
G = (N,A1, . . . , An, T1, . . . , Tn, p, u1, . . . , un) instead of
G = (N,A1, . . . , An, T1, . . . , Tn, p1, . . . , pn, u1, . . . , un) .
A play of such a game proceeds as follows: before the types are announced each player i chooses
a strategy xi ∈ ATii 1. If the type profile is t = (t1, . . . , tn) then player i′s payoff is
1In general, given two sets X and Y, the notation XY indicates the set of functions from Y to X, that is
XY = {f |f : Y −→ X}
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ui (x1(t1), x2(t2), . . . , xn(tn), t1, . . . , tn) .
The a priori expected payoff for player i when the players use strategies x1, . . . , xn respectively
is a function Ui : A
T1
1 × · · · ×ATnn −→ R such that
Ui (x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
t∈T
p(t)ui (x1(t1), x2(t2), . . . , xn(tn), t1, . . . , tn) ,
being p(t) the probability distribution of player i when her type profile is t.
Definition 1.13. Let G = (N,A1, . . . , An, T1, . . . , Tn, p, u1, . . . , un) be a Bayesian game. We say
that a strategy profile x̂ = (x̂1, x̂2, . . . , x̂n) ∈ AT11 ×AT22 ×· · ·×ATnn is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(for short BNE) if ∀i ∈ N, ∀xi ∈ ATii we have
Ui (x̂) ≥ Ui (xi, x̂−i) .
Example 1.11. Let G = (N,A1, A2, T1, T2, p, u1, u2) be a finite Bayesian game where:
• N = {1, 2} ;
• A1 = {a1, b1} , A2 = {a2, b2} ;
• T1 =
{
t11
}
, T2 =
{
t12, t
2
2
}
.
The functions u1, u2 : (A1 ×A2) × (T1 × T2) −→ R are represented by the bimatrices Table 1.6
and Table 1.7.
Table 1.6: u1
1 \ 2.1 a2 b2
a1 1 2 0 1
b1 0 4 1 3
The first one represents the case in which player 2's type is t12, while the second one represents
the case in which player 2's type is t22. We can note that the player 1's payoffs are the same in both
matrices.
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Table 1.7: u2
1 \ 2.2 a2 b2
a1 1 1 0 3
b1 0 2 1 3
We suppose that Nature extracts with probability P ∈ [0, 1] the type t12 (obviously with probability
1− P the type t22). So we have that p
(
t11, t
1
2
)
= P and p
(
t11, t
2
2
)
= 1− P.
Then the values of U1 and U2 are given in the bimatrix Table 1.8, Now we want to compute the
Table 1.8: A priori expected payoff functions
U1\U2 a2 b2
a1 1 P+1 0 3-2P
b1 0 2P+2 1 3
Bayesian Nash equilibria for this game depending on P .
• If P ≥ 23 BNE = {(a1, a2) , (b1, b2)} ;
• If P < 23 BNE = {(b1, b2)} .
Now we introduce the notion of mixed extension of a Bayesian game.
Definition 1.14. Let G = (N,A1, . . . , An, T1, . . . , Tn, p, u1, . . . , un) be a Bayesian game. Then the
mixed extension of G is the Bayesian game G˜ =
(
N, A˜1, . . . , A˜n, T1, . . . , Tn, p, u˜1, . . . , u˜n
)
, where
A˜i is the family of probability measures (on the σ−algebra of all subsets of Ai) with finite support.
Such probability measures are the form µi =
∑s
k=1 pkeak where a1, . . . , as ∈ Ai, pk ≥ 0, for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , s} and ∑sk=1 pk = 1, where
eak (B) =
{
1 if B ⊂ Ai, ak ∈ B
0 if B ⊂ Ai, ak /∈ B
,
Furthermore u˜i (µi, . . . , µn, t) =
∫
ui (a1, . . . , an, t) dµ1 (a1) . . . dµn (an) for all i ∈ N and
(µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ A˜ =
∏
i∈N A˜i.
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1.6 Supermodular Games
The class of supermodular games was introduced by [109] and further studied by [81], [110],
[121] and [122]. Supermodular games are games in which each player's marginal utility of increasing
her strategy rises with increases in her rivals' strategies. In such games the best response correspon-
dences are increasing, so that the players' strategies are strategic complements. When there are
two players, a change in variables allows this framework to also accomodate the case of decreasing
best responses. Supermodular games are particularly well behaved: they have pure-strategy Nash
equilibria. The upper bound of player i′s Nash-equilibrium strategies exists and it is a best response
to the upper bounds of her rivals' sets of Nash-equilibrium strategies, and similarly for the lower
bounds. The simplicity of supermodular games makes convexity and differentiability assumptions
unnecessary, although they are satisfied in many applications, for example in the Cournot duopoly.
Let us recall some definitions about supermodular games.
Definition 1.15. A partially ordered set (POSET) is a set X on which there is a binary
relation  that is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive.
Definition 1.16. Let us consider a partially ordered set X and a subset Y of X.
• If y ∈ X and y  x for each x ∈ Y, then y is a lower bound for Y ;
• If z ∈ X and x  z for each x ∈ Y, then z is an upper bound for Y.
When the set of lower bounds of Y has a greatest element, then this greatest lower bound of Y
is the infimum of Y in X.
When the set of upper bounds of Y has a least element, then this least upper bound of Y is the
supremum of Y in X.
Definition 1.17. • If two elements x1 and x2 of a partially ordered set X have a supremum in
X, it is called the meet of x1 and x2 and it is denoted by x1 ∧ x2;
• If two elements x1 and x2 of a partially ordered set X have a infimum in X, it is called the
join of x1 and x2 and it is denoted by x1 ∨ x2.
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Definition 1.18. A partially ordered set that contains the join and the meet of each pair of its
elements is a lattice. If a subset Y of a lattice X contains the join and the meet (with respect to
X) of each pair of elements of Y, then Y is a sublattice of X.
Remark 1.1. The real line R with the natural ordering ≥ is a lattice with x ∨ y = max {x, y} and
x∧y = min {x, y} ∀x, y ∈ R. Also Rn, (n > 1) with the usual partial order ≥ is a lattice with x∨y =
(x1 ∨ y1, . . . , xn ∨ yn) and x∧ y = (x1 ∧ y1, . . . , xn ∧ yn) , ∀x = (x1, . . . , xn) , y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn.
Any subset of R is a sublattice of R, and a subset X of Rn is a sublattice of Rn if ∀x, y ∈ X we
have that x ∨ y, x ∧ y ∈ X.
Definition 1.19. A supermodular game
G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un)
is a tuple where
• N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players;
• ∀i ∈ N, Xi ⊆ Rm(i) (for some m (i) ∈ N) and Xi 6= ∅ is the strategy space of player i,
X =
∏
i∈N Xi is the cartesian product of the strategy spaces;
• ui : X −→ R is the payoff function of player i;
• ∀i ∈ N, Xi is a sublattice of Rm(i);
• ∀i ∈ N, ui have increasing differences on X, i.e.
∀x = (x1, . . . , xn) , y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ X such that xi ≥ yi, we have
ui (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn)− ui (y1, . . . , yi−1, xi, yi+1, . . . , yn)
≥ ui (x1, . . . , xi−1, yi, xi+1, . . . , xn)− ui (y1, . . . , yi−1, yi, yi+1, . . . , yn) ;
• ∀i ∈ N, ui is supermodular in the i−th coordinate, i.e.
∀x = (x1, . . . , xn) , y = (y1, . . . , yn) , z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ X we have
ui (z1, . . . , zi−1, xi, zi+1, . . . , zn) + ui (z1, . . . , zi−1, yi, zi+1, . . . , zn)
1.6 Supermodular Games 23
≤ ui (z1, . . . , zi−1, xi ∧ yi, zi+1, . . . , zn) + ui (z1, . . . , zi−1, xi ∨ yi, zi+1, . . . , zn) .
Increasing differences point out that an increase in the strategies of player i′s rivals raises the
desirability of playing a high strategy for player i.
We can observe that supermodularity is automatically satisfied if for each i ∈ N, Xi is single-
dimensional. We will need supermodularity in the case of multi-dimensional strategy spaces to
prove that each player's best responses are increasing with her rivals' strategies.
For example the Cournot duopoly defined in Subsection 1.2.1 of Chapter 1 is a supermodular
game.
From [110] we have the following propositions.
Proposition 1.1. Let f : Rn −→ R be a differentiable function on Rn, then f has increasing
differences on Rn iff ∂f∂xi is increasing in xj for each i, j = 1, . . . , n with i 6= j and ∀x = (x1, . . . , xn) .
Proof. See [110].
Proposition 1.2. Let f : Rn −→ R be a twice differentiable function on Rn, then f has increasing
differences on Rn iff ∂
2f
∂xi∂xj
≥ 0 for each i, j = 1, . . . , n with i 6= j and ∀x = (x1, . . . , xn) .
Proof. See [110].
The following existence theorem is due to Topkis in [109].
Theorem 1.9. Let G = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a supermodular game. If, for each i ∈ N, Xi
is compact and ui is upper hemicontinuous in xi for each x−i ∈ X−i, then the set of pure-strategy
Nash equilibria is nonempty and possesses greatest and least equilibrium points.
Proof. See [109].
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Chapter 2
Multicriteria games
Multicriteria (or multiobjective) optimization problems typically have conflicting objectives, and
a gain in one objective is, sometimes, a loss for another. Therefore the definition of optimality is
not obvious as in the one-criterion case. However in many settings, mathematical models involving
more than one objective seem much more adherent to the real problems.
Formally, a multicriteria optimization problem can be formulated as
Optimize f1 (x) , . . . , fr (x) (2.1)
subject to x ∈ D,
where D denotes the feasible set of alternatives and r ∈ N the number of criterion functions
fk : D −→ R, k = 1, . . . , r.
See for example [30], [31], [101] and [124].
In this chapter we study the situation in which there is not only a conflict between criteria,
but there are, also, many optimization problems to solve simultaneously: that is we deal with
multicriteria games.
In recent years, many authors have studied the game problem with vector payoffs, for example,
see [3] and [14]. Although many concepts have been suggested to solve multicriteria games, the
notion of Pareto equilibrium, introduced by Shapley in [102], is the most studied concept in game
theory. In [125], Voorneveld et al. introduced the new concept of ideal Nash equilibrium for finite
multicriteria games which has the best properties and Radjef and Fahem in [97] provide an existence
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theorem for this new solution concept. Patrone, Pusillo, Tijs in [94] link the concept of multicriteria
game with that one of potential game. For some applications see for example [31].
2.1 Weak and Strong Pareto Equilibria
Definition 2.1. A non-cooperative multicriteria game is a tuple
Gm = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) where for each i ∈ N
• N is a finite set and represents the set of players ;
• Xi is a non-empty set and represents the pure-strategy space of player i;
• ui : X :=
∏
i∈N Xi → Rm is the utility function of player i, where m is the number of
objectives.
Let us denote with Γmfinite the class of finite multicriteria games.
Remark 2.1. We recall the partial order definition in Rm. For all a, b ∈ Rm, we say that:
• a = b if ai = bi ∀i = 1, . . . ,m;
• a = b if ai ≥ bi ∀i = 1, . . . ,m;
• a ≥ b if ai ≥ bi ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, and a 6= b;
• a > b if ai > bi ∀i = 1, . . . ,m.
Definition 2.2. Let Gm = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a multicriteria game. Then the strategy
profile x˜ ∈ X is
• a weak Pareto equilibrium for Gm if ∀i ∈ N @xi ∈ Xi such that
ui(xi, x˜−i) > ui(x˜i, x˜−i);
• a strong Pareto equilibrium for Gm if ∀i ∈ N @xi ∈ Xi such that
ui(xi, x˜−i) ≥ ui(x˜i, x˜−i).
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Let us denote with wPE(Gm) and sPE(Gm) weak and strong Pareto equilibria of Gm.
From Definition 2.2 we can note that, in one-criterion case, weak [strong] Pareto equilibria
correspond to NE [sNE] respectively, for the game.
It is clear that a strong Pareto equilibrium is also a weak Pareto equilibrium but the viceversa
does not hold as the following example shows.
Example 2.1. Let us consider the finite bicriteria game G2 = (N,X1, X2, u1, u2) with payoff matrix
given by Table2.1 where X1 = {T,B} , X2 = {L,R} are the strategy spaces of player I and II
respectively. The utility functions u1, u2 : X1×X2 −→ R2 of player I and II respectively are defined
in the following way:
u1(T, L) = (3, 4) u1(T,R) = (4, 3) u1(B,L) = (3, 5) u1(B,R) = (1, 2),
u2(T, L) = (3, 2) u2(T,R) = (2, 3) u2(B,L) = (1, 1) u2(B,R) = (2, 2).
We have that wPE(G) = {(T, L), (T,R)} while sPE(G) = {(T,R)}.Then sPE(G) ⊂ wPE(G).
Table 2.1: Weak Pareto Equilibria
I \ II L R
T (3, 4) (3, 2) (4, 3) (2, 3)
B (3, 5) (1, 1) (1, 2) (2, 2)
Pareto equilibria can be characterized as fixed points of best reply correspondences.
Definition 2.3. Let Gm = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a multicriteria game.
• We define for each i ∈ N wBi : X−i ⇒ Xi where
wBi(x−i) = {xi ∈ Xi | @yi ∈ Xi : ui(yi, x−i) > ui(xi, x−i)} .
Call X :=
∏
i∈N Xi, and define
wB : X ⇒ X
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the correspondence such that
x 7−→
∏
i∈N
wBi(x−i)
that is
wB (x) = (wB1 (x−1) , . . . , wBn (x−n)), ∀x ∈ X;
• We define for each i ∈ N sBi : X−i ⇒ Xi where
sBi(x−i) = {xi ∈ Xi | @yi ∈ Xi : ui(yi, x−i) ≥ ui(xi, x−i)} .
Define
sB : X ⇒ X
the correspondence such that
x 7−→
∏
i∈N
sBi (x−i) ,
that is
sB (x) = (sB1 (x−1) , . . . , sBn (x−n)), ∀x ∈ X.
Then wB and sB are called best reply correspondences for weak and strong Pareto
equilibria in pure strategies, respectively.
The mixed extension of a finite multicriteria game is defined in the same way of the one of
one criterion game (see Definition 1.6) where utility functions are Rm-valued. The class of mixed
extension of a finite multicriteria game is denoted with Γmmixed.
Weak and strong Pareto equilibria of the mixed extension G˜m of a finite multicriteria game Gm
are defined similarly and are denoted with wPE(G˜m) and with sPE(G˜m).
As concern the best reply correspondences for weak and strong Pareto equilibria in mixed strate-
gies we have the following definition.
Definition 2.4. Let G˜m = (N,∆(X1), . . . ,∆(Xn), u˜1, . . . , u˜n) be the mixed extension of a multicri-
teria game.
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• We define for each i ∈ N wBi : ∆(X−i)⇒ ∆(Xi) where
w˜Bi(x−i) = {xi ∈ ∆(Xi) | @yi ∈ ∆(Xi) : u˜i(yi, x−i) > u˜i(xi, x−i)} .
Call ∆(X) :=
∏
i∈N ∆(Xi), and define
w˜B : ∆(X)⇒ ∆(X)
the correspondence such that
x 7−→
∏
i∈N
w˜Bi(x−i),
that is
w˜B (x) = (w˜B1 (x−1) , . . . , w˜Bn (x−n)) ∀x ∈ ∆ (X) ;
• We define for each i ∈ N s˜Bi : ∆(X−i)⇒ ∆(Xi) where
s˜Bi(x−i) = {xi ∈ ∆(Xi) | @yi ∈ ∆(Xi) : u˜i(yi, x−i) ≥ u˜i(xi, x−i)} .
Define
s˜B : ∆(X)⇒ ∆(X)
the correspondence such that
x 7−→
∏
i∈N
s˜Bi(x−i),
that is
s˜B (x) = (s˜B1 (x−1) , . . . , s˜Bn (x−n)) ∀x ∈ ∆ (X) .
Then w˜B and s˜B are called best reply correspondences for weak and strong Pareto
equilibria in mixed strategies, respectively.
Fixed points of w˜B and s˜B are weak and strong Pareto equilibria of G˜m, respectively as stated
by the next theorem.
Theorem 2.1. Let G˜m = (N,∆(X1), . . . ,∆(Xn), u˜1, . . . , u˜n) be the mixed extension of a finite
multicriteria game, and let x¯ ∈ ∆(X) be a strategy profile. Then
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• x˜ ∈ wPE(G˜m) iff x˜ ∈ w˜B(x¯);
• x˜ ∈ sPE(G˜m) iff x˜ ∈ s˜B(x¯).
Proof. It immediately follows from Definition 2.2 and Definition 2.4.
Let us consider the next example taken from [117] (see also [124]).
Example 2.2. Consider a bicriteria game G2 with two players: an ispector (player I) who has to
decide whether or not to inspect a factory (player II) to check if its production is hygienical. Each
player has two strategies and two objectives which can be summarized in Table2.2. Payoff functions
Table 2.2: Strategies and Objectives
Strategies Objectives
Inspector (I) • inspect (I) • minimize inspection costs
• non inspect(NI) • guarantee an acceptable level of hygiene in production
Factory(II) • hygienical (H) • minimize production costs
• non hygienical (NH) • achieve some level of hygienical production
are given below in Table2.3. Here c > 1 denotes the penalty that is imposed if the inspected production
fails to be hygienical.
Table 2.3: Payoffs functions
I \ II H NH
I (−1, 1) (−1, 1) (c− 1, 12) (−c− 1, 1)
NI (0, 1) (−1, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0)
The first coordinate of the payoff to player I denotes the negative costs of inspection, the second
coordinate specifies satisfaction with the hygienical situation. The first coordinate for the factory
depicts extra negative production costs, the second represents the hygiene satisfaction level.
We have that wPE(G) = {(I,H) , (I,NH) , (NI,H)}, while sPE(G) = {(NI,H)} .
As regards Pareto equilibria in mixed strategies, let p ∈ [0, 1] the probability of player I playing I and
let q ∈ [0, 1] the probability of player II playing H. Let u˜1 and u˜2 be the utility functions in mixed
strategies of player I and II respectively. Then we have that
u˜1 (p, q) =
(
pc− p− pqc, 1
2
p− 1
2
pq + q
)
,
u˜2 (p, q) = (−p− pc+ pqc+ pq − q, p− pq + q) .
The best reply correspondence for weak Pareto equilibria in mixed strategies for player I is
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w˜BI (q) = {p¯ ∈ [0, 1] | @p ∈ [0, 1] : u˜1 (p, q) > u˜1 (p¯, q)} .
So we have
w˜BI (q) =

{1} if 0 ≤ q < 1− 1c
[0, 1] if 1− 1c ≤ q ≤ 1
Similarly for player II we have
w˜BII (p) =

{1} if 1c+1 < p < 1
[0, 1] if 0 ≤ p ≤ 1c+1 ∪ p = 1
Figure 2.1: w˜BI (q)
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 represent best reply correspondences for weak Pareto equilibria in mixed
strategies for player I and II respectively.
Then, as we can see in Figure2.3 we have that
wPE(G˜2) =
([
0,
1
1 + c
]
×
[
1− 1
c
, 1
])
∪
((
1
c+ 1
, 1
)
× {1}
)
∪ ({1} × [0, 1]) .
Weak Pareto equilibria in mixed strategies occuring in this model are those in which there is full
inspection (that is p = 1), those in which the factory produces in a hygienical way with probability
q = 1 and those in which the chance upon inspection is small (p ≤ 1c+1), but the production is
neverthless hygienical with high probability (q ≥ 1 − 1c ). This last fact is due to the penalty c > 1
imposed if the checked production is not hygienical. Obviously if c increases the set of weak Pareto
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Figure 2.2: w˜BII (p)
Figure 2.3: wPE(G˜2)
equilibria in mixed strategies shrinks because, from an interpretative point of view, the factory have to
pay a higher penalty if the inspector finds that its production is not hygienical. From a mathematical
point of view it is sufficient to observe that limc→+∞ 1− 1c = 1 and limc→+∞
(
1
c+1
)
= 0.
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Similar computations show
s˜BI (q) =

{1} if 0 ≤ q ≤ 1− 1c
[0, 1] if 1− 1c < q < 1
{0} if q = 1
and
s˜BII (p) =

{1} if 1c+1 ≤ p ≤ 1
[0, 1] if 0 ≤ p < 1c+1
From which we have
sPE
(
G˜2
)
=
(
{0} ×
(
1− 1
c
, 1
])
∪
((
0,
1
c+ 1
)
×
(
1− 1
c
, 1
))
.
In contrast to what happens for Nash equilibria, here it is not true that a Pareto equilibrium in
pure strategy is also a Pareto equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Example 2.3. Let us consider the finite bicriteria game G2 with two players with utility functions
given by the bimatrix in Table2.4.
Table 2.4: Weak Pareto equilibria in pure strategies
I \ II L R
T (2, 0) (4, 0) (2, 0) (-1, -1)
M (0, 2) (0, 4) (0, 2) (-1, -1)
B (0, 0) (0, 1) (0, 0) (-1, -1)
Here player I has 3 pure strategies T , M and B, while player II has two pure strategies L
and R. We can see that wPE (G2) = {(T, L) , (M,L) , (B,L)} . Let us consider the mixed extension
G˜2 = (N,∆(X1),∆(X2), u˜1, u˜2) of the game G2. Previously we can see that the strategy R is strongly
dominated, so player II will assign probability 0 at the strategy R (and so 1 at the strategy L ). Let
p = (p1, p2, p3) where p3 = 1 − p1 − p2 with p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1] = ∆ (X1) such that p1 is the probability
that player I assigns to T , p2 the probability for M and p3 that one for B. By previous observation,
player II has the unique mixed strategy q = (1, 0) . Then if player I chooses T with probability 12 and
34 Multicriteria games
M with probability 12 , we have that
u˜1
((
1
2
,
1
2
, 0
)
, (1, 0)
)
= (1, 1) > (0, 0) = u˜1 ((0, 0, 1) , (1, 0)) ,
and
u˜2
((
1
2
,
1
2
, 0
)
, (1, 0)
)
= (2, 2) > (0, 1) = u˜2 ((0, 0, 1) , (1, 0)) .
We can see that the mixed strategy ((0, 0, 1) , (1, 0)) corresponds to weak Pareto equilibrium in pure
strategy (B,L) . So the mixed strategy ((0, 0, 1) , (1, 0)) is strongly dominated by the mixed strategy((
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0
)
, (1, 0)
)
and so it cannot be a weak Pareto equilibrium for G˜2.
2.2 Scalarization
Generally, there are many efficient points of a multicriteria problem. One of the most analyzed
topics in multicriteria optimization is the scalarization of (2.1), namely how to build a scalar max-
imization problem, which leads one to find all the solutions of (2.1).
The classic scalarization (see [30] and [31]), which is called weight-method, consists in considering
the following scalar maximum problem
max
x∈D
r∑
k=1
µkfk (x) , (2.2)
where µ = (µ1, . . . , µr) ∈ Rr+,
∑r
k=1 µk.
Every solution of (2.2) is a weak Pareto solution of (2.1). Moreover, if, for a fixed weight-vector
µ ≥ 0, (2.2) admits a unique solution, then it is a Pareto solution of (2.1). If µk > 0, ∀k = 1, . . . , r,
then every solution of (2.2) is a strong Pareto solution of (2.1).
In the last part of this section, we are going to show the existence of weak and strong Pareto
equilibria for mixed extensions of a finite multicriteria game. This result is proved through a
particular kind of one criterion game which arises from the multicriteria game assigning non negative
weights to different objectives. See for example [14].
In order to prove an existence theorem for Pareto equilibria we give the definition of scalarized
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game as follows 1.
Definition 2.5. Let Gm = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) ∈ Γmfinite and let λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) where
λi = (λi1, . . . , λim) ∈ ∆m is a weight vector for player i' s objectives ∀i ∈ N. We define the weighted
game
Gλ =
(
N,X1, . . . , Xn, v
λ
1 , . . . , v
λ
n
)
,
where ∀i ∈ N, vλi : X −→ R is defined in the following way:
vλi (x1, . . . , xn) =
m∑
k=1
λikuik (x1, . . . , xn) . (2.3)
Theorem 2.2. Let G˜m = (∆(X1), . . . ,∆(Xn), u˜1, . . . , u˜n) ∈ Γmmixed and we take x˜ ∈ ∆(X). Then
• x˜ ∈ wPE(G˜m) iff for each i ∈ N there exists a λi = (λi1, . . . , λim) ∈ ∆m such that
x˜ ∈ NE(G˜λ);
• x˜ ∈ sPE(G˜m) iff for each i ∈ N there exists a λi = (λi1, . . . , λim) ∈ ∆0m such that
x˜ ∈ NE(G˜λ)
Proof. See [124].
2.3 Relation between Supermodular Multicriteria Games and Po-
tential Multicriteria Games
In this section we want to extend the theory of supermodular games to potential multicriteria
games.
Definition 2.6. A supermodular multicriteria game
Gm = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un)
is a tuple where
• N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players;
1Let us denote with ∆n and with ∆
0
n the following sets: ∆n =
{
x ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
i=1 xi = 1
}
, ∆0n ={
x ∈ Rn++ :
∑n
i=1 xi = 1
}
.
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• ∀i ∈ N, Xi ⊆ Rm(i)(for some m (i) ∈ N) and Xi 6= ∅ is the strategy space of player i,
X =
∏
i∈N Xi is the cartesian product of the strategy spaces;
• ui : X −→ Rm is the payoff function of player i;
• ∀i ∈ N, Xi is a sublattice of Rm(i);
• ∀i ∈ N, ui have increasing differences on X, i.e.
∀x = (x1, . . . , xn) , y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ X such that xi ≥ yi, we have
ui (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn)− ui (y1, . . . , yi−1, xi, yi+1, . . . , yn)
 ui (x1, . . . , xi−1, yi, xi+1, . . . , xn)− ui (y1, . . . , yi−1, yi, yi+1, . . . , yn) ;
• ∀i ∈ N, ui is supermodular in the i−th coordinate, i.e.
∀x = (x1, . . . , xn) , y = (y1, . . . , yn) , z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ X we have
ui (z1, . . . , zi−1, xi, zi+1, . . . , zn) + ui (z1, . . . , zi−1, yi, zi+1, . . . , zn)
 ui (z1, . . . , zi−1, xi ∧ yi, zi+1, . . . , zn) + ui (z1, . . . , zi−1, xi ∨ yi, zi+1, . . . , zn) .
Proposition 2.1. Let f : Rn −→ Rm be a twice differentiable function on Rn, then f has increasing
differences on Rn iff ∂
2f
∂xi∂xj
≥ (0, . . . , 0) , for each i, j = 1, . . . , n with i 6= j.
Proof. It is a straight generalization of a result in [110] to vectorial functions.
The following proposition is a generalization of Lemma 1 in [15].
Proposition 2.2. Let Gm = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) be a potential multicriteria game with
potential function Π. Then ∀i ∈ N there exist functions f−i : X−i :=
∏
j 6=iXj −→ Rm such that
ui (xi, x−i) = Π (xi, x−i) + 2f−i (x−i) ∀xi ∈ Xi, x−i ∈ X−i.
Proof. For each xi ∈ Xi and x−i ∈ X−i let
f−i (x−i) =
1
2
[ui (xi, x−i)−Π (xi, x−i)] .
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Since Π is a potential function for Gm, ∀xi, yi ∈ Xi and ∀x−i ∈ X−i, we have
ui (xi, x−i)− ui (yi, x−i) = Π (xi, x−i)−Π (yi, x−i)
or
ui (xi, x−i)−Π (xi, x−i) = ui (yi, x−i)−Π (yi, x−i)
= 2f−i (x−i) .
For each i ∈ N, the functions f−i in Proposition 2.2 are called separating functions.
Let us consider a Cournot bicriteria game G2 where the demand arises from a competitive
market of two types of commodities.
Definition 2.7. We define G2 = (N,X, Y, u1, u2) , where
• N = {1, 2} ;
• X = Y = [0, δ2]2 where δ is a positive amount;
• ui : X × Y −→ R2, i = 1, 2 are the utility functions defined in the following way:
Take x = (x1, x2) ∈ X, y = (y1, y2) ∈ Y, and
u1 (x, y) = (x1 (δ − x1 − y1)− c1, x2 (δ − x2 − y2)− c2) ,
and
u2 (x, y) = (y1 (δ − x1 − y1)− c1, y2 (δ − x2 − y2)− c2) ,
where c1, c2 > 0.
Remark 2.2. We can note that G2 is a particular case (more precisely is a deterministic case) of
the Cournot game Γc defined in [75] and discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore G2 is a potential game
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with potential function
Π (x, y) =
(
− (x21 + x22 + y21 + y22)− 12 (x1y1 + x1y2 + x2y1 + x2y2)
+δ (x1 + y1 + x2 + y2) ,
− (x21 + x22 + y21 + y22)− 12 (x1y1 + x1y2 + x2y1 + x2y2)
+δ (x1 + y1 + x2 + y2)
)
.
As done in [15] for the scalar case, we put x¯ = x and y¯ = −y for each x ∈ X, y ∈ Y and consider
the game
G¯2 =
(
N, X¯, Y¯ , u¯1, u¯2
)
where X¯ = X, Y¯ = −Y = [− δ2 , 0]2 and for each x¯ ∈ X¯, y¯ ∈ Y¯ ,
u¯1 (x¯, y¯) = u1 (x¯,−y¯) , u¯2 (x¯, y¯) = u2 (x¯,−y¯) . The game G¯2 is strategically equivalent to game G2.
So we have that (x, y) is a weak [strong] Pareto equilibrium for G2 iff (x,−y) is a weak [strong]
Pareto equilibrium for G¯2. In particular, since G2 is a potential bicriteria game with potential
function defined in Remark 2.2, also G¯2 is a potential bicriteria game with potential function Π¯
given by Π¯ (x¯, y¯) = Π (x¯,−y¯) , ∀x¯ ∈ X¯, y¯ ∈ Y¯ .
Proposition 2.3. Let G2 be a Cournot bicriteria game defined as in Definition 2.7 and consider
the game G¯2 as above. Then we have that G¯2 is a supermodular game.
Proof. X¯ and Y¯ are sublattices of R2 because they are product of intervals. Moreover u¯1 and u¯2
have increasing differences properties on X¯ × Y¯ , because by Proposition 2.1 we have
∂2u¯1
∂x¯∂y¯
= (1, 1) > (0, 0) ,
and
∂2u¯2
∂x¯∂y¯
= (1, 1) > (0, 0) .
Finally it is simple to prove that u¯1 is supermodular in the first coordinate and u¯2 is supermodular
in the second coordinate.
Chapter 3
Bayesian Pareto Equilibria in
Multicriteria Games
3.1 Introduction
Shapley in [102] introduced the concept of multicriteria games, that is games with vector payoffs,
and studied their equilibrium points. Subsequently many papers have been published about this
topics, as Borm, Tijs, van den Aarssen in [14] or Patrone, Pusillo, Tijs in [94]; in particular this
last paper links the concept of multicriteria games with that of potential games introduced by
Monderer and Shapley in [83]. On the other hand Harsanyi in [58] introduced games with incomplete
information and he called them Bayesian games. In these games the players are not completely
informed about the real-valued payoff function of the other players and there is an uncertainty
about the characteristics of the players (or types). The existence of Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE
for short) in the case where the pure strategy spaces are finite have been proved in [58]. Later Kim
and Yannelis in [67] proved existence theorems where the set of agent is an infinite set. Their model
allows the individual's action set to depend on the states of nature and to be an arbitrary subset of
an infinite dimensional space. Also Kitti and Mallozzi in [68] prove an existence theorem based on
Corollary 1.1. Meirowitz in [79] shows that if type and action spaces are both non-empty, compact
and convex subsets of a finite dimensional Euclidean space, agent utility functions are continuous in
their type and action as well as the action of the other players, agent expected utility functions are
strictly quasiconcave in the agent's action for every type, the set of rationalizable mappings from
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type to action have uniformly bounded slope and agent posterior beliefs are suitably continuous in
their types, then BNE exist. Reny in [100] generalizes Athey's and McAdams results in [4] and [76]
respectively, on the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria in Bayesian games. Mallozzi,
Pusillo and Tijs in [73] consider situations where one of the players may have an infinite set of pure
strategies, one criterion and a finite number of types and get an existence theorem of approximate
equilibria. Many Bayesian models have been studied recently, for example Einy et al. in [40] study
conditions under which a Bayesian Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique, in an oligopoly, in [61]
the authors prove the existence and uniqueness of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a public good
economy with differential information regarding consumers income and preferences with incomplete
information.
In this chapter we combine the concept of multicriteria games and the concept of Bayesian games:
Bayesian multicriteria games are defined and some equilibrium concepts are discussed. Moreover
we present the classical model of Cournot duopoly game in the sense of a Bayesian multicriteria
game.
3.2 Bayesian Multicriteria Games (BMG)
A Bayesian multicriteria game is a tuple
Γ = (N,A1, . . . , An, T1, . . . , Tn, p, u1, . . . , un)
(for short Γ = (N,A,T, p, u)) where
• N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players;
• ∀i ∈ N, the action space is a metric space Ai, A =
∏
i∈N Ai is the cartesian product of the
action spaces;
• ∀i ∈ N, Ti 6= ∅ is a finite set and represents the type space of player i, T =
∏
i∈N Ti is the
cartesian product of the type spaces;
• ∀i ∈ N, a strategy for player i is a function xi : Ti −→ Ai;
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• p is a probability distribution on the set T ;
• ui : A× T −→ Rm is the payoff function which assigns to player i the payoff
ui (a1, . . . , an, t1, . . . , tn) given that the players 1, 2, . . . , n have type t1, . . . , tn and choose ac-
tions a1, . . . , an respectively.
Assume that it is common knowledge that each player i belongs to one of the possible types ti ∈ Ti.
Each player knows only her own type ti. The beliefs embodied in the description of a type ti ∈ Ti
must include subjective probability distributions over the sets T−i :=
∏
k 6=i Tk. These probabilities
pi
(
t−i|ti
)
represent uncertainty about players' type against whom i is playing. If these players types
are independent, then pi is independent of ti.
Recall that we assume that initially Nature draws a vector of types (t1, . . . , tn) according to the
prior probability distribution p. Once Nature reveals ti to player i, she is able to compute the belief
pi (t−i|ti) using the Bayes' rule:
pi (t−i|ti) = p (t−i, ti)
p (ti)
.
Of course, if players' types are independent, pi (t−i|ti) does not depend on ti, but the belief is still
derived from the prior distribution p.
A play of such a game proceeds as follows: before the types are announced each player i chooses
a strategy xi ∈ ATii .If the type profile is t = (t1, . . . , tn) then player i′s payoff is
ui (x1(t1), x2(t2), . . . , xn(tn), t1, . . . , tn) .
The a priori expected payoff for player i when the players use strategies x1, . . . , xn respectively
is a function Ui : A
T1
1 × · · · ×ATnn −→ Rm such that
Ui (x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
t∈T
p(t)ui (x1(t1), x2(t2), . . . , xn(tn), t1, . . . , tn) ,
that is Ui is a vectorial sum of Rm, being p(t) the probability distribution of player i when her
type is ti.
Definition 3.1. Let Γ = (N,A, T, p, u) be a Bayesian multicriteria game. We say that a strategy
profile x̂ = (x̂1, x̂2, . . . , x̂n) ∈ AT11 ×AT22 × . . . ATnn is a
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• Weak Bayesian Pareto equilibrium (for short wBPE) for the game Γ if ∀i ∈ N,
@xi ∈ ATii such that
Ui (xi, x̂−i) > Ui (x̂) ;
• Strong Bayesian Pareto equilibrium (for short sBPE) for the game Γ if ∀i ∈ N,
@xi ∈ ATii such that
Ui (xi, x̂−i) ≥ Ui (x̂) .
We denote with wBPE (Γ) and with sBPE (Γ) the set of weak Bayesian Pareto equilibria and
strong Bayesian Pareto equilibria respectively for Γ.
Remark 3.1. If a strategy profile x̂ is a strong Bayesian Pareto equilibrium then it is a weak
Bayesian Pareto equilibrium, but the viceversa does not hold. See the Example 3.1.
Remark 3.2. If in Γ the type spaces are trivial, i.e. |T1| = |T2| = · · · = |Tn| = 1 then we can write
(N,A, u) and we obtain a multicriteria game with complete information and wBPE and sBPE boil
down to wPE (weak Pareto equilibria) and sPE (strong Pareto equilibria) respectively.
A Bayesian multicriteria game is called a finite game if Ai are finite sets for all i ∈ N.
We defined a strategy of player i as a function xi : Ti −→ Ai. For semplicity in the following
examples, in place of xi (ti) we will write the corresponding action in Ai.
Let us consider the following example:
Example 3.1. Let Γ = (N,A,T, p, u) be a finite Bayesian multicriteria game where:
• N = {1, 2} ;
• A1 = {a1, b1} , A2 = {a2, b2} ;
• T1 =
{
t11
}
, T2 =
{
t12, t
2
2
}
.
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The functions u1, u2 : (A1 ×A2)× (T1 × T2) −→ R2 are represented by the bimatrices Table 3.1
and Table 3.2.
Table 3.1: u1
1 \ 2 type 1 a2 b2
a1 (1,0) (2, 3) (0, 1) (1, 0)
b1 (0, 1) (4, 3) (1, 0) (3, 1)
Table 3.2: u2
1 \ 2 type 2 a2 b2
a1 (1,0) (1, 2) (0, 1) (3, 4)
b1 (0, 1) (2, 3) (1, 0) (3, 2)
The first table represents the case in which player 2's type is t12, whereas the second one represents
the case in which player 2's type is t22. In each entry of any bimatrix the first pair is the payoff of
player 1, while the second one is the payoff of player 2. In this example each player has two criteria.
We can note that the player 1's payoffs are the same in both matrices. In the first case a2 is a
dominant strategy for player 2.
Now we suppose that player 2's type is t12 with probability P ∈ [0, 1] and type is t22 with probability
1 − P . Then the a priori expected payoff functions U1 and U2 are given in the bimatrix Table 3.3,
where x1, y1 are the strategies of player 1, while x2, y2 are the strategies of player 2. 3.3. Now we
Table 3.3: A priori expected payoff functions
U1\U2 x2 y2
x1 (1,0) (P+1, P+2) (0, 1) (3-2P, 4-4P)
y1 (0, 1) (2P+2, 3) (1, 0) (3, 2-P)
want to compute the strong and weak Bayesian Pareto equilibria for this game depending on P .
• If P > 23 wBPE = sBPE = {(a1, a2) , (b1, a2)} ;
• If 12 < P < 23 wBPE = sBPE = {(a1, a2) , (a1, b2) , (b1, a2)} ;
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• If 25 < P < 12 wBPE = sBPE = {(a1, a2) , (a1, b2) , (b1, a2) , (b1, b2)} ;
• If P < 25 wBPE = sBPE = {(a1, b2) , (b1, a2) , (b1, b2)} ;
• If P = 23 wBPE = {(a1, a2) , (b1, a2)} sBPE = {(b1, a2)};
• If P = 25 wBPE = {(a1, b2) , (b1, a2) , (b1, b2)} sBPE = {(b1, a2) , (b1, b2)};
• If P = 12 wBPE = {(a1, a2) , (a1, b2) , (b1, a2)} sBPE = {(a1, a2) , (a1, b2)}.
In the Example 3.1 there are many equilibria. Generally the existence of equilibria is not ensured.
Indeed let us consider the following example:
Example 3.2. Let Γ = (N,A,T, p, u) be a finite Bayesian multicriteria game where:
• N = {1, 2} ;
• A1 = {a1, b1} , A2 = {a2, b2} ;
• T1 =
{
t11
}
, T2 =
{
t12, t
2
2
}
.
The functions u1, u2 : (A1 ×A2)× (T1 × T2) −→ R2 are represented by the bimatrices Table 3.4 and
Table 3.5.
Table 3.4: u1
1\ 2 type 1 a2 b2
a1 (2,3) (1, -1) (4, 1) (2, 1)
b1 (1, 2) (3, 2) (5, 2) (2, 1)
Table 3.5: u2
1 \ 2 type 2 a2 b2
a1 (2,3) (2, -1) (4, 1) (3, 0)
b1 (1, 2) (1, 2) (5, 2) (0, 0)
Also we suppose that player 1 assigns probability P ∈ [0, 1] to type t12, and probability 1 − P to
type t22, so we have that p
(
t11, t
1
2
)
= P and p
(
t11, t
2
2
)
= 1−P. Then the values of U1 and U2 are given
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in the bimatrix Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: A priori expected payoff functions
U1\U2 x2 y2
x1 (2,3) (-P+2, -1) (4, 1) (-P+3, P)
y1 (1, 2) (2P+1, 2) (5, 2) (2P, P)
It is easy to prove that there are not weak Bayesian Pareto equilibria or strong Bayesian Pareto
equilibria. In effect we can note that U1 (x1, x2) > U1 (y1, x2) and U1 (y1, y2) > U1 (x1, y2) . So
possibly Bayesian Pareto equilibria are (x1, x2) , (y1, y2) . But, since U2 (x1, y2) = (3− P, P ) >
(2− P,−1) = U2 (x1, x2) and U2 (y1, x2) = (2P + 1, 2) > (2P, P ) = U2 (y1, y2) , for each P ∈ [0, 1] ,
they are not Bayesian Pareto equilibria.
3.3 Bayesian Potential Multicriteria Games (BPMG)
In this section we define a Bayesian potential multicriteria game.
Definition 3.2. Let Γ = (N,A,T, p, u) be a Bayesian multicriteria game with a priori expected
payoff Ui for all player i ∈ N , we say that Γ is a Bayesian potential multicriteria game (BPMG
for short) if there exists a map Π : AT11 × · · · × ATnn −→ Rm such that ∀i ∈ N, xi, yi ∈ ATii and
∀x−i ∈ AT−i−i :=
∏
j∈N\{i}A
Tj
j , we have
Ui (xi, x−i)− Ui (yi, x−i) = Π (xi, x−i)−Π (yi, x−i) . (3.1)
We call Π a potential function.
Example 3.3. Let Γ = (N,A,T, p, u) be a finite Bayesian multicriteria game where:
• N = {1, 2} ;
• A1 = {a1, b1} , A2 = {a2, b2} ;
• T1 =
{
t11
}
, T2 =
{
t12, t
2
2
}
.
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The functions u1, u2 : (A1 ×A2)× (T1 × T2) −→ R2 are represented by the bimatrices Table 3.7 and
Table 3.8.
Table 3.7: u1
1 \ 2 type 1 a2 b2
a1 (3,4) (3, 2) (4, 3) (2, 3)
b1 (0, 5) (1, 1) (1, 2) (0, 0)
The first one represents the case in which player 2's type is t12, whereas the second one represents
the case in which player 2's type is t22. We can note that the player 1's payoffs are the same in both
matrices.
The value of U1 and U2 are given in the bimatrix Table 3.9.
It is easy to see that a potential Π for this game is given by the matrix Table 3.10.
We can see that the strategies (x1, x2) , (x1, y2) , (y1, x2) are sBPE for Γ, for all P ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 3.3. Let Γ = (N,A,T, p, u) be a Bayesian multicriteria game, we say that Γ is a
Bayesian coordination game if ui = uj ∀i 6= j.
Clearly, if Γ is a Bayesian coordination game then Ui = Uj ∀i 6= j. For such a game there is a
potential Π : AT11 × · · · ×ATnn −→ Rm. Take, for example, Π = U1.
Definition 3.4. Let Γ = (N,A,T, p, u) be a Bayesian multicriteria game, we say that Γ is a
Bayesian dummy game if
ui (xi (ti) , x−i (tj) , t) = ui (yi (ti) , x−i (tj) , t)
∀t ∈ T ∀i ∈ N, ∀xi, yi ∈ ATii , ∀x−i ∈ AT−i−i ∀j 6= i.
Table 3.8: u2
1 \ 2 type 2 a2 b2
a1 (3,4) (6, 4) (4, 3) (4, 4)
b1 (0, 5) (2, 2) (1, 2) (0, 0)
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Table 3.9: A priori expected payoff functions
U1\U2 x2 y2
x1 (3,4) (6-3P, 4-2P) (4, 3) (4-2P, 4-P)
y1 (0, 5) (2-P, 2-P) (1, 2) (0, 0)
Table 3.10: A potential function
Π x2 y2
x1 (3,4) (1+P, 4+P)
y1 (0, 5) (P-2, 3+P)
For a dummy game, since ui does not depend on the i-th component, for each i ∈ N we let
ui(xi, x−i) = di(x−i),∀xi, x−i and we denote by Γd = (N,A,T, p, d) a dummy game. If Γ is a
Bayesian dummy game then Ui (xi, x−i) = Ui (yi, x−i) ∀i ∈ N, xi, yi ∈ ATii , ∀x−i ∈ AT−i−i , and it
has a potential Π : AT11 × · · · ×ATnn −→ Rm, which is Π = (0, . . . , 0) .
Remark 3.3. Let Γj =
(
N,A,T, p, uj
)
be a finite set of Bayesian potential multicriteria games
with potential Πj ∀j = 1, . . . , k, then the Bayesian multicriteria game Γ =
(
N,A,T, p,
∑k
j=1 u
j
)
is a Bayesian potential multicriteria game with potential
∑k
j=1 Π
j .
Remark 3.4. By the decomposition theorem (see [16], [94]), a Bayesian multicriteria game Γ =
(N,A,T, p, u) has a potential function iff there exist a coordination game Γpi = (N,A,T, p, pi) and
a dummy game Γd = (N,A,T, p, d) such that Ui = Π +Di ∀i ∈ N, where with Ui,Π, Di we denote
the a priori expected functions of ui, pi, di, respectively. Moreover Π is a potential function of Γ.
Theorem 3.1. Let Γ = (N,A,T, p, u) be a finite Bayesian potential multicriteria game, then there
exists a strategy profile x̂ ∈ AT11 × · · · ×ATnn such that x̂ is a sBPE for Γ.
Proof. Let Π : AT11 × · · · ×ATnn −→ Rm be a potential for Γ, with Π = (Π1, . . . ,Πm) where
Πk : A
T1
1 × · · · ×ATnn −→ R ∀k = 1, . . . ,m.
Since Γ is a finite game, argmax
y∈AT11 ×···×ATnn
∑m
k=1 Πk (y) 6= ∅. Take
x ∈ argmax
y∈AT11 ×···×ATnn
m∑
k=1
Πk (y) . (3.2)
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Then x is a sBPE for Γ. Indeed, suppose that x is not a sBPE for Γ, then there exists
i ∈ N and yi ∈ ATii such that Ui (yi, x−i) ≥ Ui (xi, x−i) . But then Π (yi, x−i) − Π (xi, x−i) ≥ 0, so∑m
k=1 Πk (yi, x−i)−Πk (xi, x−i) > 0, which is in contradiction with condition (3.2).
Clearly, by Remark 3.1, x̂ is also a wBPE for Γ.
Theorem 3.2. Let Γ = (N,A,T, p, u) be a Bayesian potential multicriteria game with potential Π.
Then
sBPE (Γ) = sBPE (Γpi) ,
where Γpi = (N,A,T, p, pi) .
Proof. It follows from Remark 3.3.
An economic application of the concept of Bayesian multicriteria game in particular case of one
criterion is studied in [93].
3.3.1 Approximate Bayesian Pareto Equilibria
Definition 3.5. Let Γ = (N,A,T, p, u) be a Bayesian multicriteria game. We say that a strategy
profile x̂ = (x̂1, x̂2, . . . , x̂n) ∈ AT11 ×AT22 × · · · ×ATnn is a
• Approximate Bayesian Pareto equilibrium (for short BPE) for the game Γ if
∀i ∈ N, ∀ > 0, we have that x̂i ∈ B (x̂−i) , where
B (x̂−i) =
{
xi ∈ Xi|Ui (yi, x−i) /∈ Ui (xi, x−i) + Rm+
}
,
with Rm+ = Rm+ \ {[0, ]m} , where Rm+ = {(x1, . . . , xm) |xi ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . ,m} .
We denote with BPE (Γ) the set of approximate Bayesian Pareto equilibria for Γ.
Definition 3.6. For f : AT11 × · · · ×ATnn −→ R, we define
argsup
x∈AT11 ×···×ATnn
f (x)
=
y ∈ AT11 × · · · ×ATnn |f (y) ≥ sup
x∈AT11 ×···×ATnn
f (x)− 
 .
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Example 3.4. Consider the Example 3.2 in which there are not weak (strong) Bayesian Pareto
equilibria and let us compute the BPE of the game Γ. With trivial computations we get:
If P > 12 ,
(1) 1 <  ≤ 2− P, BPE (Γ) = {(a1, b2) , (b1, a2)} ;
(2) 2− P <  ≤ P + 1, BPE (Γ) = {(a1, b2)} ;
(3)  > P + 1, BPE (Γ) = ∅.
If P < 12 ,
(1) 1 <  ≤ P + 1, BPE (Γ) = {(a1, b2) , (b1, a2)} ;
(2) P + 1 <  ≤ 2− P, BPE (Γ) = {(b1, a2)} ;
(3)  > 2− P, BPE (Γ) = ∅.
If P = 12 ,
(1) 1 <  < 32 , BPE (Γ) = {(a1, b2) , (b1, a2)} ;
(2)  > 32 , BPE (Γ) = ∅;
(3)  = 32 , BPE (Γ) = {(a1, a2) , (a1, b2) , (b1, a2) , (b1, b2)} .
• If  < 1, BPE (Γ) = ∅;
• If  = 1, BPE (Γ) = {(a1, a2) , (a1, b2) , (b1, a2) , (b1, b2)} .
The following theorem extends the Theorem 3.1 in [73] to multicriteria games, and to Bayesian
games the Theorem 3.6 in [94].
Theorem 3.3. Let Γ = (N,A,T, p, u) be a Bayesian potential multicriteria game. Suppose that
the potential function is upper bounded, then there exists a strategy profile
x̂ ∈ AT11 × · · · ×ATnn such that x̂ is a BPE for Γ, for all  > 0.
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Proof. Let Π : AT11 × · · · ×ATnn −→ Rm be a potential for Γ, with Π = (Π1, . . . ,Πm) where
Πk : A
T1
1 × · · · ×ATnn −→ R ∀k = 1, . . . ,m.
Since Π is upper bounded, argsup
y∈AT
∑m
k=1 Πk (y) 6= ∅. Take
x ∈ argsup
y∈AT11 ×···×ATnn
m∑
k=1
Πk (y) . (3.3)
Then x is a BPE for Γ. Indeed, suppose that x is not a BPE for Γ, then let be i ∈ N and
yi ∈ ATii such that Ui (yi, x−i) ∈ Ui (xi, x−i) + Rm+,. But then
Π (yi, x−i)−Π (xi, x−i) = Ui (yi, x−i)− Ui (xi, x−i) ∈ Rm+,,
so
∑m
k=1 Πk (yi, x−i)−Πk (xi, x−i) > , which is in contradiction with condition (3.3).
Remark 3.5. Let Γ = (N,A,T, p, u) be a Bayesian potential multicriteria game with potential Π.
Then ∀ ≥ 0, we have
BPE (Γ) = BPE (Γpi) ,
where Γpi = (N,A,T, p, pi) .
3.4 Existence results: the scalarization approach
In the setting of Section 3.2, we consider the Bayesian multicriteria game Γ, and as in [68], we
use the following additional assumptions on the Bayesian game Γ. For every player i :
(A1) ui (·, t) is continuous ∀t ∈ T ∀i ∈ N.
(A2) Ai is a compact and convex set, and ui (·, a−i, t) are quasiconcave ∀a−i ∈ A−i, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ N.
In the following we apply the most popular existing methods for solving multiobjective opti-
mizations problems to Bayesian multicriteria games. See for example [80].
In order to prove an existence theorem for Bayesian Pareto equilibria (see Definition 3.1) we
give the definition of scalarized game as follows
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Definition 3.7. Let Γ = (N,A1, . . . , An, T1, . . . , Tn, p, u1, . . . , un) be a Bayesian multicriteria game
and let λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) where λi = (λi1, . . . , λim) ∈ ∆m is a weight vector for player i' s objectives
∀i ∈ N. We define the weighted game
Γλ =
(
N,A1, . . . , An, T1, . . . , Tn, p, v
λ
1 , . . . , v
λ
n
)
,
where ∀i ∈ N, vλi : A× T −→ R is defined in the following way:
vλi (a1, . . . , an, t1, . . . , tn) =
m∑
k=1
λikuik (a1, . . . , an, t1, . . . , tn) . (3.4)
Remark 3.6. We recall that the inner product, denoted by 〈·, ·〉 of two vectors a = (a1, . . . , an) ,
b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ Rn is a real number given
〈a, b〉 =
n∑
i=1
aibi.
Remark 3.7. The a priori expected payoff V λii for player i can be written in this way:
V λii (x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
t∈T
m∑
k=1
λikuik (x1 (t1) , . . . , xn (tn)) p (t)
=
m∑
k=1
[
λik
∑
t∈T
uik (x1 (t1) , . . . , xn (tn)) p (t)
]
= 〈λi, Ui (x1, . . . , xn)〉.
The next theorem links the Bayesian Pareto equilibria for the game Γ to the Bayesian Nash
equilibria for the game Γλ.
Theorem 3.4. Let Γ = (N,A,T, p, u) be a Bayesian multicriteria game which satisfies Assumptions
(A1) and (A2), such that AT11 × · · · ×ATnn is a convex subset. Let x̂ ∈ AT11 × · · · ×ATnn , then
• x̂ is a wBPE for Γ iff for all i ∈ N exists λ˜i ∈ ∆m such that x̂ is a BNE for Γλ˜;
Proof. Let x̂ be a wBPE for Γ then ∀i ∈ N, @xi ∈ ATii such that Ui (xi, x̂−i) > Ui (x̂) . Then Ui (x̂) is
weak Pareto optimal in Rm. By Theorem 10.1 pages 117-118 in [124] and for the convexity of Rm and
of AT11 ×· · ·×ATnn we have that ∀i ∈ N, ∃λ˜i ∈ ∆m such that ∀z ∈ AT11 ×· · ·×ATnn V λ˜ii (x̂) ≥ V λ˜ii (z)
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because of the Remark 3.7. It follows that x̂ is a BNE for Γλ˜.
On the other hand, we suppose by contradiction that x̂ is not a wBPE of Γ. Then ∃i ∈ N, ∃yi ∈ ATii
such that
Ui (yi, x̂−i) > Ui (x̂) . (3.5)
For hypothesis ∃λ˜i ∈ ∆m such that
V λ˜ii (x̂) ≥ V λ˜ii (yi, x̂−i) . (3.6)
So the conditions (3.5) and (3.6) lead to a contradiction.
The next corollary ensures the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibria for the weighted game Γλ.
Corollary 3.1. If vλi is continuous, Ai is a compact and convex set and v
λ
i (·, a−i, t) are quasiconcave
∀a−i ∈ A−i ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ N, then Γλ possesses a Bayesian equilibrium ∀λi ∈ ∆m.
Proof. See Proposition 1 in [68].
Finally, Corollary 3.2 ensures the existence of wBPE for a Bayesian multicriteria game.
Corollary 3.2. If vλi is continuous, Ai is a compact and convex set and v
λ
i (·, a−i, t) are quasiconcave
∀a−i ∈ A−i ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ N, and if AT11 × · · · ×ATnn is a convex subset then
• ∀i ∈ N, ∃λ˜i ∈ ∆m such that x̂λ˜ is a wBPE for the multicriteria game Γ.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 3.4.
A question of interest in economics is how the optimal choice changes as a parameter changes.
We know that, ∀i ∈ N, if V λii is twice continuously differentiable with respect to xi, given a BNE
profile x̂ = (x̂1, . . . , x̂n) it must satisfy ∀i ∈ N the condition
∂
∂xi
V λii (x̂) = 0 (3.7)
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and ∀j = 1, . . . ,m
∂2
∂x2i
V
λij
i (x̂) < 0 (3.8)
So we have ∀i = 1, . . . , n ∀j = 1, . . . ,m,
∂2
∂x2i
V λii (x̂) dxi +
∂2
∂xi∂λij
V λii (x̂) dλij = 0 (3.9)
In our case we have ∀i = 1, . . . , n ∀j = 1, . . . ,m,
dxi
dλij
= −
∑
t∈T
∂
∂xi
uij (x̂1 (t1) , . . . , x̂n (tn)) p (t)∑
t∈T
∑m
k=1 λik
∂2
∂x2i
uik (x̂1 (t1) , . . . , x̂n (tn)) p (t)
= −
∑
t∈T
∂
∂xi
uij (x̂1 (t1) , . . . , x̂n (tn)) p (t)∑m
k=1
[
λik
∑
t∈T
∂2
∂x2i
uik (x̂1 (t1) , . . . , x̂n (tn)) p (t)
]
= −
∂
∂xi
Uij (x̂1, . . . , x̂n)
〈λi, ∂2∂x2i Ui (x̂1, . . . , x̂n)〉
,
so the sign of this derivative is given by the sign of ∂∂xiUij (x̂1, . . . , x̂n) .
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Let us consider a Cournot game Γc with incomplete information on production costs and where
the demand arises from a competitive market of two types of commodity.
Then, we define Γc = (N,A1, A2, T1, T2, P, u1, u2) , where
• N = {1, 2} ;
• A1 = A2 =
[
0, δ2
]2
where δ is a positive amount. We denote with A = A1 ×A2 the Cartesian
product of the action spaces of firms;
• T1 =
{
t11
}
, T2 =
{
t12, t
2
2
}
are the type finite set. We denote with T = T1 × T2 the Cartesian
product of the type spaces of firms;
• P ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that firm 2's type is t12;
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• ui : A× T −→ R2, i = 1, 2 are the utility functions defined in the following way:
Call a = (a1, a2) ∈ A1, b = (b1, b2) ∈ A2, and
u1 (a, b, t) = (f1 (a, b) , f2 (a, b)) ,
where
• f1 (a, b) = a1 (δ − a1 − b1)− c1;
• f2 (a, b) = a2 (δ − a2 − b2)− c2.
where c1, c2 > 0.
u2 (a, b, t) =

u12 (a, b, t) if the type is t
1
2
u22 (a, b, t) if the type is t
2
2,
where with u12, u
2
2 we denote the utility function of player 2's type is t
1
2, t
2
2, respectively.
In particular
u12 (a, b, t) =
(
g11 (a, b) , g
1
2 (a, b)
)
,
where
• g11 (a, b) = b1 (δ − a1 − b1)− kb21;
• g12 (a, b) = b2 (δ − a2 − b2)− kb22.
u22 (a, b, t) =
(
g21 (a, b) , g
2
2 (a, b)
)
where
• g21 (a, b) = b1 (δ − a1 − b1)− k;
• g22 (a, b) = b2 (δ − a2 − b2)− k.
where k > 0. Let (x, y) = (x1, x2, y1, y2) ∈ AT11 × AT22 be the a priori expected payoff function of
firm 1 is U1 : A
T1
1 ×AT22 −→ R2 such that
U1 (x, y) = (F1 (x, y) , F2 (x, y))
where
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• F1 (x, y) = x1 (δ − x1 − y1)− c1;
• F2 (x, y) = x2 (δ − x2 − y2)− c2.
and the a priori expected payoff function of firm 2 is U2 : A
T1
1 ×AT22 −→ R2 such that
U2 (x, y) =
(
PG11 (x, y) + (1− P )G21 (x, y) , PG12 (x, y) + (1− P )G22 (x, y)
)
=: (G1 (x, y) , G2 (x, y)) .
where
• G11 (x, y) = y1 (δ − x1 − y1)− ky21;
• G12 (x, y) = y2 (δ − x2 − y2)− ky22;
• G21 (x, y) = y1 (δ − x1 − y1)− k;
• G22 (x, y) = y2 (δ − x2 − y2)− k.
We want to find Bayesian Pareto equilibria for Γc.
Let us define the weighted Cournot game Γλc =
(
N,A1, A2, T1, T2, P, v
λ
1 , v
λ
2
)
, with λ ∈ [0, 1],
where vi : A× T −→ R, i = 1, 2 are defined in the following way:
vλ1 (a, b, t) = λf1 (a, b) + (1− λ) f2 (a, b) ;
vλ2 (a, b, t) =

λg11 (a, b) + (1− λ) g12 (a, b) if the type is t12
λg21 (a, b) + (1− λ) g22 (a, b) if the type is t22,
The weighted Cournot game Γλc satisfies the assumptions of Corollary 3.1 because A1, A2 are convex
and compact sets, vλ1 (·, t) and vλ2 (·, t) are continuous functions because they are linear combinations
of continuous functions for each t ∈ T, vλ1 (·, y) and vλ2 (x, ·) are concave functions ∀y ∈ AT22 , and
∀x ∈ AT11 , respectively, because they are linear combinations of concave functions. Then Γλc possesses
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium ∀λ ∈ [0, 1].
If λ ∈ [0, 1], denoting by V λ1 and V λ2 the a priori expected payoff functions for firms 1 and 2
respectively, we have for all P ∈ [0, 1],
∂V λ1
∂x
(x, y) = λ (δ − 2x1 − y1) + (1− λ) (δ − 2x2 − y2) ;
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and
∂V λ2
∂y
(x, y) = λ (−2Pky1 + δ − x1 − 2y1) + (1− λ) (−2Pky2 + δ − x2 − 2y2) .
from which we obtain the following weighted quantities:
λx1 + (1− λ)x2 = δ (1 + 2Pk)
3 + 4Pk
λy1 + (1− λ) y2 = δ
3 + 4Pk
from which we have ∀λ ∈ (0, 1] the Bayesian Nash equilibria of Γλc((
1
λ
[
δ (1 + 2Pk)
3 + 4Pk
− (1− λ)x2
]
, x2
)
,
(
1
λ
[
δ
3 + 4Pk
− (1− λ) y2
]
, y2
))
, (3.10)
and for λ = 0, we get the following Bayesian Nash equilibria((
x1,
δ (1 + 2Pk)
3 + 4Pk
)
,
(
y1,
δ
3 + 4Pk
))
. (3.11)
3.5.1 The contraction approach
The contraction approach is based on showing that the best reply map
T (x, y) =
(
argmax
x∈AT11
V λ1 (x, y) , argmaxy∈AT22
V λ2 (x, y)
)
is a contraction. Then there is a unique fixed point of T, that is, unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium
for Γλc according to the Banach fixed-point theorem
1. Namely we have to prove that T is a
contraction on AT11 ×AT22 . For this a sufficient condition is that (see [122]):
∂2V λ1
∂x2
+
∣∣∣∣∂2V λ1∂x∂y
∣∣∣∣ < 0; (3.12)
1
Theorem 3.5. Let (X, d) be a non-empty complete metric space. Let T : X −→ X be a contraction mapping on X,
i.e.: there is a nonnegative real number h < 1 such that
d(T (x), T (y)) ≤ h · d(x, y)
for all x, y ∈ X. Then the map T admits one and only one fixed-point x∗ ∈ X.
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and
∂2V λ2
∂y2
+
∣∣∣∣∂2V λ2∂y∂x
∣∣∣∣ < 0, (3.13)
for each x ∈ AT11 , y ∈ AT22 and λ ∈ [0, 1] .
It easy to see that both conditions (3.12) and (3.13) are satisfied, so the weighted Cournot game Γλc
admits a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Conditions (3.12) and (3.13) also ensure dominance
solvability of Γλc
2 and, consequentely, global stability.3
Suppose we want to determine how the optimal a priori expected payoff functions V λ1 , and V
λ
2
respond to changes in the parameter λ ∈ [0, 1].
It easy to see with comparative statics techniques that ∀λ ∈ (0, 1] the unique Bayesian Nash
equilibrium for Γλc is
(x∗, y∗) =
((
δ (1 + 2Pk)
3 + 4Pk
,
δ (1 + 2Pk)
3 + 4Pk
)
,
(
δ
3 + 4Pk
,
δ
3 + 4Pk
))
. (3.14)
In particular by Theorem 3.4 we proved that (x∗, y∗) in (3.14) is a wBPE for Γc, and for the
uniqueness it is also a sBPE for Γc.
In the case λ = 0 the previous technique cannot be used because x∗1 (λ) and y∗1 (λ) defined in
(3.10) are not differentiable at λ = 0. Indeed the game Γλc is reduced to be a one-criterion game
with Bayesian Nash equilibium (x∗, y∗) =
(
δ(1+2Pk)
3+4Pk ,
δ
3+4Pk
)
.
3.5.2 The potential approach
From another point of view, we deal with the game Γc as a Bayesian potential bicriteria game.
Consider the following lemma
Lemma 3.1. The Bayesian bicriteria game Γc is a Bayesian potential bicriteria game with the
2A game is dominance solvable if the set remaining after iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies
is a singleton (see [84]).
3A BNE is globally stable if for any initial position the system converges to it.
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following potential function:
Π (x, y) =
(
− (x21 + x22)− (1 + Pk) (y21 + y22)− 12 (x1y1 + x1y2 + x2y1 + x2y2)
+δ (x1 + y1 + x2 + y2) ,
− (x21 + x22)− (1 + Pk) (y21 + y22)− 12 (x1y1 + x1y2 + x2y1 + x2y2)
+δ (x1 + y1 + x2 + y2)
)
:= (Π1 (x, y) ,Π2 (x, y)) .
Proof. Consider a two-person Bayesian bicriteria game with a priori expected payoff functions
W1 (x, y) =
(
−q111 (P ) (x · e1)2 − 2q112 (P ) (x · e1) (y · e1) + 2θ11 (x · e1) + h11 (y, P ) ,
−q211 (P ) (x · e2)2 − 2q212 (P ) (x · e2) (y · e2) + 2θ21 (x · e2) + h21 (y, P )
)
W2 (x, y) =
(
−q122 (P ) (y · e1)2 − 2q121 (P ) (x · e1) (y · e1) + 2θ12 (y · e1) + h12 (x, P ) ,
−q222 (P ) (y · e2)2 − 2q221 (P ) (x · e2) (y · e2) + 2θ22 (y · e2) + h22 (x, P )
)
.
From a straightforward generalization of Lemma 6 in [111] to two criteria, we have that it is a
Bayesian potential bicriteria game iff q12 (P ) = q21 (P ) ∀P ∈ [0, 1]. A Bayesian potential function
Π is such that
Π (x, y) = −q11 (P ) (x · x)− q22 (P ) (y · y)
−q12 (P ) (x · y)− q12 (P ) (x · e1) (y · e2)− q12 (P ) (x · e2) (y · e1)
+ (2, 2) (θ1 · x) + (2, 2) (θ2 · y) ,
where {e1, e2} is the canonical basis of R2, and
q11 (P ) =
(
q111 (P ) , q
2
11 (P )
)
,
q22 (P ) =
(
q122 (P ) , q
2
22 (P )
)
,
q12 (P ) =
(
q112 (P ) , q
2
12 (P )
)
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are aleatory vectors,
θ1 =
(
θ11, θ
2
1
)
,
θ2 =
(
θ12, θ
2
2
)
are constant vectors and
h1 : Y × [0, 1] −→ R2,
h2 : X × [0, 1] −→ R2.
In our case we have:
(i) q12 (P ) = q21 (P ) =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
;
(ii) q11 (P ) = (1, 1) , q22 (P ) = (1 + Pk, 1 + Pk) ;
(iii) θ1 = θ2 =
(
δ
2 ,
δ
2
)
;
(iv) h1 (y, P ) = (−c1,−c2) , h2 (x, P ) = (−k (1− P ) ,−k (1− P )) .
From (i) we have that Γc is a BPMG, and it is easy to compute the potential function.
Since Π (x, y) ≤ (2δ2, 2δ2) , the potential Π is an upper bounded function and for any  > 0 Γc
has an BPE (by Theorem 3.3). In particular, in our setting, if ŷ ∈ argmax
x∈AT11
Π1 (x, y) , and
x̂ ∈ argmax
y∈AT22
Π2 (x, y) (that is (x̂, ŷ) ∈ AT11 × AT22 is a sBPE for Γpic = (N,A1, A2, T1, T2, P, pi) ,
then, for Theorem 3.2, is a sBPE for Γc, and, obviously, also a wBPE for Γc.
In our example we have
argmax
x∈AT11
Π1 (x, y) =
{(
−1
4
(y1 + y2) +
1
2
δ,−1
4
(y1 + y2) +
1
2
δ
)}
,
argmax
y∈AT22
Π2 (x, y) =
{(
− 1
4 (1 + Pk)
(x1 + x2) +
1
2 (1 + Pk)
δ,
− 1
4 (1 + Pk)
(x1 + x2) +
1
2 (1 + Pk)
δ
)}
.
So it is easy to see that((
δ (1 + 2Pk)
3 + 4Pk
,
δ (1 + 2Pk)
3 + 4Pk
)
,
(
δ
3 + 4Pk
,
δ
3 + 4Pk
))
, (3.15)
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is a sBPE for Γc, as we proved in the first part of the model.
We studied the class of Bayesian multicriteria games establishing the existence of approximate,
weak and strong Bayesian Pareto equilibria in the case of Bayesian potential multicriteria games.
In a general case, by using the scalarization approach, we showed the existence of weak Bayesian
Pareto equilibria. Moreover we gave an economic example which modelize the classical game of
Cournot duopoly in the case of incomplete information and in which both firms have two objectives
to optimize.
There are many topics for further research. First of all this model of Bayesian multicriteria game
can be applied to environmental games in which countries have to take into account many objectives
and it is realistic to suppose incomplete information about political strategies of opponent countries.
The interesting case of supermodular games ([15], [94]) could be also considered in order to obtain
some further results about the Bayesian multicriteria games.
Chapter 4
A Bayesian Potential Game to Illustrate
Heterogeneity in Cost/Benefit
Characteristics
4.1 Introduction
We are going to propose an idea to model heterogeneity of agents in games where the differences
among players' behaviours can be outlined by considering two main features, basically relying on
benefit and cost.
The chosen approach comes from Bayesian game theory, where the definition and the employ-
ment of suitable types for players lead to a naturally asymmetric structure. Specifically, we will
select an asymmetric game where the type structure is finite and investigate the related Bayesian
potential game. Potential games are quite a useful tool to simplify the determination of Nash
equilibria and achieve a number of properties of the optimal strategies of the game. Specifically,
potential functions of games collect all the relevant information in a unique function, whereas in
Bayesian games every player only owns and takes into account information on her type in her payoff
structure.
Actually, my analysis takes into account a specific kind of payoff, whose features are very com-
mon across oligopoly games, i.e. the typical form of profit equalling the difference between gains,
where the information about benefit type is, and costs, where the information about cost type is.
We assume that the cost functions include the contributions of all agents, as if all strategies caused
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a damage to all agents, even if at different levels. Such a formulation can be applied to an environ-
mental game, where firms (or countries) choose their optimal emissions strategy maximizing their
own profits, having to take into account that their aggregate emissions amount to an environmental
cost suffered by all of them. We find it evident that when the involved agents are countries, even
more than firms, the issue of modeling heterogeneity assumes high priority.
The Bayesian game approach seems to be suitable, in that it permits a complex characteriza-
tion of types which may reflect countries' economic attitudes, productive characteristics and even
propensity to cause environmental damage.
In our opinion, the distinction among types usually employed in Bayesian game theory responds
to the commitment to manage the complexity and the heterogeneity of such a framework, in which all
countries are endowed with such different prerogatives. Furthermore, some contributions appeared
in recent literature taking into account the issue of monotonicity of pure-strategy equilibria in
Bayesian games (in particular, [76], [118] and [100]) in setups where the type spaces are partially
ordered probability spaces. In this chapter, we intend to develop a procedure to check monotonicity
in our framework, where the type spaces are discrete and consisting of a finite number of types,
because the techniques employed by [118] and [100] cannot be applied.
After constructing the Bayesian game and establishing a suitable preference order on the type
spaces, we proceed to take into examination the Bayesian potential structure of the game. Additive
separability in the strategic variables of the environmental cost functions makes such structure quite
simple to deal with and provides some clear properties for the Nash equilibria.
In particular in this chapter we underline that the potential of the original game can be explicitly
calculated and decomposed in the sum of the aggregate revenue and the aggregate cost, giving rise
to an equivalent game where information on the probability distributions of all types is collected.
Moreover the cost structure emerging from the formula of the potential function provides necessary
and sufficient conditions to ensure monotonicity of the pure strategies, in compliance with the partial
order established on the type spaces. Finally, monotonicity and feasibility of the pure strategies are
shown and proved in some very basic examples. The first example involves a unique pure strategy
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in the original strategy space, in the second one the pure strategy is unique as well but the strategy
space must be restricted in order to ensure monotonicity, whereas the third example, which relies
on a non-standard payoff structure, does not have a globally concave potential function and then
requires a different kind of analysis.
4.2 The setup of the model
In standard environmental games, N countries choose their optimal emissions strategies ei ≥ 0,
in order to maximize their profit functions. Typically, their emissions contribute to increase the
total stock of pollution.
An aggregate dynamic variable is usually employed denoting the stock of pollution produced by
the accumulation of all countries'emissions: P . P causes damage to the environment and affects
countries'payoffs negatively, behaving as a negative environmental externality whose effect differs
across countries, as if each player had to bear a specific environmental cost depending on the
aggregate stock of emissions. In [5], [18] and in analogous models, such heterogeneity is modeled
by employing asymmetric marginal damages across countries and asymmetric marginal revenues.
Our approach will be different, in that we will assume that individual environmental cost will
be determined by each country's own type. Specifically, P = fk (e1, . . . , en), assuming that the
production function fk(·), corresponding to type k, is such that fk (0, . . . , 0) = 0, and is increasing
with respect to each emission variable, i.e.:
∂fk
∂ej
> 0, ∀ j = 1, . . . , n.
Such production function fk(·) expresses the effect of the accumulation of the pollution stock
on a country whose type is k. Thus, we can look upon it either as an environmental cost for the
country or as the marginal contribution of each country with type k to the aggregate pollution
stock.
Generally, the Bayesian games are endowed with a structure which may be suitable to model
heterogeneity of agents. In this case, we are going to take into account two basic elements of het-
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erogeneity, possibly different across countries: the marginal gains from emissions and the individual
contributions to damage caused by the accumulation of pollution. In both cases, we will consider
a low and a high level, labeled by indexes L and H. Hence, we intend to rely on 4 different types
(an example of such a discrete type structure can be found in [24]).
The main characteristics of our framework can be summarized as follows:
• N = {1, . . . , n}, where n < ∞, is the set of players, i.e. countries which aim to maximize
their payoffs;
• bL, bH ∈ R+ are parameters indicating all the possible marginal gains from emissions; bL < bH ,
then bL is suitable to define the action spaces of countries;
• the action spaces of countries are called Ei (standing for emissions) and are all equal compact
intervals, i.e.:
E1 = E2 = . . . = En = E = [0, 2bL];
• the finite sets representing the type spaces of players are all equal to
T = {(bL, fL(·)), (bL, fH(·)), (bH , fL(·)), (bH , fH(·))},
equipped with the partial ordering < which will be established in Definition 4.3, and Tn is
the Cartesian product of n copies of T . Note that this type structure allows each involved
country to belong to 4 alternative types;
• the common prior belief of the agents is represented by a discrete probability measure having
full support on each finite type space T . Each probability distribution is designed in such a
way that the i-th country has probability pjki to belong to type (bj , fk(·)) ∈ T ; namely, the
following properties are supposed to hold:
pjki ≥ 0, ∀ i = 1, . . . , n, k, j ∈ {L,H},
pLLi + p
LH
i + p
HL
i + p
HH
i = 1 ∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
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• if the i-th country belongs to type (bj , fk(·)), her payoff function reads as follows:
ei
(
bj − ei
2
)
− fk (e1, . . . , en) ;
hence, the i-th utility function is given by ui : E
n × Tn −→ R such that:
ui(e1, . . . , en, t1, . . . , tn) =

uLLi (e1, . . . , en, t1, . . . , tn) if ti = (bL, fL(·))
uLHi (e1, . . . , en, t1, . . . , tn) if ti = (bL, fH(·))
uHLi (e1, . . . , en, t1, . . . , tn) if ti = (bH , fL(·))
uHHi (e1, . . . , en, t1, . . . , tn) if ti = (bH , fH(·))
, (4.1)
where
ujki (e1, . . . , en, t1, . . . , tn) = ei
(
bj − ei
2
)
− fk (e1, . . . , en) ;
• the a priori expected payoff function of country i is Ui : (ET )n −→ R such that:
Ui(x1, . . . , xn) = p
LL
i u
LL
i (x1 (t1) , . . . , xn (tn) , t1, . . . , tn) (4.2)
+pLHi u
LH
i (x1 (t1) , . . . , xn (tn) , t1, . . . , tn)
+pHLi u
HL
i (x1 (t1) , . . . , xn (tn) , t1, . . . , tn)
+pHHi u
HH
i (x1 (t1) , . . . , xn (tn) , t1, . . . , tn),
where x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ (ET )n are the strategic variables depending on the type profile
(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Tn assigned to the n countries by Nature 1.
From now on, we will call Γ = (N, E, T, p, u) the game at hand.
4.2.1 Main characteristics of the game
Generally, we can formulate the conditions under which a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE for
short) is implicitly determined:
Proposition 4.1. Let Γ = (N, E, T, p, u) be a Bayesian game with a priori expected utility
functions Ui, i = 1, . . . , n. Call W the largest open set with subset topology containing (ET )n. If
∀ i ∈ N the following additional assumptions hold:
1We will take into account pure strategies only, i.e. measurable functions xi : T −→ E, as in the definition in
[100], p. 508.
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(A1) Ui ∈ C2 (W ) , and FH , FL ∈ C2 (W ) ;
(A2)
∂Ui
∂xi
(x1, . . . , xn) ≥ 0;
(A3)
∂2FH
∂x2i
(x1, . . . , xn) ≥ 0, ∂
2FL
∂x2i
(x1, . . . , xn) ≥ 0.
where FL and FH are the a priori expected payoff functions of fL and fH , respectively.
Then the strategy profile x̂ = (x̂1, . . . , x̂n) ∈
(
ET
)n
, where ∀i ∈ N
x̂i =
∑
j,k∈{L,H}
pjki
[
bj − ∂Fk
∂xi
(x̂)
]
(4.3)
is a candidate strategy to be a BNE for Γ.
Proof. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈W . We have that ∀ i ∈ N,
Ui (x) = p
LL
i
[
xi
(
bL − xi
2
)
− FL (x)
]
+ pLHi
[
xi
(
bL − xi
2
)
− FH (x)
]
(4.4)
+pHLi
[
xi
(
bH − xi
2
)
− FL (x)
]
+ pHHi
[
xi
(
bH − xi
2
)
− FH (x)
]
.
If Assumption (A1) holds, we have
∂Ui
∂xi
(x) = −xi +
∑
j,k∈{L,H}
pjki
[
bj − ∂Fk
∂xi
(x)
]
and
∂2Ui
∂x2i
(x) = −1−
∑
j,k∈{L,H}
pjki
∂2Fk
∂x2i
(x)
is negative by Assumption (A3).
Therefore, ∀ i ∈ N , if x̂i is solution to the n equations ∂Ui
∂xi
(x) = 0, i.e. (4.3) hold, then the strategy
profile x̂ = (x̂1, . . . , x̂n) is a candidate strategy to be a BNE for Γ.
4.3 The Bayesian potential game
In compliance with the standard notation employed in Bayesian game theory, in this subsection
we will use the following symbols, possibly indexed (see also [75]): N for the set of players, E for the
action spaces, T for the type spaces, p for the probability distribution, u for the payoff functions, U
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for the a priori expected utility functions, Γ for the Bayesian game and Π for the potential functions.
Furthermore, we will denote with ET the space of all functions from T to E. In [75] the authors
prove existence theorem for Pareto equilibria in Bayesian potential multicriteria games. We adapt
these results to the case in which there is one criterion as in Remark ??.
We are going to construct a BPG by exploiting the additivity argument stated in Remark 3.3.
Consider two different Bayesian games, the former representing the revenue contribution and the
latter representing the cost contribution. Each one of them is endowed with the same type spaces
and the same probability distributions, that is:
Γ1 =
(
N, E, T, p, gji
)
and Γ2 =
(
N, E, T, p, hki
)
,
∀ i ∈ N, j, k ∈ {L,H}, where
gji (e1, . . . , en, t1, . . . , tn) = ei
(
bj − ei
2
)
,
hki (e1, . . . , en, t1, . . . , tn) = −fk (e1, . . . , en) .
∀ i ∈ N, the a priori expected payoff functions respectively are:
Gi (x) =
(
pLLi + p
LH
i
) [
xi
(
bL − xi
2
)]
+
(
pHLi + p
HH
i
) [
xi
(
bH − xi
2
)]
, (4.5)
Hi (x) = −
(
pLLi + p
HL
i
)
FL (x)−
(
pLHi + p
HH
i
)
FH (x) . (4.6)
Before getting to calculate the potential functions, we remind the readers that a necessary and
sufficient condition for the existence of a potential function Π is stated in [83]: given the payoff
functions Ui, a potential function exists if and only if
∂2Ui
∂xi∂xj
=
∂2Uj
∂xi∂xj
(4.7)
for all i 6= j. The conditions (4.7) hold for Ui = Gi as in (4.5), whereas for Hi as in (4.6) we need
the following result:
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Proposition 4.2. Γ2 is a potential game if and only if ∀ i 6= j ∈ N we have
pLLi + p
HL
i = p
LL
j + p
HL
j ,
pLHi + p
HH
i = p
LH
j + p
HH
j .
Proof. It suffices to write down (4.7) for Hi:
(
pLLi + p
HL
i
) ∂2FL (x)
∂xi∂xj
+
(
pLHi + p
HH
i
) ∂2FH (x)
∂xi∂xj
=
=
(
pLLj + p
HL
j
) ∂2FL (x)
∂xi∂xj
+
(
pLHj + p
HH
j
) ∂2FH (x)
∂xi∂xj
if and only if for all i 6= j we have:
pLLi + p
HL
i = p
LL
j + p
HL
j and p
LH
i + p
HH
i = p
LH
j + p
HH
j .
We are going to assume some kind of suitable separability in the variables of the production
functions FL(·) and FH(·). For example, referring to [8], we can consider forms of payoffs taken
from standard games in normal form.
Definition 4.1. An n− player normal form game Γ = (N,X1, . . . , Xn, f1, . . . , fn) is called a par-
tially separable game if for any i ∈ N there exist two functions f ii : Xi −→ R and
f−ii :
∏
k 6=iXk −→ R such that
fi (x) = f
i
i (xi) + f
−i
i (x−i) .
The separable games, introduced in [8], are a particular case of partially separable games intro-
duced in [95] in which ∀i ∈ N, f−ii = 0. Accordingly, we can employ production functions of the
following kind:
FL (x) =
n∑
j=1
[
ΦjL (xj) + Φ˜(−j)L (x−j)
]
,
FH (x) =
n∑
j=1
[
ΦjH (xj) + Φ˜(−j)H (x−j)
]
.
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Hypothesizing that for all j = 1, . . . , n, ΦjL,ΦjH ∈ C2
(
ET
)
and Φ˜(−j)L, Φ˜(−j)H ∈ C2
((
ET
)n−1)
and that the conditions on weights stated in Proposition 4.2 hold, then Γ2 is a Bayesian potential
partially separable game (see [95] for the non-Bayesian case). In our case, we will rely on a stronger
form of separability, i.e. Φ˜(−j)L (x−j) = 0 and Φ˜(−j)H (x−j) = 0 for all j = 1, . . . , n.
Proposition 4.3. If FL (x) =
∑n
j=1 ΦjL (xj) , and FH (x) =
∑n
j=1 ΦjH (xj) , and for all
j = 1, . . . , n, ΦjL, ΦjH ∈ C2
(
ET
)
, the Bayesian games Γ1 and Γ2 are BPGs, whose potential
functions are as follows:
P1 (x) = −
n∑
j=1
1
2
x2j +
n∑
j=1
[
(bL − bH)
(
pLLj + p
LH
j
)
+ bH
]
xj , (4.8)
P2 (x) = −
n∑
j=1
(
pLLj + p
HL
j
)
ΦjL (xj)−
n∑
j=1
(
pLHj + p
HH
j
)
ΦjH (xj) . (4.9)
Proof. It is immediate to check that
∂Gi
∂xi
=
∂P1
∂xi
, and that
∂Hi
∂xi
=
∂P2
∂xi
. Furthermore, Proposition
4.2 is verified, hence (4.8) and (4.9) are potential functions for Γ1 and Γ2.
Corollary 4.1. If FL (x) =
∑n
j=1 ΦjL (xj) , and FH (x) =
∑n
j=1 ΦjH (xj) , and for all j = 1, . . . , n,
ΦjL,ΦjH ∈ C2
(
ET
)
, the Bayesian game Γ = (N, E, T, p, u), where ujki = g
j
i + h
k
i , is a BPG
whose potential function is given by:
Π (x) = −1
2
n∑
j=1
x2j + bH
n∑
j=1
xj +
n∑
j=1
[(bL − bH)xj − ΦjL(xj)] pLLj +
+
n∑
j=1
[(bL − bH)xj − ΦjH(xj)] pLHj −
n∑
j=1
ΦjL(xj)p
HL
j −
n∑
j=1
ΦjH(xj)p
HH
j . (4.10)
Proof. It immediately follows from Proposition 4.3 and Remark 3.3. Summing the potentials and
finally rearranging terms yields:
Π (x) = P1 (x) + P2 (x) = −
n∑
j=1
1
2
x2j +
n∑
j=1
[
(bL − bH)
(
pLLj + p
LH
j
)
+ bH
]
xj+
−
n∑
j=1
(
pLLj + p
HL
j
)
ΦjL(xj)−
n∑
j=1
(
pLHj + p
HH
j
)
ΦjH(xj) =
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= −1
2
n∑
j=1
x2j + bH
n∑
j=1
xj +
n∑
j=1
[(bL − bH)xj − ΦjL(xj)] pLLj +
+
n∑
j=1
[(bL − bH)xj − ΦjH(xj)] pLHj −
n∑
j=1
ΦjL(xj)p
HL
j −
n∑
j=1
ΦjH(xj)p
HH
j .
Remark 4.1. The explicit calculation of Bayesian potential functions has already been investigated
in some recent papers (for example, [111]), and in particular, it turns out to be simple when the
structure of the game is linear-quadratic. If we consider a Bayesian game Γ with a priori expected
payoff functions:
U˜i (x) = −qii (p)x2i − 2
∑
j 6=i
qij (p)xixj + 2θi (p)xi + hi (x−i, p) ,
where qij and θi are sufficiently regular functions of the probability distributions p and hi is a
sufficiently regular function of x−i and p, then by Lemma 6 in [111], we have that Γ is a BPG iff
qij (p) = qji (p) ∀ i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, and for all p. A Bayesian potential function for Γ is given by
Π (x) = −xtQ (p)x+ 2θ (p)t x,
where Q (p) = [qij (p)]n×n, θ (p) = [θ1 (p) , . . . , θn (p)]t and t denotes the transpose of a matrix.
Note that (4.10) can easily be decomposed in the sum R(x) + ∆(x), i.e. the sum of aggregate
revenue and aggregate damage. R(x) = −1
2
∑n
j=1 x
2
j +bH
∑n
j=1 xj has no aleatory features, whereas
∆(x) =
∑n
j=1 Ej [∆j(xj)], where Ej [·] is the expectation operator when its variable is distributed
according to pj , and the determinations of ∆j(xj) are:
∆j(xj , tj) =

(bL − bH)xj − ΦjL(xj) if tj = (bL, fL(·))
(bL − bH)xj − ΦjH(xj) if tj = (bL, fH(·))
−ΦjL(xj) if tj = (bH , fL(·))
−ΦjH(xj) if tj = (bH , fH(·))
.
The economic intuition behind the formulation R(x) + ∆(x) can be further refined: in particular,
R(x) represents the aggregate revenue of all agents if they all shared the same high marginal revenue
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type H, whereas ∆(x) can be expressed as follows:
∆(x) =
n∑
j=1
Ej [∆j(xj)] =
∑
j∈{1,...,n}, s∈{L,H}
psLj [(bs − bH)xj − ΦjL(xj)]+
+
∑
j∈{1,...,n}, s∈{L,H}
psHj [(bs − bH)xj − ΦjH(xj)],
where the two sums indicate the aggregate damage, or cost, for all agents due to their marginal
gains'levels. The former measures the aggregate losses of agents with low production functions
based on their marginal revenue type, whereas the latter does the same for the agents with high
production functions. ∆(x) can be thought of as the function quantifying the loss in payoff caused
by the fact that they fail to belong to the high marginal revenue type.
The following proposition provides necessary and sufficient conditions for Π to admit a maximum
point, i.e. a BNE for Γ (by Theorem 3.2 in the special case of one criterion).
Proposition 4.4. If there exists a unique point x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗n) ∈ (0, 2bL)n such that for all
j = 1, . . . , n the following first order conditions hold:
− x∗j + (bL − bH)
(
pLLj + p
LH
j
)
+ bH −
(
pLLj + p
HL
j
)
Φ′jL(x
∗
j )−
(
pLHj + p
HH
j
)
Φ′jH(x
∗
j ) = 0, (4.11)
and Φ′′jL (xj) ≥ 0 and Φ′′jH (xj) ≥ 0 for any x = (x1, . . . , xn) in an open neighbourhood of x∗ for all
j = 1, . . . , n, then x∗ is a BNE for Γ.
Proof. The necessary conditions for the maximization of (4.10) are the n equations (4.11). Because
all the second order partial mixed derivatives are zero, the sufficient conditions are given by:
∂2Π
∂x2i
= −1− (pLLj + pHLj )Φ′′jL(x∗j )− (pLHj + pHHj )Φ′′jH(x∗j ),
which are strictly negative if Φ′′jL (xj) ≥ 0 and ΦjH (xj) ≥ 0 for all j = 1, . . . , n. Then x∗ is the
unique maximizer for Π and consequently a BNE for Γ.
Note that Proposition 4.4 only takes into consideration a unique equilibrium point and assumes
it not to be on the boundary of the domain, hence it essentially concerns globally concave potential
functions. In Section 4.4, we will also examine an example in which global concavity of Π is not
verified.
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4.3.1 Monotonicity of strategies
In this subsection, we are going to establish a preference order on our type spaces, whereby we
will be able to define monotonicity of strategies. We recall for reader's convenience the following
definition.
Definition 4.2. Let A be a nonempty set. A partial preorder < on A is a reflexive and transitive
relation. A total preorder is a reflexive, transitive and total relation. An antisymmetric partial
preorder < is called partial order, if < is also a total relation, we call it a total order.
Let Θ be a compact subset of Rm containing the origin and consider the following set
F (Θ) = {f : Θ −→ R | f (0, . . . , 0) = 0, (4.12)
f ∈ C2(Θ), ∂f
∂xj
(c) ≥ 0, ∀ c ∈ Θ, ∀ j = 1, . . . , n.
}
.
We want to construct a partial order < on the set R+ ×F (Θ) in the following way:
Definition 4.3. Let (α, f) , (β, g) ∈ R+ ×F (Θ) , we say that
(α, f) < (β, g)
iff
α ≥ β and ∂f (c)
∂xj
≤ ∂g (c)
∂xj
∀j = 1, . . . , n. (4.13)
It is easy to verify that the relation in Definition 4.3 is a partial order. Namely, (4.13) establishes
a preference on pairs, leading to a preference on types, which is based on a double prerogative: a
larger benefit parameter and a lower maximum cost. Note that because Θ is compact and f and g
are both continuous, the sides of both inequalities involve finite values.
Remark 4.2. The partial order < defined in Definition 4.3 on the set R+ × F ([0, 2bL]n) induces
the following partial order on type set T :
(bH , fL (·)) < (bH , fH (·)) < (bL, fH (·))
(bH , fL (·)) < (bL, fL (·)) < (bL, fH (·)) ,
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then (T, <) is a poset.
Definition 4.4. A strategy for player i, xi : T −→ A, is monotone if t′i < ti implies xi (t′i) ≥ xi (ti)
for all t′i, ti ∈ T.
The following theorem intends to characterize the monotonicity of BNEs in our framework.
Intuitively, it relies on the fact that the preference order on R+×F ([0, 2bL]n) is reproduced in the
FOCs of our maximization problem.
Theorem 4.1. Let Γ = (N, E, T, p, u) a Bayesian game such that BNE (Γ) 6= ∅.
If FL (x) =
∑n
j=1 ΦjL (xj) , and FH (x) =
∑n
j=1 ΦjH (xj) , and for all j = 1, . . . , n, ΦjL,ΦjH ∈
F ([0, 2bL]n) , Γ admits a monotone BNE x∗ with respect to the partial order < on the set R+ ×
F ([0, 2bL]n) iff ∀ j = 1, . . . , n, we have:
∂ΦjL (xj)
∂xj
≤ ∂ΦjH (xj)
∂xj
, (4.14)
for all xj ∈ (0, 2bL).
Proof. Rearranging the j-th FOC (4.11) yields:
x∗j = (bL − bH)
(
pLLj + p
LH
j
)
+ bH −
(
pLLj + p
HL
j
)
Φ′jL(x
∗
j )−
(
pLHj + p
HH
j
)
Φ′jH(x
∗
j ),
leading to the following implicit definitions of the pure strategies:
x∗j (bH , fL (·)) = bH − Φ′jL(x∗j )
x∗j (bH , fH (·)) = bH − Φ′jH(x∗j )
x∗j (bL, fH (·)) = bL − Φ′jH(x∗j )
x∗j (bL, fL (·)) = bL − Φ′jL(x∗j )
and it follows immediately that if (4.14) holds for all players, the preference order defined in Defi-
nition 4.3 and in Remark 4.2 is satisfied by x∗ ∈ BNE(Γ).
What follows is a criterion to ensure the feasibility of monotone pure strategies:
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Proposition 4.5. If x∗ is a monotone pure strategy of Γ and if the following inequalities hold:{
x∗j (bH , fL (·))) < 2bL
x∗j (bL, fH (·)) > 0,
then x∗ ∈ [0, 2bL]n .
Proof. It directly follows from monotonicity of x∗ and from the strategy spaces of the problem.
We can also prove another standard property of oligopoly games:
Proposition 4.6. If x∗j (bk, ·) is a monotone pure strategy of Γ for player j, the j-th consumer
surplus CSj is monotone in x∗j (bk, ·) irrespective of j's type.
Proof. The j-th consumer surplus at equilibrium is the area of the triangle between the inverse
demand function and its level corresponding to the equilibrium x∗j (bk, ·), i.e.:
CSj(x
∗
j (bk, ·)) =
1
2
x∗j (bk, ·)
[
bk −
(
bk −
x∗j (bk, ·)
2
)]
=
(x∗j (bk, ·))2
4
,
then CSj(·) is strictly monotone in x∗j and does not depend on types.
In the next section, we will investigate different kinds of functions ΦjL(·) and ΦjH(·), calculate
the related potential functions explicitly, and determine the Nash equilibrium structures of the
related BPGs.
4.4 Examples with different production functions
Case A
Consider an elementary case of Bayesian game where both production functions are linear, although
having different slopes. Heterogeneity relies on the different individual effects from emissions, i.e.:
FL (x) =
n∑
j=1
xj (4.15)
and
FH (x) =
n∑
j=1
δjxj , with δj > 1 ∀ j ∈ N. (4.16)
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Calling ΓL the Bayesian game with FL as in (4.15) and FH defined as in (4.16), it is simple to prove
the following:
Lemma 4.1. ΓL is a BPG with the following potential function:
ΠL (x) = −1
2
n∑
j=1
x2j + bH
n∑
j=1
xj+
+
n∑
j=1
(bL − bH − 1)xjpLLj +
n∑
j=1
(bL − bH − δj)xjpLHj −
n∑
j=1
xjp
HL
j −
n∑
j=1
δjxjp
HH
j . (4.17)
Proof. The conditions (4.7) hold for all i, j = 1, . . . , n, then ΓL is a BPG. (4.17) immediately follows
from the application of (4.10).
To determine the pure-strategy equilibria, it suffices to describe the FOCs:
∂ΠL
∂xi
= 0 ⇐⇒ xi = bH + (bL − bH − 1)pLLi + (bL − bH − δj)pLHi − pHLi − δipHHi ,
for all i = 1, . . . , n. By Theorem 4.1, the pure strategies are monotone with respect to the poset
(T, <). Namely, the i-th optimal strategies based on all possible type realizations are:
x̂i (bH , fL (·)) = bH − 1
x̂i (bH , fH (·)) = bH − δi
x̂i (bL, fH (·)) = bL − δi
x̂i (bL, fL (·)) = bL − 1
and the verification of monotonicity is straightforward. Note that in this specific case they
exactly correspond to marginal cost levels for all agents. In order to check the feasibility of such
strategies, we have to state some suitable parametric conditions, in compliance with Proposition
4.5. x̂ ∈ [0, 2bL]n if:{
bH − 1 < 2bL
bL − δi > 0
⇐⇒ bL > max
{
δ1, δ2, . . . , δn,
bH − 1
2
}
.
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Case B
A similar technique can be applied to a Bayesian game played by agents endowed with even more
heterogenous types. In particular, a game in which the pollution production functions fk(·) have
different structures, for example the one corresponding to the lowest sensitivity to the stock of
pollution which is linear and the one corresponding to the highest sensitivity which is quadratic.
In such a case, we will have:
FL (x) =
n∑
j=1
γjxj , with γj > 1 ∀j ∈ N. (4.18)
and
FH (x) =
n∑
j=1
x2j . (4.19)
Call ΓLQ the Bayesian game with FL as in (4.18) and FH as in (4.19).
Lemma 4.2. The Bayesian game ΓLQ is a BPG with the following potential function:
ΠLQ (x) = −1
2
n∑
j=1
x2j + bH
n∑
j=1
xj+
+
n∑
j=1
[bL − bH − γj ]xjpLLj +
n∑
j=1
[
(bL − bH)xj − x2j
]
pLHj −
n∑
j=1
γjxjp
HL
j −
n∑
j=1
x2jp
HH
j . (4.20)
Proof. (4.7) hold for all i, j = 1, . . . , n, then ΓLQ is a BPG. The application of (4.10) yields (4.20).
Note that in ΓLQ the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1 are not verified in the whole strategy space
[0, 2bL]
n. In fact,
∂ΦiL (xi)
∂xi
≤ ∂ΦiH (xi)
∂xi
⇐⇒ xi ≥ γi
2
,
hence we have to restrict the strategy space to Θ :=
∏n
j=1
[γj
2
, 2bL
]
, which is nonempty if and only
if bL > max
{γ1
4
, . . . ,
γn
4
}
.
Because the structure of ΠLQ is linear-quadratic, it admits a unique maximizer as well, i.e.
x̂i =
[bL − bH − γi]pLLi + [bL − bH ]pLHi − γipHLi
1 + 2pLHi + 2p
HH
i
, (4.21)
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so the profile strategy x̂ is a feasible and monotonic BNE for ΓLQ if x̂ ∈
∏n
j=1
[γj
2
, 2bL
]
. The
i-th optimal strategies based on all types are as follows:
x̂i (bH , fL (·)) = bH − γi
x̂i (bH , fH (·)) = bH
3
x̂i (bL, fH (·)) = bL
3
x̂i (bL, fL (·)) = bL − γi
and adapting the hypotheses of Proposition 4.5, the sufficient conditions for feasibility are given
by:
bH − γi < 2bLbL
3
>
γj
2
⇐⇒ bL > max
{
bH − γ1
2
, . . . ,
bH − γn
2
,
3γ1
2
, . . . ,
3γn
2
}
.
Case C
In this example we will deal with a potential having two stationary points. The damage functions
are the following:
FL (x) =
n∑
j=1
log (xj + 1) , (4.22)
and
FH (x) =
n∑
j=1
xj . (4.23)
Call ΓLogL the Bayesian game with FL as in (4.22) and FH as in (4.23).
Lemma 4.3. The Bayesian game ΓLogL is a BPG endowed with the following potential function:
ΠLogL (x) = −1
2
n∑
j=1
x2j + bH
n∑
j=1
xj+
+
n∑
j=1
[(bL − bH)xj − log(xj + 1)] pLLj +
n∑
j=1
(bL − bH − 1)xjpLHj −
n∑
j=1
log(xj + 1)p
HL
j −
n∑
j=1
xjp
HH
j .
(4.24)
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Proof. The formula (4.24) follows from the application of (4.10).
The FOCs of this model read as:
∂ΠLogL
∂xi
= −xi + bH +
[
bL − bH − 1
xi + 1
]
pLLi + (bL − bH − 1)pLHi −
pHLi
xi + 1
− pHHi = 0,
for all i = 1, . . . , n.
The explicit computation of the related BNE deserves some detailed comments. To begin with,
the conditions (4.14) hold because
1
xj + 1
≤ 1 for all xj ∈ [0, 2bL]. On the other hand, ΠLogL(x) is
not globally concave: in fact,
∂2ΠLogL
∂x2i
≥ 0 in the whole interval [0, 2bL] if and only if
pLLi = p
HL
i = 0. Hence, the two unique pure strategies than can be immediately determined are:
x̂i (bH , fH (·)) = bH − 1
x̂i (bL, fH (·)) = bL − 1,
∀ i ∈ N. The remaining strategies must be deduced from a second degree equation. For example:
−x̂i (bH , fL (·)) + bH − 1
x̂i (bH , fL (·)) + 1 = 0 ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ x̂i (bH , fL (·)) =
bH − 1 +
√
b2H + 2bH − 3
2
,
after discarding the negative root. Analogously, we have:
−x̂i (bL, fL (·)) + bL − 1
x̂i (bL, fL (·)) + 1 = 0 ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ x̂i (bL, fL (·)) =
bL − 1 +
√
b2L + 2bL − 3
2
.
Both of them are real for bL > 1. As far as monotonicity is concerned, we note that all the
inequalities
x̂i (bH , fL (·)) > x̂i (bH , fH (·)) > x̂i (bL, fH (·)) ,
x̂i (bH , fL (·)) > x̂i (bL, fL (·)) > x̂i (bL, fH (·))
are simply verified for bL > 1.
4.4 Examples with different production functions 79
Finally, to ensure feasibility, we have to check the hypotheses of Proposition 4.5 to achieve a
suitable parametric condition:

bH − 1 +
√
b2H + 2bH − 3
2
< 2bL
bL − 1 > 0
⇐⇒ bL > max
bH − 1 +
√
b2H + 2bH − 3
4
, 1
 .
In this chapter we proposed a new approach to model heterogeneity in oligopoly games, based on
a 2-dimensional finite type structure, separately indicating benefit and cost characteristics of agents.
In our opinion, an environmental n-countries game in which the revenue is a linear-quadratic func-
tion of emissions and the cost is a production function of the aggregate emissions is an appropriate
application for our technique. We established a suitable preference order on the type spaces of the
Bayesian game under consideration and subsequently took into examination the Bayesian potential
structure of the game. We exploited additive separability in the strategic variables of the environ-
mental cost functions to ensure the existence of a potential for the model. Such potential is relevant
in that all information on the probability distributions of all types is collected. We found out that
the cost structure emerging from the formula of the potential function provides necessary and suffi-
cient conditions to ensure monotonicity of the pure strategies, in compliance with the partial order
established on the type spaces. Finally, we applied our results to some different models, whose
respective payoffs were endowed with linear, linear-quadratic and linear-logarithmic cost functions.
The first model involves a unique pure strategy in the original strategy space, in the second one
the pure strategy is unique as well but the strategy space must be restricted in order to ensure
monotonicity, whereas the third model, relying on a non-standard payoff structure, does not have
a globally concave potential function and then requires a different kind of analysis.
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Part II
Cooperative Approach

Chapter 5
TU-Games: an overview
While in non-cooperative game theory, we focus on the individual players' strategies and their
influence on payoffs, and try to predict what strategies players will choose (equilibrium concept), in
cooperative game theory, we abstract from individual players' strategies and instead focus on the
coalition players may form. We assume each coalition may attain some payoffs, and then we try to
predict which coalitions will form (and hence the payoffs agents obtain).
In its classical interpretation, a TU-game describes a situation in which the players in every coalition
S of N can cooperate to form a feasible coalition and earn its worth.
Solutions of TU-games are divided in two types: set solutions and point solutions.
As concerns the set solutions, the first option when searching for a solution to a cooperative game
is the core. In the core no coalition of agents ends up preferring to stay alone to that resulting from
overall cooperation. However, the possible emptiness is a serious limitation of the core concept. A
rich class of TU-games with a nonempty core is the class of convex games. For a convex game the
Shapley value appears to be a core selector. Simply and well-known examples of convex games are
the so-called unanimity games that create a basis in the game space.
Shapley value is a well-knowed point solution. Axiomatizations of the Shapley value can be found
in [36], [37], [72], [112], [113], [114], [115], [128]. Another point solution is the Banzhaf-Coleman
index which, for example, is studied in [112] and [63].
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5.1 Preliminary Definitions
Definition 5.1. Let N be a finite set with cardinality n and let v : 2N −→ R be a map such
that v(∅) = 0. The ordered pair (N, v) is a side-payment game or trasferable utility game
(TU-game).
We can interpret N as the set of players, and S ∈ 2N is a coalition of player. v is called
characteristic function of the game.
We denote with Γ the class of TU - games and with Gn the set of all characteristic functions v,
corresponding to a TU - game (N, v).
Notation 5.1. If S, T ∈ 2N , the inclusion S ⊆ T, means that each player of coalition S is a player
of the coalition T. In particular ∅ ⊂ T ∀T ∈ 2N .
Definition 5.2. A TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ is cohesive if
v(N) ≥
k∑
i=1
v(Si) ∀ {S1, . . . , Sk} partition of N
Most of TU-games derived from practical situations have the superadditivity property.
Definition 5.3. A TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ is superadditive if
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) ∀S, T ∈ 2N ,with S ∩ T = ∅.
In a superadditive game the value of the union of two disjoint coalitions is at least as large as
the sum of the values of the subcoalition separately.
The following definition is less interesting because there is no convenience to cooperation.
Definition 5.4. A TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ is additive [subadditive] if
v(S ∪ T ) = v(S) + v(T ) [v(S ∪ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T )] ∀S, T ∈ 2N ,with S ∩ T = ∅.
It is easy to show that a superadditive game is also a cohesive game:
Proposition 5.1. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a superadditive game, then (N, v) is a cohesive game.
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Proof. Let {S, T} be a partition of N. Then
v(N) = v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
We can observe that an additive game is both superadditive and subadditive. Moreover by
Proposition 5.1 it is also a cohesive game. However, a cohesive game is not necessarily a superad-
ditive game as shown by the next example.
Example 5.1. We consider the game (N, v) where N = {1, 2, 3} and v : 2N −→ R is defined as
follows:
v(S) =

0 if S = ∅
1 if |S| = 1
3
2 if |S| = 2
5 if S = N
Note that this is a cohesive game, but it is not a superadditive game because if we consider S = {1}
and T = {2} , we have that v(S ∪ T ) = 32 < 1 + 1 = v(S) + v(T ).
Definition 5.5. A TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ is convex [strictly convex] if
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) [v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) > v(S) + v(T )] ∀S, T ∈ 2N .
We can see that a convex game is also a superadditive game:
Proposition 5.2. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a convex game, then (N, v) is a superadditive game.
Proof. We take S, T ∈ 2N such that S ∩ T = ∅. Then
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) = v(S ∪ T ) + v(∅)
= v(S ∪ T ) + 0
≥ v(S) + v(T ).
86 TU-Games: an overview
However, the viceversa is not true as shown by the next example.
Example 5.2. We consider the game (N, v) where N = {1, 2, 3} and v : 2N −→ R is defined as
follows:
v(S) =

0 if S = ∅
1
4 if |S| = 1
3
2 if |S| = 2
7
4 if S = N
We can notice that this is a superadditive game, but it is not a convex game because if we consider
S = {1, 2} and T = {1, 3} , we have that v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) = 74 + 14 < 32 + 32 = v(S) + v(T ).
Definition 5.6. A TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ is concave [strictly concave] if
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ) [v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) < v(S) + v(T )] ∀S, T ∈ 2N .
We can observe that (N, v) ∈ Γ is [strictly] convex iff (N,−v) ∈ Γ is [strictly] concave.
Definition 5.7. A TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ is monotonic [strictly monotonic] if
v(S) ≤ v(T ) [v(S) < v(T )] ∀S, T ∈ 2Nwith S ⊂ T.
Definition 5.8. A TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ is essential if
v(N) >
∑
i∈N
v({i})
It is inessential otherwise.
Proposition 5.3. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a superadditive game such that v(S) ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ 2N ; then (N, v)
is a monotonic game.
Proof. We take S, T ∈ 2N such that S ⊂ T. We can observe that T = S ∪ (T \ S). Then
v(T ) = v(S ∪ (T \ S))
≥ v(S) + v(T \ S).
Then v(T )− v(S) ≥ v(T \ S) ≥ 0.
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In particular, because of Proposition 5.2 the following statement holds.
Corollary 5.1. If (N, v) ∈ Γ is a convex game such that v(S) ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ 2N , then it is also a
monotonic game.
We can note that an additive game is an inessential game.
Proposition 5.4. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a monotonic game then v(S) ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ 2N .
Proof. We have that ∅ ⊂ T ∀T ∈ 2N . Then, by monotonicity, we have
0 = v(∅) ≤ v(T ).
The next pictures summarize the previous implications.
convex games
superadditive games
cohesive games
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convex and non-negative games
superadditive and non-negative games
monotonic games
non-negative games
We can also show that a convex game is not necessarily a monotonic game as the next example
shows.
Example 5.3. We consider the game (N, v) where N = {1, 2} and v : 2N −→ R is defined as
follows:
v(S) =

0 if S = ∅
−6 if S = {1}
−4 if S = {2}
−5 if S = N
It is easy to show that this is a convex game, but it is not a monotonic game because if we consider
S = {2} and T = {1, 2} , we have that S ⊂ T but −4 = v(S) > v(T ) = −5.
Moreover, because of Proposition 5.2, the previous example shows that superadditivity condition
is not sufficient for monotonicity.
We can also observe that the game of Example 5.3 is essential, so we conclude that convexity
and essentiality are not sufficient conditions for monotonicity. (Obviously also superadditivity and
essentiality are not sufficient conditions for monotonicity).
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Now we show that monotonicity and essentiality are not sufficient conditions for superadditivity.
We consider the following example.
Example 5.4. We consider the game (N, v) where N = {1, 2, 3} and v : 2N −→ R is defined as
follows:
v(S) =

0 if S = ∅
1
3 if |S| = 1
7
4 if |S| = 2
2 if S = N
We can see that this is a monotonic and essential game, but it is not a superadditive game because
if we consider S = {1} and T = {2, 3} , we have that
v(S ∪ T ) = v(N)
= 2
< v(S) + v(T )
= v({1}) + v({2, 3})
=
1
3
+
7
4
=
25
12
.
Moreover, since this game is not cohesive, we can conclude that monotonicity and essentiality are
not sufficient conditions for cohesivity.
In particular it follows that monotonicity and essentiality are not sufficient conditions for convexity.
Namely we can observe that monotonicity is not a sufficient condition for superadditivity (and
for convexity).
Definition 5.9. A TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ is said to be constant -sum if
v(S) + v(N \ S) = v(N) ∀S ∈ 2N ,with S ⊂ N.
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Proposition 5.5. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be an additive game then (N, v) is a constant- sum game.
Proof. We take S, T ∈ 2N such that T = N \ S. Then
v(S) + v(T ) = v(S) + v(N \ S) = v(N)
It is easy to show that the opposite does not hold.
The most important problem for a TU-game (N, v) is how to divide the profits among the
players. Indeed there is not an unique rule: the theory does not tell us which solution we have to
choose, but it describes the property of solutions, highlighting positive and negative aspects.
For further details see [91] (pages 212-233) and [107] (pages 60-66).
The next subsections are devoted to describe some kind of solutions.
5.2 Imputation and Core
Definition 5.10. Take (N, v) ∈ Γ. A vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn is called allocation. If∑
i∈N xi = v(N) then the allocation x is called pre-imputation. A pre imputation x such that
xi ≥ v({i}) ∀i ∈ N, is called imputation.
A pre-imputation is a distribution of v(N) among players. The condition
∑
i∈N xi = v(N) is an
efficient condition or also called collective rationality. On the other hand the condition xi ≥ v({i})
is called individual rationality.
The set of imputations of the TU-game (N, v) is denoted by I(v).
From another point of view we can think of the imputation as a correspondence
I : Gn ⇒ Rn where
I(v) =
{
x ∈ Rn |
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N), xi ≥ v({i})
}
.
Proposition 5.6. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a cohesive game then I(v) 6= ∅.
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Proof. Because (N, v) is a cohesive game, in particular we have
v(N) ≥
n∑
i=1
v({i}).
Then ∃i ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , n such that
v(N) =
n∑
i=1
(v({i}) + i).
We can define the vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) with xi = v({i}) + i ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Obviously x ∈ I(v).
Naturally, it might happen that I(v) = ∅ as shown by the following example.
Example 5.5. We consider the game (N, v) where N = {1, 2, 3} and v : 2N −→ R is defined as
follows:
v(S) =

0 if S = ∅
1 if |S| = 1
3
2 if |S| = 2
2 if S = N
Definition 5.11. Take (N, v) ∈ Γ, let x, y ∈ I(v) be two imputations, and let S be a coalition. We
say x dominates y through S (x `S y) if
• xi > yi ∀i ∈ S;
• ∑i∈S xi ≤ v(S).
We say x dominates y (x ` y) if there is a coalition S such that x `S y.
Definition 5.12. Take (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ. We say that they are isomorphic if there exists a
bijection f : I(v)→ I(w) such that
x `S y ⇔ f(x) `S f(y) ∀x, y ∈ I(v), S ⊂ N.
It may be difficult to tell whether two games are isomorphic in this sense. We have, however,
the following criterion:
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Definition 5.13. Take (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ. We say that they are S-equivalent if there exist a
positive number r and n real constants α1, . . . , αn such that
v(S) = rw(S) +
∑
i∈S
αi ∀S ⊂ N.
Essentially, if two games are S-equivalent, we can obtain one from the other simply by performing
a linear transformation on the utility space of the several players. It is easy to prove that S-equivalent
implies isomorphism:
Theorem 5.1. If (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ are S-equivalent, they are isomorphic.
Proof. See [91] (page 216)
It is obvious that S-equivalence is, indeed, an equivalence relation. It is interesting to choose
one particular game from each equivalent class.
Definition 5.14. A TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ is said to be in 0 normalization if
• v({i}) = 0 ∀i ∈ N.
Theorem 5.2. If (N,w) ∈ Γ is a TU-game, it is S-equivalent to exactly one game in 0 normaliza-
tion.
Proof. It suffices to take v(S) = w(S) −∑i∈S w({i}). In fact (N, v) is S-equivalent to (N,w) and
it is also 0 normalized.
Definition 5.15. A TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ is said to be in (0,1) normalization if
• v({i}) = 0 ∀i ∈ N ;
• v(N) = 1.
Theorem 5.3. If (N,w) ∈ Γ is an essential game, it is S-equivalent to exactly one game in (0, 1)
normalization.
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Proof. It is sufficient to take v(S) =
w(S)−∑i∈S w({i})
w(N)−∑i∈N w({i}) . Indeed (N, v) is S-equivalent to (N,w) and
it is also (0, 1) normalized.
There are two special types of games which are of interest:
Definition 5.16. Take (N, v) ∈ Γ.We say that it is symmetric if v(S) depends only on the number
of elements in S.
Definition 5.17. Take (N, v) ∈ Γ in (0, 1) normalization. We say that it is simple if, for each
S ⊂ N, we have either v(S) = 0 or v(S) = 1.
We can note that a game is simple if its (0, 1) normalization is simple.
In a simple game, a coalition S is said to be a winning coalition if v(S) = 1 and a losing
coalition if v(S) = 0. So in a simple game every coalition is either winning or losing.
We can note that if (N, v) ∈ Γ is a superadditive, simple game then every subset of a losing
coalition is losing, and every superset of a winning coalition is winning.
We can interpret a simple game in the following way: players are members of legislature or
members of the board of directors of a corporation, etc. In such games, a proposed bill or decision
is either passed or rejected. Those subsets of the players that can approve bills without outside help
are called winning coalitions while those that cannot are called losing coalitions.
Typical examples of simple games (N, v) ∈ Γ are
• the majority rule game where v(S) = 1 if |S| > n/2, and v(S) = 0 otherwise;
• the unanimity game where v(S) = 1 if S = N and v(S) = 0 otherwise;
• the dictator game where v(S) = 1 if {1} ∈ S and v(S) = 0 otherwise.
We introduce a concept of solution, the core, that selects the imputations which have an other
rationality property.
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Definition 5.18. Take (N, v) ∈ Γ. The core of the game is a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ I(v) such
that ∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) ∀S ∈ 2N \ {∅} .
The set of core elements of the TU-game (N, v) is denoted by C(v).
We can observe that C(v) is a convex set.
From an other point of view we can think the core as a correspondence C : Gn ⇒ Rn where
C(v) =
{
x ∈ I(v) |
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S)
}
Obviously C(v) ⊆ I(v). Consequely I(v) = ∅, implies C(v) = ∅. But also for a superadditive game
it can happen that C(v) = ∅ as shown by the next example.
Example 5.6. We consider the game (N, v) where N = {1, 2, 3} and v : 2N −→ R is defined as
follows:
v(S) =

0 if S = ∅
0 if |S| = 1
1 if |S| ≥ 2.
It is easy to show that this is a superdditive game, but C(v) = ∅.
Moreover we have
Theorem 5.4. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be an essential and constant-sum game, then C(v) = ∅.
Proof. See [91] (page 220).
The concept of the core is useful as a measure of stability. As a solution concept, it presents a
set of imputations without distinguishing one point of the set as preferable to another. Indeed, the
core may be empty.
For further details see [91] (pages 212-233) and [107] (pages 67-73).
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5.3 Indices of Power
Here we deal with the concept of a value. In this approach, one tries to assign to each game in
coalitional form a unique vector of payoffs, called the value. The i-th entry of the value vector may
be considered as a measure of the value or power of the i-th player in the game. Alternatively, the
value vector may be thought of as an arbitration outcome of the game decided upon by some fair
and impartial arbiter.
Definition 5.19. A function φ : Gn → Rn is called value.
Here φi(v) represents the worth or value of player i ∈ N in the TU-game (N, v).
In this section we introduce two values: the Shapley value and the Banzhaf-Coleman index,
and their variations.
To define Shapley value we give an axiomatic treatment.
Definition 5.20. Take (N, v) ∈ Γ and let σ : N → N be a permutation of the set N. Then, by
(N, σv) we mean the TU-game such that,
σv(S) = v(σ(S)) ∀S ∈ 2N .
Definition 5.21. Take (N, v) ∈ Γ we called dummy player a player i ∈ N such that
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i}) ∀S ∈ 2Nwith i /∈ S.
Definition 5.22. Take (N, v) ∈ Γ we called null player a player i ∈ N such that
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) ∀S ∈ 2Nwith i /∈ S.
Definition 5.23. Take (N, v) ∈ Γ we called symmetric players two players i, j ∈ N such that
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) ∀S ∈ 2Nwith i, j /∈ S.
Axioms 5.1. Take (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ, then a value φ : Gn → Rn satisfies the next axioms if
Axiom 1 (efficiency)
∑
i∈N φi(v) = v(N);
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Axiom 2 (anonimity) φσ(i)(σv) = φi(v) ∀σ : N → N permutation;
Axiom 3 (dummy player) φi(v) = v({i}) ∀i ∈ N dummy player;
Axiom 4 (additivity) φi(v + w) = φi(v) + φi(w) ∀i ∈ N.
Theorem 5.5. There is a unique value φ : Gn → Rn that satisfies efficiency, anonimity, dummy
player and additivity.
Proof. For the proof see [91] (pages 262-265).
This unique value is called Shapley value and denoted with ϕ. Given (N, v) ∈ Γ, it is explicitly
defined as follows
ϕi(v) =
∑
i∈S
S⊆N
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
[v(S)− v(S \ {i})] , (5.1)
where s denotes the cardinality of S.
It can be seen that ∑
i∈S
S⊆N
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
= 1.
We can note that the Shapley value is not only additive but also satisfies the following stronger
axiom of linearity.
Axioms 5.2. Take (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ, then a value φ : Gn → Rn satisfies the next axioms if
Axiom 5 (linearity) φi(av + bw) = aφi(v) + bφi(w) ∀i ∈ N and ∀a, b ∈ R.
We can also give an alternative definition of Shapley value. First of all we give the following
definitions.
Definition 5.24. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a TU-game, take i ∈ N and let σ : N −→ N be a permu-
tation. Take j ∈ N such that i = σ(j). A marginal contribution of i ∈ N to the coalition
{σ(1), . . . , σ(j − 1)} is the number
mσi (v) = v({σ(1), ..., σ(j)})− v({σ(1), ..., σ(j − 1)}).
We denote with mσ(v) the vector of Rn with component mσi (v).
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Definition 5.25. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a TU-game and let σ : N −→ N be a permutation. A set of
predecessor of i ∈ N in σ is the set
Pσ(i) =
{
j ∈ N | σ−1(j) < σ−1(i)} .
We can observe that, with the previous definitions mσi (v) = v(Pσ(i) ∪ {i})− v(Pσ(i)).
Then we have the following definition:
Definition 5.26. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a TU-game, then the Shapley value is defined in the following
way:
ϕi(v) =
1
n!
∑
σ∈pi(N)
mσi (v), (5.2)
where pi(N) is the set of permutations of N.
Theorem 5.6. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a convex game, then ϕ(v) ∈ C(v).
Proof. Take S ⊆ N and σ : N → N a permutation. Let i1, . . . , ik, . . . , is be the elements of S in
the order in which there are in σ.
So by definition of marginal contribution and for superadditivity of (N, v), we have
mσik(v) = v(Pσ(ik) ∪ {ik} − v(Pσ(ik))) ≥ v({ik}),
and
n∑
k=1
mσik(v) = v(N).
Moreover, for the convexity of (N, v), we have
s∑
k=1
mσik(v) ≥
s∑
k=1
v(Pσ(ik) ∪ {ik})− v(Pσ(ik)) = v(S)
That ismσ(v) ∈ C(v).Moreover, by convexity of C(v) and for Definition 5.26, we have ϕ(v) ∈ C(v).
From previous theorem follows the next claims.
Corollary 5.2. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a superadditive game, then ϕ(v) ∈ I(v).
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Corollary 5.3. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a convex game, then C(v) 6= ∅.
There are also many others axiomatizations of the Shapley value. For example, let us consider
the following axioms:
Axioms 5.3. Take (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ, then a value φ : Gn → Rn satisfies the next axioms if
Axiom 6 (null player) φi(v) = 0 ∀i ∈ N null player;
Axiom 7 (fairness) φi(v + w)− φi(v) = φj(v + w)− φj(v) ∀i, j ∈ N symmetric players.
Then, in [113] the author proves the next theorem.
Theorem 5.7. There is a unique value φ : Gn → Rn that satisfies efficiency, null player and
fairness. This value is the Shapley value.
Proof. See [113].
For further details see [112] and [128] where the authors characterize the Shapley value on the
class of monotonic games.
One of the principal difficulties with the Shapley value is that its computation generally requires
the sum of a very large number of terms. Thus, even when the characteristic function is easy to
define, evaluation may require a prohibitive amount of work. Recourse is therefore frequently had
to multilinear extension (MLE) of the game.
Definition 5.27. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a TU-game, then the multilinear extension of (N, v) is
defined in the following way:
h(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
S⊂N
(∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i/∈S
(1− xi)
)
v(S), (5.3)
with xi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i ∈ N.
The following property relates the MLE to the Shapley value.
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Theorem 5.8. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a TU-game, and h its multilinear extension, then
ϕi(v) =
∫ 1
0
∂h
∂xi
(t, . . . , t)dt ∀i ∈ N. (5.4)
For the proof see [91] (page 270) and [107] (page 94), while for more classical results see [91]
(pages 261-280) and [107] (pages 85-95).
We can observe that if we take the subclass of essential simple games we have that v(N) = 1,
for any (N, v) in this subclass and hence the sum of two simple games (N, v) and (N,w) does not
belong to this subclass. Therefore, this has motivated several authors to introduce an alternative
version of the additive axiom, see [36], [37] and [72].
In the following, as in [115], we denote the class of simple games by Γs and its subclass of essential,
monotonic simple games by Γsm, and we denote byGns , andG
n
sm the set of all characteristic functions
v, corresponding to a TU- game (N, v) ∈ Γs and Γsm, respectively. The alternative version of the
additivity axiom in case of simple games makes use of the concept of the maxgame and the mingame
of two games.
Definition 5.28. Take (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ , then the maxgame of (N, v) and (N,w) is denoted
(N, z+vw) where
z+vw = max [v(S), w(S)] ∀S ⊆ N,
and the mingame of (N, v) and (N,w) is denoted (N, z−vw) where
z−vw = min [v(S), w(S)] ∀S ⊆ N.
Clearly, when both (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γs, then also (N, z+vw), (N, z−vw) ∈ Γs.
Moreover, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Let (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γs be two simple games. Then it holds that
v(S) + w(S) = z+vw(S) + z
−
vw(S) ∀S ⊆ N.
Proof. It follows immediately by Definition 5.28.
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Dubey in [36] stated the next additivity axiom for a value.
Axioms 5.4. Take (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γs, then a value φ : Gns → Rn satisfies the next axiom if
Axiom 8 (minmax additivity) φi(z
+
vw) + φi(z
−
vw) = φi(v) + φi(w) ∀i ∈ N.
The next theorem states the Shapley value is the unique value satisfying the axioms of efficiency,
anonimity, dummy player and minmax additivity.
Theorem 5.9. There is a unique value φ : Gns → Rn that satisfies efficiency, anonimity, dummy
player and minmax additivity.
Proof. See [36].
This unique value is called Shapley-Shubik index. Given (N, v) ∈ Γs, it is explicitly defined
as follows
ϕi(v) =
∑
i∈S
S⊆N
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
, (5.5)
where s denotes the cardinality of S, and where the summation is taken over all winning coalition
S such that S \ {i} is not winning.
Another index of power has been suggested by Banzhaf and Coleman.
Definition 5.29. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a TU-game . We define the Banzhaf-Coleman index as
χi(v) =
∑
i∈S
S⊆N
(
1
2
)n−1
[v(S)− v(S \ {i})].
There is a certain relation between the Shapley value and the Banzhaf-Coleman index: both give
averages of player i's marginal contributions v(S)− v(S \ {i}). The difference lies in the weighting
coefficients used: for the Shapley value, these varied according to the size of S; for the Banzhaf-
Coleman index, they are all equal.
It follows immediately by definition that the Banzhaf-Coleman index satisfies anonimity, dummy
player, linearity and in particular, additivity. We can note that the Banzhaf-Coleman index does
not satisfy the efficiency axiom. Infact we can consider the following example.
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Example 5.7. Let us consider the following simple game (N, v) ∈ Γ and let us calculate the Banzhaf-
Coleman index. N = {1, 2, 3} and
v(S) =

1 if |S| ≥ 2
0 otherwise .
We have χ(v) =
(
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2
)
.
Axiomatizations of the Banzhaf-Coleman index on the class of simple games have been given in
[37] and in [72]. In the latter paper an axiomatization is also given for the general case by using
a monotonicity property with respect to the amalgamation of two players to one player. In [57] is
provided an axiomatization for the Banzhaf-Coleman index on the class of TU-games Γ by using an
axiom of neutral collusion, besides the standard axioms of dummy player, anonimity and linearity.
We can consider the following definition.
Definition 5.30. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a TU-game and let i, j ∈ N be two different players. Take
ζ = {i, j} a reduced game is a TU-game (N \ {j} , vζ) ∈ Γ where
vζ(S) = v(S) and vζ(S ∪ {ζ}) = v(S ∪ {ζ}) ∀S ⊆ N \ {ζ} .
Clearly (N \ {j} , vζ) is a TU-game with n− 1 players obtained by amalgamating the players i
and j in the game (N, v) into one player ζ.
In this way we can revisit the efficiency property in the following axiom.
Axioms 5.5. Take (N, v) ∈ Γ, then a value φ : Gn → Rn satisfy the next axiom if
Axiom 9 (2- efficiency) φi(v) + φj(v) = φζ(vζ) ∀i 6= j ∈ N.
Now we introduce the axioms that characterize the Banzhaf-Coleman index.
Axioms 5.6. Take (N, v) ∈ Γ, then a value φ : Gn → Rn satisfy the next axiom if
Axiom 10 (equal treatment) φi(v) = φj(v) ∀i, j ∈ N symmetric players;
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Axiom 11 (marginal contributions) Take (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ. If for some player i ∈ N we have
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = w(S ∪ {i})− w(S) ∀S ⊆ N \ {i, j} , then φi(v) = φi(w).
Theorem 5.10. There is a unique value φ : Gn → Rn that satisfies 2-efficiency, dummy player,
equal treatment and marginal contributions. This value is the Banzhaf-Coleman index.
Proof. See [87].
Also for the Banzhaf-Coleman index there is a characterization through the multilinear exten-
sion, see for example [90].
Theorem 5.11. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a TU-game, and h its multilinear extension, then
χi(v) =
∂h
∂xi
(
1
2
, . . . ,
1
2
)
∀i ∈ N. (5.6)
Proof. See [91] (pages 294-297).
See also [92] for a reformulation of the Banzhaf-Coleman index.
For a simple game, we can define also the Normalized Banzhaf-Coleman index. First of all
we formalize a concept already discussed.
Definition 5.31. Let (N, v) ∈ Γs be a simple game [in (0, 1) normalization], a swing for player
i ∈ N is a set S ⊂ N such that i ∈ S, S wins and S \ {i} loses.
Definition 5.32. Let (N, v) ∈ Γs be a simple game [in (0, 1) normalization], and let θi be the
number of swings for player i ∈ N. We define the Normalized Banzhaf-Coleman index on
simple games as
βi(v) =
θi∑
j∈N θj
.
Clearly, we can also define the Normalized Banzhaf-Coleman index on the more general class of
TU-games.
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Definition 5.33. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ be a TU-game. We define the Normalized Banzhaf-Coleman
index as
βi(v) = η(v) · χi(v) ∀i ∈ N,
where
η(v) =
v(N)∑
j∈N χj(v)
.
The Normalized Banzhaf-Coleman index (on simple games and on TU- games in general) is
efficient and it satisfies anonimity. It does not satisfy linearity and dummy player property.
In [112] there is a characterization of the Normalized Banzhaf-Coleman index on the class of
monotonic games.
There is a large class of simple games called weighted voting games.
Definition 5.34. A TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ is a weighted voting game if
v(S) =

1 if
∑
i∈S wi > q
0 if
∑
i∈S wi ≤ q,
for some non-negative numbers wi, called the weights, and some positive number q, called the
quota. If q = 12
∑
i∈S wi, this is called a weighted majority game.
Example 5.8. The elections of Ireland held February 2011 are a 7-players weighted voting game
(N, v). The Ireland Parliament has 166 seats so the quota q is fixed to 84, that is the majority plus
one. The weights are the seats which each party get. The winner coalitions are:
{FG,LP} , {FG,FF} , {FG, I} , {FG, SF} .
All the coalitions containing the previous four coalitions are winning. Moreover the following coali-
tions are winning
{LP,FF, I, SF} , {LP,FF, I, SF, SP} , {LP,FF, I, SF, PBP} , {LP,FF, I, SF, SP, PBP} .
Let us compute the number of swings (θ), divided per cardinality of coalitions (s), of players:
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Now we can calculate the three power indices: Shapley value (ϕ), Banzhaf-Coleman index (χ ),
Normalized Banzhaf-Coleman index ( β).
ϕFG(v) = 0.6, ϕLP (v) = 0.1 ϕFF (v) = 0.1 ϕI(v) = 0.1 ϕSF (v) = 0.1 ϕSP (v) = 0 ϕPBP (v) = 0.
χFG(v) = 0.875 χLP (v) = 0.125 χFF (v) = 0.125 χI(v) = 0.125 χSF (v) = 0.125 χSP (v) =
0 χPBP (v) = 0.
βFG(v) =
56
88 βLP (v) =
8
88 βFF (v) =
8
88 βI(v) =
8
88 βSF (v) =
8
88 βSP (v) = 0 βPBP (v) = 0.
Table 5.1 represents the three power indices: Shapley value (ϕ), Banzhaf-Coleman index (χ ),
Normalized Banzhaf-Coleman index ( β).
Table 5.1: Elections of Ireland 2011
Parties Seats ϕ χ β
FG 76 0.6 0.875 5688
LP 37 0.1 0.125 888
FF 20 0.1 0.125 888
I 15 0.1 0.125 888
SF 14 0.1 0.125 888
SP 2 0 0 0
PBP 2 0 0 0
Example 5.9. The elections of Finland held April 2011 are a 9-players weighted voting game (N, v).
The Finnish Parliament has 200 seats so the quota q is fixed to 101, that is the majority plus one.
The weights are the seats which each party get.
Table 5.2 represents the three power indices: Shapley value (ϕ), Banzhaf-Coleman index (χ ),
Normalized Banzhaf-Coleman index ( β).
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Table 5.2: Elections of Finland 2011
Parties Seats ϕ χ β
KOK 44 0, 221428571428571 0, 44921875 115527
SDP 42 0, 2 0, 40234375 103527
PS 39 0, 176190476190476 0, 35546875 91527
KESK 35 0, 147619047619047 0, 29296875 75527
VAS 14 9, 64285714285705 · 10−2 0, 20703125 53527
VIHR 10 6, 19047619047615 · 10−2 0, 13671875 35527
SFP 9 5, 47619047619044 · 10−2 0, 12109375 31527
KD 6 3, 69047619047616 · 10−2 0, 08203125 21527
RA 1 4, 76190476190458 · 10−3 0, 01171875 3527
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Chapter 6
A new perspective on cooperative games
In the following chapter we are going to propose a new perspective on cooperative games, by
assuming that the involved players are supposed to face a common damage. The agents can choose
to make an agreement and form a coalition or to defect and face such damage individually.
When such disadvantage is modeled by a dynamic state variable evolving over time, cooperating and
non-cooperating agents solve different optimization problems, but they all must take into account
such state variable, as if it represented an externality in all their respective value functions. Even
if we just consider the cooperative and static aspects of such a game, the externality has a key role
in the worth of coalitions.
The approach we will develop relies on a class of cooperative games including an external effect,
such that the characteristic value function is split in two parts: one of them is standard, the other
one is affected by externality.
It is worth describing our idea of externality, which basically differs from the previous character-
izations in literature. Transferable utility games with positive externalities were defined by [99],
which related such externality to an increase in pay-off for the players in a specific coalition when
the remaining coalitions committed to merging. That is, in presence of a partition of the set of
agents and of multiple coalitions, a group of players may enjoy a positive spillover originating from
a merger of external coalitions rather than from a strategic choice.
In our case, on the other hand, the role of externality is played, and its amount is measured, by
108 A new perspective on cooperative games
a different state variable, not directly depending on the possibly undertaken agreements. Loosely
speaking, in our setting externalities arise in the same way as they do in standard dynamic oligopoly
models (see [64]).
When we relate this idea to the welfare of a country dealing with an emission reduction strategy, we
stress that the clean share of welfare is always positive, whereas the share including the pollution
effect is negative, then the total welfare must be globally evaluated.
In recent years, a growing interest has been devoted to dynamic models of pollution abatement (on
which [64] is quite an exhaustive survey), within both cooperative and non-cooperative frameworks.
In particular, the design and the modeling of International Environmental Agreements (IEA, from
now on) have been extensively and critically discussed in [46]. Just to cite some recent examples,
[48] investigated stability of coalitions to form IEAs empirically, [77] examined IEAs from the view-
point of evolutionary game theory, whereas [71] concentrated on the cooperative dynamic allocation
of total costs incurred by countries.
Our starting points are [5] and [18], which on their turn are related to [52] and [53]. We are going
to arrange a theoretical setup building on their model, investigate a wider set of properties for such
game structures, and finally carry out a coalitional power assessment in detail.
Substantially, this game relies on a cooperative structure which is generated as agents play
the strategies of a dynamic optimization game of pollution reduction. In this game each country
commits to maximizing her welfare either joining an IEA or refusing to join it, during the process of
accumulation of an aggregate stock of pollution. All the countries implement their optimal emissions
strategies, which differ between signatory and non-signatory countries. At a given level of pollution,
an aggregate welfare must be shared among them, according to the quantity of cooperating nations
and their related characteristics.
Note that this structure of game differs from the so-called global emission games (a very ac-
curate description of which can be found in [45], Chapter 9), which are basically conceived in a
static framework. The principal difference is in the structure of the damage cost function: in the
global emission games it is an increasing convex function of the aggregate emissions, whereas in our
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framework it is a function of the stock of pollution, which incorporates the emissions in its evolu-
tionary dynamics. We are going to characterize this game as an extended cooperative game affected
by negative externality. Explicit formulas for the Banzhaf-Coleman index and the Shapley value
(which belongs to the core of the game) will be reckoned and subsequently applied to a numerical
framework exposing the countries' actual achievement of the aggregate welfare. We will also discuss
the effects of the countries' marginal contributions to pollution on their share of welfare.
6.1 Extended cooperative games
We aim to extend the standard definition of cooperative games on a finite player set building
on the dependence on a second argument, a real variable. Let N be a finite set with cardinality n,
and consider a subset D ⊆ [0,+∞). Let v¯ : 2N ×D −→ R be a map such that v¯(∅, ·) = 0.
Definition 6.1. The ordered pair (N, v¯) is an extended cooperative game (ECG for short).
We will denote with Γ¯ the class of the extended cooperative games and with G¯n the set of all
characteristic functions v¯, corresponding to an extended cooperative game (N, v¯) ∈ Γ¯.
We are going to investigate the properties of the extended cooperative games, particularly taking
into account the effect of this non-negative variable whenever it negatively affects the values of
coalitions. Note that, in the simplest case, Definition 6.1 reduces to one-parameter families of
cooperative games, notwithstanding that we intend to make it fit to a possibly much wider class
of games. The second argument of an ECG is allowed to denote the state level in a dynamic
optimization problem when some agents make a coalition agreement. Under such circumstances,
v¯(·) is the optimal value function solving a discrete Bellman equation and its arguments respectively
represent the set of cooperating agents and the problem's state variable.
The next definition characterizes the suitable class of games on which we will focus our attention.
Specifically, we will denote with v¯NE(·) the characteristic function incorporating such negative
externality.
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Definition 6.2. Given (N, v¯NE) ∈ Γ¯ such that
v¯NE(S, P ) = w(S)− g(P )u(S)
∀S ∈ 2N \ {∅} ∀P ∈ D ⊆ [0,+∞), and
v¯NE(∅, P ) = 0
∀P ∈ D ⊆ [0,+∞) , where
• w(S) > 0 ∀S ∈ 2N \ {∅} , w(∅) = 0;
• u(S) > 0 ∀S ∈ 2N \ {∅} , u(∅) = 0;
• g(P ) ≥ 0 ∀P ∈ D, g strictly increasing;
we call such a game extended cooperative game with negative externalities (ECGWNE for
short).
Call Γ¯NE the class of ECGWNE, and G¯
n
NE the set of all characteristic functions v¯NE , correspond-
ing to an ECGWNE (N, v¯NE). For the sake of simplicity, consider the non-restrictive assumption
D = [0,+∞).
Proposition 6.1. Let (N, v¯NE) ∈ Γ¯NE . Then the pair (N, v¯NE) is a nonnegative ECGWNE iff
P ∈
[
0, min
S∈2N\{∅}
{
g−1
(
w (S)
u (S)
)}]
.
Proof. By hypothesis, ∀S ∈ 2N \ {∅} and ∀P ∈ [0,+∞) , we have
v¯NE(S) = w(S)− g(P )u(S)
which is nonnegative if and only if
g(P ) ≤ w (S)
u (S)
.
Since g is strictly increasing, then it's invertible. Taking the minimum interval with respect to all
possible coalitions, we obtain:
P ≤ min
S∈2N\{∅}
{
g−1
(
w (S)
u (S)
)}
.
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We can employ the same definitions of Chapter 5 for the convexity of an ECGWNE.
Proposition 6.2. Let (N, v¯NE) ∈ Γ¯NE be a nonnegative ECGWNE and let w(·) be convex and u(·)
be strictly convex. Then the pair (N, v¯NE) is a convex ECGWNE iff
P ∈
[
0,min
{
min
S, T∈2N
{
g−1
(
w (S ∪ T ) + w (S ∩ T )− w (S)− w (T )
u (S ∪ T ) + u (S ∩ T )− u (S)− u (T )
)}
,
min
S∈2N\{∅}
{
g−1
(
w (S)
u (S)
)}}]
,
where S, T are not both empty sets.
Proof. By hypothesis, ∀S, T ∈ 2N (not both empty), and ∀P ∈ [0,+∞) , we have
v¯NE (S ∪ T, P ) + v¯NE (S ∩ T, P )− v¯NE (S, P )− v¯NE (T, P )
= w (S ∪ T ) + w (S ∩ T )− w (S)− w (T )− g(P ) [u (S ∪ T ) + u (S ∩ T )− u (S)− u (T )] ,
which is nonnegative if and only if
g(P ) ≤ w (S ∪ T ) + w (S ∩ T )− w (S)− w (T )
u (S ∪ T ) + u (S ∩ T )− u (S)− u (T ) .
Since g is strictly increasing, then it's invertible. Taking the minimum interval with respect to all
possible coalitions, we obtain:
P ≤ min
S, T∈2N
{
g−1
(
w (S ∪ T ) + w (S ∩ T )− w (S)− w (T )
u (S ∪ T ) + u (S ∩ T )− u (S)− u (T )
)}
.
By intersecting such interval with the domain achieved in Proposition 6.1 for nonnegativity, we
complete the proof.
Remark 6.1. In Proposition 6.2, note that if we replace the assumption of strict convexity of u(·)
with the standard modularity assumption:
u (S ∪ T ) + u (S ∩ T )− u (S)− u (T ) = 0
for all S, T ∈ 2N , then the convexity of v¯NE (S, P ) holds for all P ∈ D.
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6.1.1 Power indices for extended cooperative games
We are going to arrange the foremost solution concepts of cooperative games for ECGWNE.
Definition 6.3. Given (N, v¯) ∈ Γ¯, the Shapley value of v¯(S, P ) is the vector ϕ(v¯(S, P )) =
(ϕ1(v¯(S, P )), ϕ2(v¯(S, P )), . . . , ϕn(v¯(S, P ))) ∈ Rn such that:
ϕi(v¯(S, P )) =
∑
i∈S
S⊆N
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
[(v¯(S, P ))− (v¯(S \ {i} , P )] , (6.1)
∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
In (6.1) s denotes the cardinality of each coalition S.
The computation of the Shapley value might require the sum of a very large number of terms.
In the following, we will employ the formulas related to the multilinear extension (MLE) of the
game:
Definition 6.4. Given (N, v¯) ∈ Γ¯, then the multilinear extension (or MLE) of (N, v¯) is
defined as follows:
h(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
S⊂N
(∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i/∈S
(1− xi)
)
v¯(S, P ), (6.2)
where xi ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
The MLE of a cooperative game (N, v¯) is related to the Shapley value by the following alternative
formulation:
ϕi(v¯) =
∫ 1
0
∂h
∂xi
(t, . . . , t)dt, ∀ i ∈ N. (6.3)
From now on, call h the MLE of an ECGWNE.
Theorem 6.1. Let (N, v¯NE) ∈ Γ¯NE be an ECGWNE. Then
ϕi(v¯NE) = ϕi(w)− g(P )ϕi(u), ∀ i ∈ N. (6.4)
Proof. Let a and b be the multilinear extensions of (N,w) and (N, u), respectively. Then, Definitions
6.2 and 6.4 imply:
h(x1, . . . , xn) = a(x1, . . . , xn)− g(P )b(x1, . . . , xn)
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where xi ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
Consequently, (6.3) implies:
ϕi(w)− g(P )ϕi(u) =
∫ 1
0
∂a
∂xi
(t, . . . , t)dt− g(P )
∫ 1
0
∂b
∂xi
(t, . . . , t)dt
=
∫ 1
0
∂ (a− g(P )b)
∂xi
(t, . . . , t)dt
=
∫ 1
0
∂h
∂xi
(t, . . . , t)dt = ϕi(v¯NE).
The following two corollaries simply follow from Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 and from Theorem 6.1.
Corollary 6.1. If (N, v¯NE) is a nonnegative ECGWNE, then:
ϕi(w)− g(P˜ )ϕi(u) ≤ ϕi(v¯NE) ≤ ϕi(w)− g(0)ϕi(u),
∀ i ∈ N , where
P˜ = min
S∈2N\{∅}
{
g−1
(
w (S)
u (S)
)}
.
Corollary 6.2. If (N, v¯NE) is a nonnegative and convex ECGWNE, then:
ϕi(w)− g(P̂ )ϕi(u) ≤ ϕi(v¯NE) ≤ ϕi(w)− g(0)ϕi(u),
∀ i ∈ N , where
P̂ = min
{
min
S, T∈2N
{
g−1
(
w (S ∪ T ) + w (S ∩ T )− w (S)− w (T )
u (S ∪ T ) + u (S ∩ T )− u (S)− u (T )
)}
, P˜
}
.
Another index of power has been suggested by Banzhaf and Coleman.
Definition 6.5. Given (N, v¯) ∈ Γ¯, the Banzhaf - Coleman index of v¯(S, P ) is the vector
χ(v¯(S, P )) = (χ1(v¯(S, P )), χ2(v¯(S, P )), . . . , χn(v¯(S, P ))) ∈ Rn such that:
χi(v¯(S, P )) =
∑
i∈S
S⊆N
(
1
2
)n−1
[v¯(S, P )− v¯(S \ {i} , P )],
∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
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The Banzhaf-Coleman index can be characterized via the MLE:
χi(v¯) =
∂h
∂xi
(
1
2
, . . . ,
1
2
)
, ∀ i ∈ N. (6.5)
Theorem 6.2. Let (N, v¯NE) ∈ Γ¯NE be an ECGWNE. Then
χi(v¯NE) = χi(w)− g(P )χi(u) ∀i ∈ N (6.6)
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 6.1, we have:
χi(w)− g(P )χi(u) = ∂a
∂xi
(
1
2
, . . . ,
1
2
)
− g(P ) ∂b
∂xi
(
1
2
, . . . ,
1
2
)
=
∂ (a− g(P )b)
∂xi
(
1
2
, . . . ,
1
2
)
=
∂h
∂xi
(
1
2
, . . . ,
1
2
)
= χi(v¯NE).
The estimates provided by Corollaries 6.1 and 6.2 can also be applied to χ(v¯NE).
The core of an ECGWNE can be synthetically redefined too, and it will turn out to be a key
tool for our next application. Suppose that P ∗ ∈ D is a fixed level of P , such that Proposition 6.1
holds.
Definition 6.6. Given (N, v¯NE) ∈ Γ¯NE , and P ∗ such that v¯NE ≥ 0, the following set of vectors:
CP ∗(v¯NE) =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn :
n∑
j=1
xj = w(N)− g(P ∗)u(N), (6.7)
∑
k∈S
xk ≥ w(S)− g(P ∗)u(S), ∀ S ∈ 2N
}
(6.8)
is the core of v¯NE at P ∗.
Different levels of externality entail disjoint cores, as we show in the following:
Proposition 6.3. If P1 6= P2, then CP1(v¯NE) ∩ CP2(v¯NE) = ∅.
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Proof. If at least one of the two cores is empty, the proof is trivial. Suppose they are both nonempty.
By Definition 6.2, P2 > P1 implies g(P2) > g(P1). Therefore, if z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ CP1(v¯NE), then
z1 + z2 + . . .+ zn = w(N)− g(P1)u(N) > w(N)− g(P2)u(N),
then z /∈ CP2(v¯NE), hence the two cores have no common imputations.
6.2 Pollution-Control Game
We want to give some practical applications of the class of games defined in Section 6.1. The
first one is based on environmental issues. Taking inspiration from [5] we consider a set N of n
players, called countries in the sequel, involved in a pollution-control game. Denote by ejt the
carbon emissions arising from the production activity of player j at the instant of time t ∈ [0,+∞).
Assume that the net revenues derived from player j′ s production activity in a given period are
given by the following concave function of his emission R(·) such that
R(ejt) = ejt
(
bj − 1
2
ejt
)
,
where bj is a strictly positive parameter denoting the emission level at which the revenue attains its
maximum. The stock of pollution, which causes damage to the environment, evolves according to
Pt = Pt−1 (1− δ) +
∑
j∈N
ejt,
with P0 given, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the absorption rate by Mother Nature. Players suffer an
environmental damage arising from global pollution, which is assumed linear in the pollution stock,
and given by
Dj(Pt) = djPt,
where dj > 0 is the constant marginal damage. The total discounted welfare over an infinite horizon
of player j is then given by
Wj =
+∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ejt
(
bj − ejt
2
)
− djPt
)
,
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such that
Pt = Pt−1 (1− δ) +
∑
j∈N
ejt with P0 given,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the one-period discount factor assumed common to all players.
Our purpose is the design and implementation of an International Environmental Agreement
(IEA), that is a mechanism allocating to each country a collectively suitable emissions policy.
6.2.1 Different Approaches
Small coalition approach
Assume that a set of players, identified as `signatory countries', decide to join an IEA, according to
which their production activity is decided by maximizing the aggregate welfare of the coalition. We
denote by S the set of signatory countries, with cardinality s. The remaining players, identified as
`non-signatory countries' act individually, that is, each of them decides her production activity by
maximizing her individual welfare, and we denote by S¯ the set of non-signatories, with cardinality
n− s.
As part of the agreement, we assume that each signatory country has to punish a non-signatory
for its irresponsible behavior with a punishment proportional to the level of pollution, reflecting an
environmental concern increasing with pollution stock. The non-environmental cost incurred by a
non-signatory punished by s signatories when the pollution stock is Pt is thus given by sαPt. We
also suppose that punishing itself has a cost, which is proportional to the punishment αPt imposed
to the n− s non -signatory countries, so that each signatory incurs a non-environmental cost given
by (n− s) ταPt, where τ ≥ 0. As a consequence, the welfare of a signatory country j ∈ S in time
period t when the number of non-signatories is n− s is given by
WSt (ejt, Pt, s) = ejt
(
bj − 1
2
ejt
)
− djPt − (n− s)ταPt,
and the welfare of a non-signatory j ∈ S¯ is given by
W S¯t (ejt, Pt, s) = ejt
(
bj − 1
2
ejt
)
− djPt − αsPt.
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Notice that we implicitly assume that all countries are punished in the same way, and that the cost
of punishment is the same for all countries.
Now, to solve the dynamic emissions game, we assume that, for a given fixed set of signatories,
countries optimize their welfare by taking into account the evolution of the pollution stock. The
total discounted welfare of players is maximized over an infinite horizon, where β ∈ (0, 1) is the
one-period discount factor assumed common to all players. The welfare optimization problem for a
signatory country j ∈ S is thus given by
max
(ej)j∈S
WS =
∑
j∈S
+∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ejt
(
bjt − ejt
2
)
− Pt (dj + τα (n− s))
)
s.t.
Pt = Pt−1 (1− δ) +
∑
i∈S
eit +
∑
k∈S¯
ekt, with P0 given,
where ejt is the emissions of country j during period t and ej denotes the sequence of emissions
{ejt}t∈[0,+∞) . In the same way, the welfare optimization problem for a non-signatory country j ∈ S¯
is
max
(ej)j∈S¯
W S¯ =
+∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ejt
(
bjt − ejt
2
)
− Pt (dj + αs)
)
s.t.
Pt = Pt−1 (1− δ) +
∑
i∈S
eit +
∑
k∈S¯
ekt, with P0 given.
As in [18], we use a dynamic programming formulation where the state variable is P , that is, the
pollution stock level in the preceding time period. We obtain a Nash equilibrium in stationary feed-
back strategies between the group of signatories, acting as a single player, and the non-signatories,
acting as n − s individual players, where s ∈ [0, n]. The case where s = 0 corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium between all players, or fully non-cooperative outcome, while the case where s = n cor-
responds to the optimization of the total welfare of all players, or fully cooperative outcome (grand
coalition). We call k the constant representing the combined effect of the discount factor and the
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natural pollution decay, that is,
k =
1
1− β(1− δ) > 1.
For the set of signatory countries, denoted with ES¯ the emissions of non-signatory countries, that
is ES¯ =
∑
k∈S¯ ek, the value function V
S
(
P ;ES¯
)
represents the optimal total welfare of the group,
given ES¯ , and it satisfies
V S
(
P ;ES¯
)
= max
(ej)j∈S
∑
j∈S
ej
(
bj − ej
2
)
(6.9)
− (dj + τα (n− s))
P k − 1
kβ
+
∑
j∈S
ej + E
S¯

+ βV S
P k − 1
kβ
+
∑
j∈S
ej + E
S¯ ;ES¯

Proposition 6.4. The value function (6.9) of a signatory country is linear in P. The optimal
reaction of signatory countries is independent of the level of pollution and of the defectors' strategy
and it is given by
eSj = bj − ksτα (n− s)− k
∑
j∈S
dj ,
assuming non-negative emissions.
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Proof. Assume that V S
(
P ;ES¯
)
= hS −mSP. Then we have
V S
(
P ;ES¯
)
= max
(ej)j∈S
∑
j∈S
ej
(
bj − ej
2
)
− (dj + τα (n− s))
P k − 1
kβ
+
∑
j∈S
ej + E
S¯

+ βV S
P k − 1
kβ
+
∑
j∈S
ej + E
S¯ ;ES¯

= max
(ej)j∈S
∑
j∈S
ej
(
bj − ej
2
)
− (dj + τα (n− s))
P k − 1
kβ
+
∑
j∈S
ej + E
S¯

+ β
hS −mS
P k − 1
kβ
+
∑
j∈S
ej + E
S¯

=: max
(ej)j∈S
v1 (ej) .
Differentiating with respect to emissions yields:
d
dej
v1 (ej) =
∑
j∈S
bj −
∑
j∈S
ej − s
∑
j∈S
dj + τα (n− s)
− sβmS .
d
dej
∑
j∈S
bj −
∑
j∈S
ej − s
∑
j∈S
dj + τα (n− s)
− sβmS
 = −s < 0.
So that the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient, provided that the solutions is interior.
The FOC are satisfied at
eSj = bj −
∑
j∈S
dj − τα (n− s)− βmS .
Replacing eSj in (6.9) and placing c
S =
∑
j∈S dj + τα (n− s) , we obtain
V S
(
P ;ES¯
)
=
1
2
∑
j∈S
(
bj − cS − βmS
) (
bj + c
S + βmS
)− cS∑
j∈S
(
bj − cS − βmS
)− cSES¯
+βhS − βmS
∑
j∈S
(
bj − cS − βmS
)− βmSES¯ − P k − 1
kβ
(
cS + βmS
)
= hS −mSP.
120 A new perspective on cooperative games
so that
mS = cS
k − 1
β
hS =
1
1− β
∑
j∈S
(
bj − cS − βcS k − 1
β
)1
2
∑
j∈S
(
bj + c
S + βcS
k − 1
β
)
− cS − βcS k − 1
β

−ES¯
(
cS + βcS
k − 1
β
)]
The optimal emissions of a signatory country are therefore:
eSj = bj − ksτα (n− s)− k
∑
j∈S
dj .
In the same way, the value function V S¯j of a non-signatory country represents its optimal total
welfare, given P and the emissions of the other players, denoted by ES+, and it satisfies
V S¯j
(
P ;ES+
)
= max
e
{
e
(
bj − e
2
)
−
(
P
k − 1
kβ
+ ES+ + e
)
(dj + αs) (6.10)
+ βV S¯j
(
P
k − 1
kβ
+ ES+ + e;ES+
)}
,
Proposition 6.5. The value function (6.9) of a defector country is linear in P. The optimal reaction
of non-member countries is independent of the level of pollution and of the other players' strategy
and it is given by
eS¯j = bj − k (dj + αs) ,
assuming non-negative emissions.
Proof. Assume that V S¯j
(
P ;ES+
)
= hS¯ −mS¯P. Then we have:
V S¯j
(
P ;ES+
)
= max
e
{
e
(
bj − e
2
)
−
(
P
k − 1
kβ
+ ES+ + e
)
(dj + αs)
+ βV S¯j
(
P
k − 1
kβ
+ ES+ + e;ES+
)}
= max
e
{
e
(
bj − e
2
)
−
(
P
k − 1
kβ
+ ES+ + e
)
(dj + αs)
+ β
(
hS¯ −mS¯
(
P
k − 1
kβ
+ ES+ + e;ES+
))}
=: max
e
v2 (e) .
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Differentiating with respect to emissions yields:
d
de
v2 (e) = bj − e− dj − αs− βmS¯ .
d
de
[
bj − e− dj − αs− βmS¯
]
= −1 < 0.
So that the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient, provided that the solutions is interior.
The FOC are satisfied at
eS¯j = bj − dj − αs− βmS¯ .
Replacing eS¯j in (6.10) and placing c
S¯ = dj + αs , we obtain
V S
(
P ;ES
+
)
=
1
2
(
bj − cS¯ − βmS¯
)(
bj + c
S¯ + βmS¯
)
− cS¯
(
bj − cS¯ − βmS¯ + ES+
)
+βhS¯ − βmS¯
(
bj − cS¯ − βmS¯ + ES+
)
− P k − 1
kβ
(
cS¯ + βmS¯
)
= hS¯ −mS¯P
so that
mS¯ = cS¯
k − 1
β
hS =
1
1− β
[(
bj − cS¯ − βcS¯ k − 1
β
)(
1
2
(
bj + c
S¯ + βcS¯
k − 1
β
)
− cS¯ − βcS¯ k − 1
β
)
− ES+
(
cS¯ + βcS¯
k − 1
β
)]
.
The optimal emissions of a defector country are therefore:
eS¯j = bj − k (dj + αs) .
Combining these results, the equilibrium strategy vector is given by
(
eSj , e
S¯
k
)
j∈S,k∈S¯
and the
total emissions at equilibrium when the set of signatory countries is S are
TS =
n∑
j=1
bj − k
∑
j∈S¯
dj + s
∑
j∈S
dj + sα (sτ + 1) (n− s)
 ,
from which we obtain the steady-state of the pollution stock corresponding to coalition S
PS =
TSkβ
kβ − k + 1 .
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Finally, the total discounted welfare, over an infinite horizon, of player j, according to his status,
when the set of signatories is S and the pollution stock is P, is given by
WSj (P ) =
b2j − k2
(∑
k∈S dk + τα (n− s) s
)2
2 (1− β) (6.11)
− (dj + τα (n− s)) k
(
P
k − 1
kβ
+
TS
1− β
)
.
W S¯j (P ) =
b2j − k2 (dj + αs)2
2 (1− β) − k (dj + αs)
(
P
k − 1
kβ
+
TS
1− β
)
. (6.12)
To conclude, we point out that the assumption that the damage function is linear in P makes the
emission strategies of all players independent of the stock of pollution, but this does not mean that
the emissions of the players are necessarily constant in time, because they depend on the number
of signatories, which could depend on the stock of pollution.
To check for the stability of a coalition, we use a dynamic version of the equilibrium concept
introduced in [34]. Thus, internal stability of a coalition S is achieved at P if no signatory country
would increase its total discounted welfare by deciding to quit the coalition, that is
WSj (P ) ≥W S¯+jj (P ) ∀j ∈ S.
Similarly, external stability of a coalition S is achieved at P if no non-signatory country would
increase its total discounted welfare by deciding to join the coalition, that is
W S¯j (P ) > W
S+j
j (P ) ∀j ∈ S¯.
A general result in static games with identical players is that these stability conditions can only
be satisfied by very small coalitions if no additional mechanism is provided in the agreement. For
instance, in the quadratic cost/linear damage case, which corresponds to our model, they can only
be satisfied by coalitions of two members. In a dynamic setting with identical players, Breton et al.
in [18] show that the addition of a punishment mechanism in the agreement allows to obtain stable
coalitions where s ∈ n
(
τ
1+τ , 1
]
, depending on the value of α and of Pt.
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Grand coalition approach
In the grand coalition approach to IEAs, it is assumed that a group of countries has already agreed
to participate in a joint agreement. The design of a stable IEA then reduces to finding a way
to distribute the benefits of cooperation to the members of the coalition, which is acceptable to
all players. In opposition to what is assumed in the small coalition approach, the grand coalition
approach implies that the agreement collapses if at least one player defects from it. In this sense
this approach is also called the cooperative one in opposition to the small coalition approach, called
non-cooperative approach.
If one interprets the characteristic function v(S), defined in the Chapter 5, as the payoff that
a coalition S of countries can secure when they sign an environmental treaty, then it is clear that
its actual value depends on the environmental strategies (or behavior) of the left-out-players (LOP,
for short), i.e., N \ S. A first option is to assume that v(S) is given as a Nash equilibrium payoff
of the non-cooperative game played between S and the LOP acting individually. In that case, each
characteristic function value involves computing a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game with
n − s + 1 players. This approach is often referred to as PNE (for Partial Nash Equilibrium), or
γ -characteristic function. A second option is to assume that the LOP also form a coalition, and,
consequently, v(S) is defined as a Nash equilibrium payoff of the non-cooperative game between S
and N \S. The advantage of this approach with respect to the previous one is that each equilibrium
problem now involves finding a Nash equilibrium of a two-player non-cooperative game, however,
it may not lead to a superadditivity characteristic function. For an example in the framework of
IEAs see [17]. A third possibility is to follow [123] and suppose that the LOP form an anti-coalition
whose sole aim is to minimize the payoff of coalition S, which transforms the computation of v(S)
into the simple problem of finding a solution to a zero-sum game.
In the context of IEAs, the PNE approach seems to be the most attractive. Indeed, there is
no reason to believe that, if some countries decide to form a coalition to tackle an environmental
problem, then necessarily the remaining players will design a parallel treaty, and even less a treaty
aiming at minimizing the welfare of the environmentally responsible countries. Further, the fact
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that this approach leads to a superadditive characteristic function is definitely an interesting feature.
The only drawback is that it is heavily demanding in terms of computation: with n players, one
needs to solve 2n − 1 equilibrium problems. To reduce the computational burden, Petrosjan and
Zaccour in [96] propose a characteristic function where the LOP stick to their Nash strategies as
determined in the fully non-cooperative game, i.e., when each player acts alone. The advantage of
this approach is that only one equilibrium problem has to be solved, and it only remains to solve
the optimization problem of each possible coalition.
The PNE approach corresponds to the assumption used for the solution of the emission game
in the small coalition approach: the members of a coalition S decide to join an IEA, according
to which their production activity is decided by maximizing the aggregate welfare of the coalition.
The remaining left-out-players act individually, that is, each of them decides its production activity
by maximizing his individual welfare. The solution of the emissions game can be retrieved from
the solution of the dynamic programs (6.9) and (6.10) by setting α to 0. At P, the characteristic
function assigns to each of the possible subsets S ⊆ N the total discounted welfare of coalition S
over an infinite horizon, that is
v̂(S, P ) =
∑
j∈S b
2
j − sk2
(∑
j∈S dj
)2
2 (1− β)
−k
P k − 1
kβ
+
∑
j∈N bj − k
(∑
l∈S¯ dl + s
∑
j∈S dj
)
1− β
∑
j∈S
dj .
6.2.2 Main Features
Our aim is to study the main features of this characteristic function.
Remark 6.2. It's necessary to check the positivity of v̂(S, P ), subject to the constraints for the
optimal emissions obtained in Propositions 6.4 and 6.5, which entail the following lower bound for
the sum of all bj, for each coalition S ∈ 2N :
∑
j∈N
bj ≥ k
s∑
i∈S
di +
∑
l∈S¯
dl
 . (6.13)
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Theorem 6.3. If
max
S
k
s∑
i∈S
di +
∑
l∈S¯
dl
 ≤∑
j∈N
bj < min
S 6=∅

∑
j∈S b
2
j
2k
∑
j∈S dj
+
sk
2
∑
j∈S
dj + k
∑
l∈S¯
dl
 (6.14)
holds, then the pair (N, v̂) is a nonnegative ECGWNE for all P ∈ [0,+∞) .
Proof. Recalling the notation in Section 6.1, we can define:
v̂(S, P ) = ŵ(S)− ĝ(P )û(S),
where
ŵ(S) =
∑
j∈S b
2
j − sk2
(∑
j∈S dj
)2
2 (1− β) − k
∑j∈N bj − k
(∑
j∈S¯ dj + s
∑
j∈S dj
)
1− β
∑
j∈S
dj ,
û(S) =
k − 1
β
∑
j∈S
dj ,
ĝ(P ) = P.
Obviously, if S = ∅ then v̂(∅, P ) = 0. Moreover ĝ(P ) is nonnegative in [0,+∞) and strictly increas-
ing, and û(S) is positive ∀S 6= ∅. After extending (6.13) to all S ⊆ N , we are going to assess the
positivity of ŵ(S):
ŵ(S) =
∑
j∈S b
2
j − sk2
(∑
j∈S dj
)2
2 (1− β) −
k
∑
j∈S dj
1− β
∑
j∈N
bj − k
∑
l∈S¯
dl + s
∑
j∈S
dj

=
∑
j∈S b
2
j + sk
2
(∑
j∈S dj
)2
2 (1− β) −
k
∑
j∈S dj
∑
j∈N bj
1− β +
k2
∑
j∈S dj
∑
l∈S¯ dl
1− β > 0,
if the condition (6.14) holds.
Proposition 6.6. The game (N, v̂) is convex ∀ P ∈ [0,+∞).
Proof. By Proposition 6.2 and Remark6.1, since
û (S ∪ T ) + û (S ∩ T )− û (S)− û (T )
=
k − 1
β
 ∑
j∈S∪T
dj +
∑
j∈S∩T
dj −
∑
j∈S
dj −
∑
j∈T
dj
 = 0,
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then if ŵ is convex ∀ P ∈ [0,+∞) , convexity is ensured for all nonnegative P , hence (N, v̂) is a
convex ECGWNE for all suitable P such that Proposition 6.2 holds. If we denote respectively with
s, t, h the cardinality of S, T, S ∩ T, we have
ŵ(S ∪ T ) + ŵ(S ∩ T )− ŵ(S)− ŵ(T ) = k
2
2(1− β)
(s+ t− h− 2)
 ∑
j∈S∪T
dj
2 + (h− 2)
 ∑
j∈S∩T
dj
2 + (6.15)
+(2− s)
∑
j∈S
dj
2 + (2− t)
∑
j∈T
dj
2
=
k2
2(1− β)
s
 ∑
j∈S∪T
dj
2 −
∑
j∈S
dj
2
+t
 ∑
j∈S∩T
dj
2 −
∑
j∈T
dj
2
+h
 ∑
j∈S∩T
dj
2 −
 ∑
j∈S∪T
dj
2+ 2
∑
j∈S
dj
2
+
∑
j∈T
dj
2 −
 ∑
j∈S∪T
dj
2 −
 ∑
j∈S∩T
dj
2
≥ k
2
2(1− β)
h
 ∑
j∈S∪T
dj
2 −
∑
j∈S
dj
2 +
 ∑
j∈S∩T
dj
2 −
∑
j∈T
dj
2
+2
−
 ∑
j∈S∪T
dj
2 +
∑
j∈S
dj
2 −
 ∑
j∈S∩T
dj
2 +
∑
j∈T
dj
2
=
k2(h− 2)
2(1− β)
 ∑
j∈S∪T
dj
2 +
 ∑
j∈S∩T
dj
2 −
∑
j∈S
dj
2 −
∑
j∈T
dj
2
=
k2(h− 2)
2(1− β)
 ∑
j∈S∩T
dj −
∑
j∈S
dj
 ∑
j∈S∩T
dj +
∑
j∈S
dj

+
 ∑
j∈S∪T
dj −
∑
j∈T
dj
 ∑
j∈S∪T
dj +
∑
j∈T
dj
 ,
and since ∑
j∈S
dj +
∑
j∈T
dj =
∑
j∈S∪T
dj +
∑
j∈S∩T
dj ,
then (6.16) is equal to
=
k2(h− 2)
2(1− β)
∑
j∈T
dj −
∑
j∈S∪T
dj
 ∑
j∈S∩T
dj +
∑
j∈S
dj −
∑
j∈S∪T
dj −
∑
j∈T
dj
 ,
which is positive because its two factors are both negative, consequently ŵ(·) is convex and the
proof is complete.
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The convexity of (N, v̂) ensures that its Shapley value belongs to its core (see Definition 5.18).
Moreover
Corollary 6.3. If n ≥ 2, the game (N, v̂) is an essential ECGWNE ∀P ∈ [0,+∞) .
Proof. We have that the game (N, ŵ) is an essential game. Indeed
ŵ(N)−
∑
j∈N
ŵ({j}) =
−nk2
(∑
j∈N dj
)2
+ k2
∑
j∈N d
2
j
2 (1− β)
+
nk2
(∑
j∈N dj
)2
1− β −
k2
(∑
j∈N dj
)2
1− β
=
k2(n− 2)
(∑
j∈N dj
)2
2 (1− β) > 0
Moreover
û(N)−
∑
j∈N
û({j}) = 0
The thesis follows because v̂ is an affine trasformation of ŵ and û.
Remark 6.3. The nonnegative ECGWNE (N, v̂) is a monotonic game ∀P ∈ [0,+∞) .
6.2.3 Welfare allocation among players
First of all we consider the following notation:
Notation 6.1. Let (N, v̂), be an extended cooperative game. We indicate respectively with ϕ(n)i (v̂)
and with χ(n)i (v̂) the Shapley value and the Banzhaf - Coleman index of (N, v̂) when the number of
players is n.
(Case 1) Symmetric players In this case we assume symmetry by positing di = dj = d and
bi = bj = b for all i, j ∈ N.
Proposition 6.7. When agents are symmetric, the Shapley value for the extended cooperative game
(N, v̂) ∀i ∈ N ∀n ≥ 2 is
ϕ
(n)
i (v̂) =
(ndk − b)2
2(1− β) − P
[
d
k − 1
β
]
.
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Proof. We proceed by induction on the number of players. We calculate the Shapley value using
the multilinear extension. For n = 2 we obtain
ϕ
(2)
i (v̂) =
(2dk − b)2
2(1− β) − P
[
d
k − 1
β
]
.
Supposing that the thesis is true for n, we are going to prove it for n+ 1.
The inductive hypothesis implies that
ϕ
(n−1)
i (v̂) =
((n− 1)dk − b)2
2(1− β) − P
[
d
k − 1
β
]
and
ϕ
(n)
i (v̂) =
(ndk − b)2
2(1− β) − P
[
d
k − 1
kβ
]
,
and so
ϕ
(n)
i (v̂)− ϕ(n−1)i (v̂) =
d2k2 (2n− 1)− 2dkb
2 (1− β) .
Consequently, it suffices to show that
ϕ
(n+1)
i (v̂)− ϕ(n)i (v̂) =
d2k2 (2(n+ 1)− 1)− 2dkb
2 (1− β)
Then
ϕ
(n)
i (v̂) +
d2k2 (2(n+ 1)− 1)− 2dkb
2 (1− β) =
=
(ndk − b)2
2(1− β) − P
[
d
k − 1
β
]
+
d2k2 (2(n+ 1)− 1)− 2dkb
2 (1− β) =
=
((n+ 1)dk − b)2
2(1− β) − P
[
d
k − 1
kβ
]
= ϕ
(n+1)
i (v̂).
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Remark 6.4. Proposition 6.7 maintains that the Shapley value is constant across players under
symmetry, providing an alternative formula for the Shapley value:
ϕ
(n)
i (v̂) =
v̂(N,P )
n
∀i ∈ N, ∀n ≥ 2 (6.16)
Since the Banzhaf - Coleman index is equal for all players, we can state the following:
Proposition 6.8. If dj = d and bj = b ∀j ∈ N, then we have
χ
(n)
i (v̂) ≤ ϕ(n)i (v̂) ∀i ∈ N, ∀n ≥ 2 (6.17)
Proof. Since Banzhaf-Coleman index doesn't satisfy the efficiency axiom (see [87]), whereas the
Shapley value does, we have
∑
i∈N
χ
(n)
i (v̂) ≤ v̂(N,P ) =
∑
i∈N
ϕ
(n)
i (v̂).
Moreover, since none of the indices depend on players, we have
nχ
(n)
i (v̂) ≤ v̂(N,P ) = nϕ(n)i (v̂) ∀i ∈ N,
trivially proving the assertion.
We can note that in the relation (6.17) the strict inequality does not hold because, for example,
for n = 2, χ
(n)
i (v̂) = ϕ
(n)
i (v̂) ∀i ∈ N.
Proposition 6.8 means that for all agents, the allocation corresponding to the Shapley value is
preferable to the one corresponding to the Banzhaf-Coleman index.
(Case 2) Non Symmetric players
We can calculate some indices of power for the extended cooperative game (N, v̂), in the general
case.
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Proposition 6.9. The Shapley value for the extended cooperative game (N, v̂) ∀i ∈ N ∀n ≥ 2 is:
ϕ
(n)
i (v̂) =
k2
3(1− β)
(n− 2) di
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj +
n∑
j,k=1
j<k
j 6=i
djdk
+ k
2
4(1− β)
(n− 1) d2i + n∑
j=1
j 6=i
d2j
+
+
b2i − k2d2i
2 (1− β) −
k
1− β
 n∑
j=1
bj − k
n∑
j=1
dj
 di − P [dik − 1
β
]
. (6.18)
Proof. By induction on the number of players, we use Theorem 6.1 to calculate the Shapley value.
For n = 2 we have
ϕ
(2)
1 (v̂) =
k2(3d21 + d
2
2) + 4k
2d1d2 + 2b
2
1 − 4kd1(b1 + b2)
4(1− β) − P
[
d1
k − 1
β
]
,
ϕ
(2)
2 (v̂) =
k2(d21 + 3d
2
2) + 4k
2d1d2 + 2b
2
2 − 4kd2(b1 + b2)
4(1− β) − P
[
d2
k − 1
β
]
.
For n = 3 we have
ϕ
(3)
1 (v̂) =
k2
(
12d21 + 3d
2
2 + 3d
2
3 + 16d1d2 + 16d1d3 + 4d2d3
)
12(1− β)
+
6b21 − 12kd1(b1 + b2 + b3)
12(1− β) − P
[
d1
k − 1
β
]
.
Similarly
ϕ
(3)
2 (v̂) =
k2
(
3d21 + 12d
2
2 + 3d
2
3 + 16d1d2 + 4d1d3 + 16d2d3
)
+ 6b22
12(1− β)
− 12kd2(b1 + b2 + b3)
12(1− β) − P
[
d2
k − 1
β
]
.
ϕ
(3)
3 (v̂) =
k2
(
3d21 + 3d
2
2 + 12d
2
3 + 4d1d2 + 16d1d3 + 16d2d3
)
+ 6b23
12(1− β)
− 12kd3(b1 + b2 + b3)
12(1− β) − P
[
d3
k − 1
β
]
.
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Supposing that the thesis is true for n, we prove it for n + 1. By the inductive hypothesis we
have that:
ϕ
(n−1)
i (v̂) =
k2
3(1− β)
(n− 3) di
n−1∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj +
n−1∑
j,k=1
j<k
j 6=i
djdk
+ k
2
4(1− β)
(n− 2) d2i + n−1∑
j=1
j 6=i
d2j
+
+
b2i − k2d2i
2 (1− β) −
k
1− β
n−1∑
j=1
bj − k
n−1∑
j=1
dj
 di − P [dik − 1
β
]
,
ϕ
(n)
i (v̂) =
k2
3(1− β)
(n− 2) di
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj +
n∑
j,k=1
j<k
j 6=i
djdk
+ k
2
4(1− β)
(n− 1) d2i + n∑
j=1
j 6=i
d2j
+
+
b2i − k2d2i
2 (1− β) −
k
1− β
 n∑
j=1
bj − k
n∑
j=1
dj
 di − P [dik − 1
β
]
.
Therefore
ϕ
(n)
i (v̂)− ϕ(n−1)i (v̂) =
k2
3 (1− β)
didn + dn n−1∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj
+ k24 (1− β) [d2i + d2n]− k1− β [bn − kdn] di.
We have to show that
ϕ
(n+1)
i (v̂)−ϕ(n)i (v̂) =
k2
3 (1− β)
didn+1 + dn+1 n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj
+ k24 (1− β) [d2i + d2n+1]− k1− β [bn+1 − kdn+1] di.
Then
ϕ
(n)
i (v̂) +
k2
3 (1− β)
didn+1 + dn+1 n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj
+ k24 (1− β) [d2i + d2n+1]− k1− β [bn+1 − kdn+1] di
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=
k2
3(1− β)
(n− 2) di
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj + didn+1 +
n∑
j,k=1
j<k
j 6=i
djdk + dn+1
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj

+
k2
4(1− β)
(n− 1) d2i + d2i + n∑
j=1
j 6=i
d2j + d
2
n+1
+ b2i − k2d2i2 (1− β)
− k
1− β
 n∑
j=1
bj + bn+1 − k
 n∑
j=1
dj + dn+1
 di − P [dik − 1
β
]
=
k2
3(1− β)
(n− 1) di
n+1∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj +
n+1∑
j,k=1
j<k
j 6=i
djdk
+ k
2
4(1− β)
nd2i + n+1∑
j=1
j 6=i
d2j

+
b2i − k2d2i
2 (1− β) −
k
1− β
n+1∑
j=1
bj − k
n+1∑
j=1
dj
 di − P [dik − 1
β
]
= ϕ
(n+1)
i (v̂).
Moreover, we have a similar formula for the Banzhaf - Coleman index.
Proposition 6.10. The Banzhaf - Coleman index for the extended cooperative game (N, v̂)
∀i ∈ N ∀n ≥ 2 is
χ
(n)
i (v̂) =
k2
4(1− β)
(n− 2) di
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj +
n∑
j,k=1
j<k
j 6=i
djdk
+ k
2
4(1− β)
(n− 1) d2i + n∑
j=1
j 6=i
d2j
+
+
b2i − k2d2i
2 (1− β) −
k
1− β
 n∑
j=1
bj − k
n∑
j=1
dj
 di − P [dik − 1
β
]
. (6.19)
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Proof. It is similar to the proof of Proposition 6.9.
Propositions 6.9 and 6.10 imply that, also in the non-symmetric case, the Banzhaf - Coleman
index is suboptimal respect to Shapley value, i.e.
χ
(n)
i (v̂) ≤ ϕ(n)i (v̂) ∀i ∈ N ∀n ≥ 2.
In particular, by (6.18) and (6.19), the difference between the two measures is given by:
ϕ
(n)
i (v̂)− χ(n)i (v̂) =
k2
12(1− β)
(n− 2) di
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dj +
n∑
j,k=1
j<k
j 6=i
djdk
 .
Hence, they are equal for n = 2 players.
6.2.4 A numerical simulation
As in [5], we use the MERGE model to calibrate the parameters of the game. MERGE is a
Model for Evaluating the Regional and Global Effects of GHG reductions. In MERGE, the world is
divided into nine geopolitical regions: Canada, Australia and New Zealand (CANZ); China; Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU); India; Japan; Mexico and OPEC (MOPEC); USA;
Western Europe (WEUR) and the rest of the world (ROW). The data are borrowed from [5].
Table 6.1: Model parameter values
bj dj (low) dj (high) β k P
USA 1759 0.358 0.429 0.95 15.095 390000
WEUR 993 0.310 0.4345 0.95 15.095 390000
Japan 318 0.143 0.1495 0.95 15.095 390000
CANZ 293 0.053 0.0685 0.95 15.095 390000
EEFSU 919 0.056 0.134 0.95 15.095 390000
China 985 0.216 0.807 0.95 15.095 390000
India 334 0.063 0.1915 0.95 15.095 390000
MOPEC 751 0.100 0.231 0.95 15.095 390000
ROW 1202 0.288 0.717 0.95 15.095 390000
With data of Table 6.1, the game (N, v̂) satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 6.3, and so it's an
ECGWNE.
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In the following two tables, we are going to show the Shapley values and the Banzhaf-Coleman
indices for this game in the two different cases corresponding to distinct levels for dj .
Table 6.2: Numerical solution (low case)
ϕ(9) (Shapley) χ(9) (Banzhaf)
USA 28062244 28060838
WEUR 7368204.666 7366899.333
Japan -137234.3214 -138108.2105
CANZ 434146.1666 433557.5263
EEFSU 7997129.5 7996530.5
China 7966384.666 7965306.5
India 610759.9444 610137.8
MOPEC 4837516 4836773.8
ROW 12132794.5 12131538.66
Table 6.3: Numerical solution (high case)
ϕ(9) (Shapley) χ(9) (Banzhaf)
USA 27506247 27501994
WEUR 6381780 6377499
Japan -180148.8947 -182755.8823
CANZ 317080.4761 315016.8571
EEFSU 7378603.3333 7376098
China 3233134.3333 3227223.1667
India -412872.8889 -415749.8571
MOPEC 3794584.25 3791460.6667
ROW 8701525.5 8695950
The above tables suggest us a reduction effect of the individual welfare for higher values of di,
namely the sensitivity of the power indices with respect to the coefficients di can be assessed more
accurately, by taking into account the first order derivatives of (6.18) and (6.19):
Proposition 6.11. There exist n threshold values
P∗i =
β(1− β)
k(k − 1)
k(n+ 1)(∑j 6=i dj
3
+
di
2
)
−
n∑
j=1
bj

such that for any P > P∗i the Shapley value of the i-th country decreases as its marginal contribution
to the stock of pollution increases.
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Proof. Deriving (6.18) with respect to di we have:
∂ϕ
(n)
i (v̂)
∂di
=
k2
1− β
n+ 1
3
∑
j 6=i
dj +
n+ 1
2
di
− k
1− β
n∑
j=1
bj − k − 1
β
P
which is negative for
P >
β(1− β)
k(k − 1)
k(n+ 1)(∑j 6=i dj
3
+
di
2
)
−
n∑
j=1
bj
 := P∗i .
Consequently, the value
P∗ := max
i∈N
P∗i
is the level such that, for any P > P∗, each country's individual welfare decreases as its marginal
contribution to externality increases.
Also in this case, we can prove an analogous assertion on the Banzhaf-Coleman index.
Remark 6.5. In our numerical example we have the following threshold values for P in the two
cases:
Table 6.4: Threshold values
P∗ (low case) P∗ (high case)
USA -1.6667 -1.6485
WEUR -1.6668 -1.6485
Japan -1.6678 -1.6501
CANZ -1.6683 -1.6505
EEFSU -1.6683 -1.6502
China -1.6674 -1.6464
India -1.6682 -1.6498
MOPEC -1.6680 -1.6496
ROW -1.6670 -1.6469
We can note that in our simulation such values are slightly different from one another, and that
given their negativity, the Shapley value and the Banzhaf-Coleman index of all countries decrease
as their marginal contributions to the stock of pollution increase, for all positive levels of P .
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This chapter is divided in two parts: in the first part we introduced the class of extended
cooperative games with negative externality in order to contribute to the modeling of TU-games
in which the coalitional payoff is affected by an undesired and inevitable effect. We showed that
such games may have good properties, such as nonnegativity and convexity. Moreover, we proved
several features for classical concept solutions of cooperative games belonging to this new class.
In the second part the traditional model of emissions reduction game is seen as an application of
the theory elaborated in the first part: in particular we obtained two closed form formulas for the
Shapley value and the Banzhaf-Coleman index. In a concluding numerical simulation we employed
such formulas to calculate the welfare of countries inside the MERGE model.
Taking into account asymmetrical countries, we found that the welfare depends on each country's
specific prerogatives, and the suboptimality of the Banzhaf-Coleman index with respect to the
Shapley value suggests that, the latter is the preferred solution because it is also efficient in core-
sense.
The reduction effect of the individual welfare for higher values of countries' marginal contribu-
tions to the pollution stock suggests that power indices are decreasing functions not just of pollution
but also of the propensity to pollute as soon as pollution outnumbers a certain threshold.
In general, we stress that the theory approached in Section 6.1 can also be exploited to inves-
tigate other kinds of games where players maximize their payoffs while facing a common damage.
Future developments of such findings might concern games either with more complex accumula-
tion dynamics (i.e., nonlinear) or with more than one externality variable, for example introducing
different types of damages for different geographical areas.
Moreover, a deeper discussion on the stability of the computed solution concepts in this frame-
work has still to be entirely developed.
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